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Abstract
As a science and practice dedicated to preventing, stopping, and
reversing negative effects on nature, conservation is constantly faced
with new challenges. Combine this fact with the rise of large, freely
available datasets and computational power, and the result is a need to
advance the methods and conceptual approach to conservation planning.
In my dissertation I present novel methods and address research
questions that aim to keep conservation science and practice relevant
and effective in a changing world. This picture of continual change is
illustrated in Chapter 1, in which I explore how the ongoing collection of
observations of rare species changes spatial conservation priorities. I find
that even after a century of data collection, new records do and will
continue to significantly affect spatial priorities. I then moved to consider
a new threat: the environmental impacts from shale gas surface
infrastructure. I focus on how those environmental impacts may be
partially abated by changing the locations of infrastructure. In Chapter 2
I assess the relative performance of simple guidelines for placing well
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines for shale gas development. I
find that while targeted guidelines can be effective, none are universally
so. In Chapter 3, I examine the site-level tradeoffs between reducing
environmental impacts and increased construction costs for shale gas
surface infrastructure. I find notable heterogeneity among sites in both
the degree to which impacts can be reduced and the relative cost of doing
so. Finally in Chapter 4, I evaluate the cost effectiveness of different
regulations for reducing aggregate impacts from surface infrastructure
across sites and find large gains from trade when implementing a cap
and trade system. Overall, my dissertation facilitates a transition of
knowledge for conservation planning to be able to better adapt to and
cope with the changing world.
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Introduction
Background and Motivation
The world is changing. Change is not new, but the nature of this change
is. Some aspects of this change include new threats to conservation
priorities, an increasingly global scope for problems and decisions, the
integration of conservation practice and human development (Sutherland
et al. 2009; Rands et al. 2010), the increasing availability of large
datasets (Hampton et al. 2013), and increasing computational power.
These changes point to a need for conservation planning as a science and
practice to keep pace by updating.
Conservation resources are limited relative to biodiversity needs
(Waldron et al. 2013), which increases the need for new science to inform
conservation practice now, not in decades when it may be too late.
Sunderland et al. (2009) argue that the well-accepted gap between
conservation science and practice can be partially ameliorated by
increasing the accessibility and relevance of science to practitioners. One
way this has been done in the past decades has been to incorporate
limited budgets into conservation planning (e.g a few from the past year:
Bode et al. 2015; Lentini & Wintle 2015; Boyd, Epanchin-Niell &
Siikamäki 2015). However, conservation can only benefit by further
increasing our commitment to immediately applicable science. Further, it
is increasingly recognized that in order to be relevant, science needs to
reflect the realities of conservation practice (Salafsky et al. 2002). This
means designing science that matches the scales, process, data, and
assumptions of conservation practitioners, sometimes at a cost of
theoretically optimal outcomes.
Increasingly common are the availability and use of large datasets
for science and practice (Hampton et al. 2013), the format and methods
of use of which are important. For instance, the use of range maps or
species distribution models may lead to different planning decisions from
the direct use of presence only point occurrence data (Wilson et al. 2005;
Rondinini et al. 2006). In conservation practice it is common to use point
occurrences in isolation or with modeled distributions. Similarly, the
choice of planning method may significantly affect decisions (Rondinini et
al. 2006; Lentini & Wintle 2015).
We have an increasing need and ability to make decisions at larger
spatial and temporal scales. However, larger scale conservation planning
does not obviate the need to think about smaller scales at high
resolutions. The focus of studies at different scales should be
proportional to the needs of decision makers operating at those scales.
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One aspect of the changing world to be addressed is how the
ongoing collection of biodiversity data is influencing spatial conservation
priorities. Spatial prioritization is prominent in the science (Brooks et al.
2006; Pressey et al. 2007; Watson et al. 2011; Coll et al. 2012; Rainho &
Palmeirim 2013) and practice (Redford et al. 2003; Didier et al. 2009;
Henson et al. 2009; Groves et al. 2012) of conservation. This is due to the
long history of spatial conservation planning methods (Diamond 1975;
Margules & Pressey 2000; Watson et al. 2011), to the recognition that
conservation funding is limited (Ando 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Bottrill et
al. 2008) and to the spatial nature of many conservation decisions
(Pressey et al. 2007). Although several studies exist that look at the
influence of data characteristics on spatial conservation priorities
(Freitag & van Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001; Gladstone & Davis
2003; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003; Grantham et al. 2008; De Ornellas,
Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011), they tend to use snapshots in time or
focus on data weaknesses rather than on the actual use of those
datasets over long time periods. Doing this allows authors to cover a
range of data collection scenarios in order to generalize across many
situations that might be encountered. Equally, however, an argument
can be made for the analysis of longer-term datasets that maintain the
autocorrelated structure of the data over time and reflect how datasets
would be used in practice.
Another aspect of the changing world is the integration of
conservation and development. This change to both activities has some
advantages. Development will continue in places of high conservation
value, so it is in the interest of conservation stakeholders to work with
developers. Also, since conservation is partially anthropocentric, it makes
sense to integrate land use decisions to incorporate multiple competing
objectives, since only by simultaneous planning can tradeoffs be
minimized (Naidoo et al. 2008).
One especially noteworthy example of a context that can benefit
from the integration of conservation and development is shale gas in
Appalachia. Shale gas development has been an increasing source of
environmental and human health concerns in recent years. In the United
States, shale gas production has increased steadily over the past decades
and now makes up ~40% of gas production (Annual Energy Outlook 2014
2014). Concerns have been raised about the environmental (Gillen &
Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and
human health (Perry 2012) effects of shale energy production, leading to
careful consideration of how to protect society and nature from those
effects (Howarth, Ingraffea & Engelder 2011; Hays et al. 2015) and at
times outright bans on development.
2

Terrestrial impacts resulting from the spatial locations of gas
surface infrastructure are an understudied and important issue. Impacts
occur at all stages of the development process, from pre-production
through post-production (Burton et al. 2014). Here I focus exclusively on
pre-production activities and specifically the construction of well pads,
access roads, and gathering pipelines, the impacts of which may play out
at different rates and spatial extents. The magnitudes and types of
impacts change from stage to stage, but it is clear that site construction
incurs the most direct and thus quantifiable land use changes. Below, I
describe some of the impacts resulting from shale gas surface
infrastructure.
In much of the dissertation, I examine how development for shale
gas, a new kind of threat to species and habitats, can be reconfigured to
reduce its potential environmental impacts while still allowing
development to proceed. In doing so, my research builds on a rich history
of conservation biology that focuses on mitigating and moderating
threats from particular industries. For example, my research is
thematically similar to past work on bycatch reduction measures in
fisheries (Crowder & Murawski 1998), especially with regards to the
protection of loggerhead sea turtle populations (Crouse, Crowder &
Caswell 1987; Crowder et al. 1994; Lewison, Freeman & Crowder 2004),
sea birds, and marine mammals (Cox et al. 2007). Another prominent
theme in the fisheries literature comes from observations of the
destruction of seafloors by trawling gear spurred further studies (Graham
1955; Caddy 1973; Wenner 1983; Jones 1992). Examples exist from
other sectors as well. In agriculture, for instance, past studies have
focused on understanding the effects of different practices on bird
diversity with an eye on how to improve diversity around cropland
(Owens & Myres 1973; Best 1983). In forestry, some research has been
concerned with how to best measure the biodiversity outcomes of
different forest management practices (Lindenmayer, Margules & Botkin
2000; Lindenmayer, Franklin & Fischer 2006), whether altered or
managed forests can provide sufficient biodiversity benefits (Hansen et al.
1991), and the ecological effects of different harvesting patterns (Franklin
& Forman 1987).
The Appalachian mountains are highly diverse in species (Stein,
Kutner & Adams 2000), many of which are endemic to the region and/or
sensitive to changes in the environment. As such, the negative
environmental effects of gas infrastructure development are likely to
impact many species and their habitats. Perhaps the most immediate
and clear expected impact from gas development is the displacement of
rare and vulnerable species. Gas development is occurring in fairly
pristine forests (Drohan et al. 2012) and other important habitats,
3

meaning that there is a high chance that infrastructure will destroy the
sensitive habitats or individuals directly in its path.
At the landscape scale, gas infrastructure disrupts forests,
wetlands, and other habitats. Habitat fragmentation is well studied in
ecology and conservation (Margules, Milkovits & Smith 1994; Ranta et al.
1998; Didham et al. 1998; Davies, Margules & Lawrence 2000; Jaeger
2000; Fahrig 2003). The major fragmenting effects of gas infrastructure
act through reduction of core habitat, creation of edges, and reduction of
connectivity. Well pads and their associated infrastructure are regularly
spaced on the landscape, but with little distance between them. This
spatial pattern maximally fragments the landscape by creating many
long edges in core forests and other core habitats (Drohan et al. 2012).
Edges change the light, humidity, wind, sound, temperature, and
other factors at the edge of forests and into their interiors (Saunders,
Hobbs & Margules 1991; Matlack 1993; Forman & Alexander 1998;
Haskell 2000). These edge effects may increase stress on organisms at
the habitat edge (Burke & Nol 1998; Gibbs 1998; Lehtinen, Galatowitsch
& Tester 1999), may facilitate invaders (Cadenasso & Pickett 2001;
Watkins et al. 2003; Pauchard & Alaback 2006), and will alter the future
species composition of communities at the edge and in the interior
(García-Tejero et al. 2013).
In addition to creating edges, gas infrastructure disturbances
reduce habitat connectivity by creating barriers to dispersal and
movement. Some species avoid crossing roads (Rico, Kindlmann &
Sedláček 2007; Shepard et al. 2008), and we might expect similar
responses for well pads and gathering pipelines. When roads or pipelines
cross streams, they change stream flows and may prevent movement upor down-stream (Pépino, Rodríguez & Magnan 2012). These connectivity
issues are especially important for Appalachian species when considered
in the context of climate change, since this region is projected to be very
important for species migrating to track changing conditions (Lawler et
al. 2013).
Infrastructure construction increases soil erosion, which has
negative ecological consequences. Erosion may increase sediment loads
in streams and consequently affect the turbidity, light absorption,
chemistry and temperature of the water column (Reid & Dunne 1984;
Lane & Sheridan 2002). When sediment settles, it can alter the stream
substrate (Boxall & Maltby 1995). Many species are sensitive to small
changes in water and substrate quality (Curry & MacNeill 2004; Cover et
al. 2008). Gas development tends to be concentrated in time and space,
e.g. many well pads, roads, and pipelines are constructed simultaneously
(pers. observation), which will enhance short-term erosion impacts and
could lead to long-term changes in stream biodiversity. Nearer to
4

infrastructure, erosion changes soil qualities (Verity & Anderson 1990; Ni
& Zhang 2007) and may affect which species move in to the disturbed
area after construction is complete.
The combination of drilling technology, energy demand, and desire
for energy independence means that domestic gas development will
continue in the Appalachian region and more broadly for some time.
Since we cannot prevent all gas development, our best chance to avoid
some of the discussed ecological impacts is to alter future development
through improved siting practices.

Chapter Summary
My dissertation is composed of four chapters which aim to advance the
science and practice of conservation planning by providing new solutions
to real world conservation problems as well as concrete
recommendations for how to use my results. The chapters of my
dissertation are motivated by four questions:

Chapter 1: How do new surveys of rare species change our
conservation priorities?
In Chapter 1, I use a long-duration time series of rare-species surveys to
see how a growing dataset changes rankings of watersheds in Tennessee.
The chapter provides some insight into how data used by conservation
practitioners may affect their decisions in data poor, data rich, and nearfuture contexts.

Chapter 2: What are the environmental impact tradeoffs
between four easy-to-implement natural gas surface
infrastructure siting guidelines?
In Chapter 2, I compare negative effects of realistic gas infrastructure
layouts that I create using four siting practices and examine tradeoffs
between impacts within and across siting practices. The results inform
how one strategy used by conservation practitioners – rules of thumb – to
affect gas developer behavior may introduce tradeoffs in future negative
impacts. The results also point to a need to explore how more advanced
conservation planning tools may improve the performance of surface
infrastructure by simultaneously optimizing infrastructure locations to
reduce potential impacts.

5

Chapter 3: What is the cost of reducing environmental impacts
from surface infrastructure at the lease-hold scale?
In Chapter 3, I assess the magnitudes of avoidable impacts from surface
infrastructure in Pennsylvania by using advanced spatial planning
software I created for this task to plan well pad, access road, and
gathering pipeline locations with environmental objectives and monetary
constraints. I find that the cost of reducing impacts varies considerably
across sites, and while impacts at a median site can be reduced upwards
of 40% before costs become prohibitive, a uniform policy applied to this
context may not produce desirable outcomes. The results of this chapter
indicate that larger scale actions to reduce environmental impacts from
shale gas surface infrastructure will perform best when accounting for
heterogeneity across sites.

Chapter 4: How cost-effective are different regulations for
reducing environmental impacts from surface infrastructure?
In my final chapter, I assess the cost effectiveness of multiple policy
options for reducing aggregate impacts across the same set of sites
explored in Chapter 3. I find that a typical uniform, inflexible approach
similar to the median site approach mentioned above would lead to much
higher system-wide costs for a given level of impact avoidance as
compared to a market based, tradable permits approach. These results
provide inside for several decision makers, but especially policy makers
who are tasked with formulating and implementing conservation-oriented
regulations for shale gas development.

6

Chapter 1: Updating conservation priorities
over 111 years of species observations

7

A version of this chapter was originally published by Austin W. Milt, Sally
R. Palmer, and Paul R. Armsworth:
Austin W. Milt, Sally R. Palmer, and Paul R. Armsworth. “Updating
conservation priorities over 111 years of species observations.” Journal of
Applied Ecology 51 (2014): 1515-1524.
Austin Milt performed the secondary data collection, data processing,
analysis, interpretation, and writing for this article. Sally Palmer and
Paul Armsworth contributed intellectually to the design, interpretation,
and revision of the article.

1.1 Abstract
Observations of species occurrences are often used to inform spatial
prioritizations for the effective use of limited conservation resources.
Additional species observations have the potential to change where a
conservation group plans to invest. But by how much? How different
would conservation priorities be if planners updated current observations
with the information they will have next year? We sought to address
these questions using a 111 year dataset that reflects commonly used
collection and prioritization practices. We quantify changes in the
ranking of Tennessee watersheds brought on by annual additions of
species observations made between 1900 and 2010. We ranked
watersheds by their complementary contribution to overall species
richness. We examine the sensitivity of our results to the number of
watersheds prioritized. We expected the effect of new observations to
diminish as the dataset grew, and we found this to be the case.
Importantly, however, additional observations may continue to
significantly change conservation priorities in the future if current data
collection trends continue. We found that, overall, additional
observations can greatly affect priorities and that this result is sensitive
to the number of watersheds ranked. Thus the extent of planning
activities moderates the effect of including additional data. Synthesis and
applications: Long-term, opportunistically collected data of species
locations are commonly used in conservation planning. We find that
when using such data additional species observations significantly affect
subsequent priorities. This effect is most pronounced when data are
sparse. As such, data collection should be a focus of very early
conservation actions in new areas. Even in well-studied areas, however,
additional observations may continue to change spatial priorities into the
future, and so while data collection can decrease in well studied areas, it
should continue at a lower intensity. Our methods could also be used to
8

determine the balance of data collection and conservation action in a new
location.

1.2 Introduction
Spatial prioritization is prominent in the science (Brooks et al. 2006;
Pressey et al. 2007; Watson et al. 2011; Coll et al. 2012; Rainho &
Palmeirim 2013) and practice (Redford et al. 2003; Didier et al. 2009;
Henson et al. 2009; Groves et al. 2012) of conservation. This is due to the
long history of spatial conservation planning methods (Diamond 1975;
Margules & Pressey 2000; Watson et al. 2011), to the recognition that
conservation funding is limited (Ando 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Bottrill et
al. 2008) and to the spatial nature of many conservation decisions
(Pressey et al. 2007). Prioritization methods vary depending on the
conservation goals, expertise and data available to planners. Priorities
may be determined by local species richness or biodiversity uniqueness
(Csuti et al. 1997; Myers et al. 2000), by metrics of threat (Pressey et al.
2007; Joseph, Maloney & Possingham 2009; Carwardine et al. 2012) or
many other factors. This variation in method, along with variation in the
data used in a particular evaluation, can lead to very different decisions
about where, when and how to take action (Wilson et al. 2005; Rondinini
et al. 2006).
Data on species occurrences are commonly used in conservation
prioritization (e.g. Zafra-Calvo et al. 2010; Simaika et al. 2013; Mateo et
al. 2013). Often, such datasets change in extent, resolution, accuracy,
and coverage as more observations are added (e.g. Magurran et al. 2010;
Ahrends et al. 2011; Felinks et al. 2011; Martin, Blossey & Ellis 2012).
Spatial priorities will be affected by data characteristics, such as spatial
resolution (Araujo et al. 2005; Arponen et al. 2012), type (e.g.
presence/absence data vs. abundance data; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003)
and bias (De Ornellas, Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011; Metcalfe et al.
2013). Past studies looking at the effect of changing data on the outcome
of conservation planning have tended to stylize the spatio-temporal
extent and resolution of data used in conservation (Freitag & van
Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001; Felinks et al. 2011) and ignore
the somewhat opportunistic nature of data being used by many
conservation practitioners.
In this paper, we examine how additional species occurrence
records affect spatial conservation priorities. In so doing, we focus on
species-centric conservation approaches, as opposed to focusing on
conservation goals targeting priority habitats or whole ecoregions
(Watson et al. 2011). Tennessee, which we use as a case study, is a
centre of richness for freshwater fish species and molluscs and a region
9

within the coterminous United States of particularly high species
imperilment (Dobson et al. 1997; Stein, Kutner & Adams 2000). We
examine how annual additions of species observations made from 1900
to 2010 would change the ranking of watersheds being prioritized for
conservation action. Specifically, we rank watersheds by complementary
richness. As a conservation objective, complementary richness rewards
watersheds for covering species not found in other protected watersheds
(Vane-Wright, Humphries & Williams 1991). We use a rank correlation
statistic to quantify the change in priorities brought on by an additional
year’s observations. Further, we assess the magnitude, trend, and
consistency of priority changes over time. We examine the sensitivity of
our results to the number of watersheds prioritized. In the Appendix, we
also explore the sensitivity of our results to ranking method, spatial or
taxonomic sampling bias, and changes in data reliability due to changing
technology and organism or population persistence.
The dataset we use is one currently used by conservation planners
in Tennessee. As is often the case with datasets built from historical
occurrence records, this one has been collated in a piecemeal and
somewhat opportunistic fashion. As a result, the dataset suffers from
more spatial, temporal, and taxonomic sampling bias than in systematic
surveys. Arguably, it still represents the best information available to
conservation planners regarding the distribution of priority species in
Tennessee today.
Previous studies with similar methodologies to ours focus on the
effectiveness of conservation outcomes under different data quality and
quantity scenarios (Freitag & van Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001;
Gladstone & Davis 2003; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003; Grantham et al.
2008; De Ornellas, Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011). The general
approach in empirical studies has been to aggregate data over time,
simulate changes to the data (e.g. by subsampling to represent reduced
sampling effort), and to evaluate conservation plans on the altered
dataset (but see Felinks et al. 2011). Doing this allows authors to cover a
range of data collection scenarios in order to generalize across many
situations that might be encountered. These studies conclude that data
quality and quantity are important factors in taking effective
conservation actions, but the details are dataset specific. For example,
Grantham et al. (2009) assess how switching from initial species surveys
to habitat protection affects the long-term coverage and retention of
proteas. They find that for their case study area, a shorter duration of
surveying (~2 years) followed by longer protection is optimal. Their study
has important implications for conservation planning since it indicates
that long-term data collection need not preclude conservation actions.
We complement previous work in many ways. First, we use a much
longer-term dataset spanning 111 years. Second, we build the dataset
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sequentially over the time period rather than subsampling without
regard to time and thus we follow the actual collection of species
observations. As such, our analysis includes the co-variation of data
characteristics over time. Third, our analyses do not rely on the
aggregate dataset as the most accurate knowledge of species
distributions over time. Rather, we focus on describing how changing
knowledge over time affects conservation priorities. Finally, we use raw
species observations as they were recorded rather than modelled data or
controls for data biases. We briefly explore how reducing amongwatershed sampling bias affects our results (see Appendix S1).

1.3 Materials and Methods
1.3.1 Case Study Area
Tennessee is one of the most biodiverse inland states in the U.S., second
only to Alabama in the diversity of freshwater fishes and possessing a
comparatively high degree of species endemism (Stein 2002). Over 10%
of the state’s plant and animal species are considered at-risk, and
Tennessee ranks seventh among all states in the number of documented
extinctions, a fact largely attributed to the major modification of streams
and river systems in the early to mid-20th century (Stein, Kutner &
Adams 2000; Stein 2002). Widespread conversion of lands for
agricultural purposes has also contributed to fundamental changes in
hydrologic regimes in many sub-regions of the state, and excess
nutrients and sedimentation from agricultural production contribute to
degraded water and habitat quality (Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation 2014). Increased urbanization within the
state’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas has resulted in destruction and
fragmentation of terrestrial habitats and degradation of streams and
wetlands.
Local, national and international conservation organizations such
as The Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund have invested in
Tennessee for over 35 years in collaboration with many partners,
including federal agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and
state agencies such as the Tennessee Natural Heritage Program and the
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency. Foundational to this work have
been a series of conservation plans designed at ecoregional scales and
using species occurrence data to set biodiversity conservation goals
(Smith et al. 2002; The Nature Conservancy 2006). Beginning in 2005,
all state wildlife agencies receiving federal State Wildlife Grant funding
were required to submit a Comprehensive Wildlife Conservation Strategy,
more commonly known as a State Wildlife Action Plan. The primary
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emphasis of State Wildlife Action Plans is to improve the habitat and
population conditions of “species of greatest conservation need” as
defined by the state (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency 2005).
Designing and executing these plans has resulted in an increased
emphasis on the use of field-collected species occurrence and habitat
data to identify priority conservation geographies and assess threats to
these areas.

1.3.2 Prioritization Data
We used species observation data collected between 1900 and 2010 by
Tennessee Natural Heritage Program to test how species observations
affect conservation priorities. The Natural Heritage dataset is used in
multiple forms of conservation planning in Tennessee, and the State
Wildlife Action Plan in particular (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency
2005). The 2005 Tennessee State Wildlife Action Plan used these species
occurrence data in combination with NatureServe global and state rarity
rankings, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service federal status listings, and other
available population status data to assign “species of greatest
conservation need” status (SGCN). The species occurrence data have
been used as a key component in mapping local richness to understand
where high SGCN concentrations occur across the state. These same
data have been used to assess the complementarity of larger ecological
units for terrestrial and freshwater species.
The Natural Heritage data are opportunistically recorded point
observations (EOs) of individual species, most of which have a
NatureServe Conservation Status rank higher than S3, and some of
which are regularly monitored (TN Natural Heritage Program, pers.
comm.). Rarely, observations are made as a result of premeditated
prediction and collection efforts (TN Natural Heritage Program, pers.
comm.). Because of the nature of how these data have been collected,
there is no measure of sampling effort embedded in the dataset. The
dataset contains both unique and repeat observations. A unique EO
represents the spatial location, species identity, and date of an
observation of an individual or group. Subsequent observations of the
same individual or group are here called repeat EOs. The dataset
contains 17 586 unique EOs or 25 838 EOs including repeats. Fig. 1.1
shows the number of EOs recorded in each year including repeats. The
dataset contains both terrestrial and aquatic species. The majority of
EOs recorded in the dataset are of plants (15 001 records or 58%),
although the dataset also represents species from 14 other taxonomic
groups recognized under the State Wildlife Action Plan. Approximately
51% of EOs were recorded after 1995.
Conservation organizations often make use of a mix of raw point
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Fig. 1.1. Distribution of element occurrences (EOs) across watersheds and species
over the 111 year period; x-axis is year.(a) Number of new EOs recorded throughout
Tennessee each year broken down by taxonomic groups. An EO is an observed point
location of an individual or population. There are 25,838 EOs in total, with the
majority represented by Plant (15,001 or 58%). (b) and (c) show distributions as
histograms of (b) species occupancies in Tennessee watersheds and (c) watershed
richnesses at 11 time periods.
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observations and interpolated layers or modelled distributions
(NatureServe, pers. comm.; The Nature Conservancy 2006; Schloss et al.
2011; Wilson 2011; Yorkshire Wildlife Trust, pers. comm.). Modelled
data, such as those produced by species distribution models, are
valuable because they estimate the unobserved range of a species and
thus point out potential high-value areas not revealed by raw point
occurrences. Also, species distribution models incur fewer omission
errors and may reduce the effects of spatial sampling bias on
conservation plans (Rondinini et al. 2006). On the other hand, raw point
observations are simple to use and do not suffer as much from
commission errors as species distribution models. Moreover, species
distribution models cannot accurately estimate the ranges of very rare or
under-sampled species (Olden, Jackson & Peres-Neto 2002; Wisz et al.
2008), a particular problem for our dataset and similar contexts, because
most species occur fewer than five times in the data (Fig. 1.1b, year
2010).
We used watersheds from the US Geological Survey HUC-12
Watershed Boundary Dataset (http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov,
accessed 09 May 2013) as our spatial unit of analysis. Watersheds are an
appropriate unit for spatial prioritization in conservation at the state
level when focusing on terrestrial and aquatic species. At this scale,
planners can target particular watersheds for further action. This action
may come in the form of whole-watershed management (e.g. best
practices by all farmers in the watershed), or it may call for more refined
analysis to target protection within the watershed (e.g. protecting stream
headwaters through forested-land conservation). For instance,
watersheds have been used to delineate conservation priorities for known
occurrences of freshwater species in the south-eastern United States
(Smith et al. 2002) and elsewhere (Pryce et al. 2006). Watershed
boundaries are also less changeable than other spatial units like land
parcel boundaries and are therefore fitting for our century-spanning
analysis. Of the 1152 watersheds in Tennessee, 925 have at least one
observation by the Natural Heritage Program by 2010. These 925
watersheds (Fig. 1.2) acted as our candidate sites for selection and have
a median area of 101 km2 (1st quartile = 77 km2, 3rd quartile = 142
km2).

1.3.3 Ranking Watersheds
We explored the situation in which a conservation group aims to
cover as many species across the combined set of priority watersheds,
rather than only the most species rich watersheds. This requires
consideration of how the species assemblages of watersheds complement
one another. To implement this, we ranked watersheds based on their
14

Fig. 1.2. Number of EOs, including repeats, accumulated in each watershed since
1900 at six snapshots in time. Darker colors have a higher density of EOs. For
example, the darkest watershed in 1970 has 155 EOs which it accumulated between
1900 and 1970. Of the 1152 watersheds, 925 have at least one EO by 2010, 695
have ≤ 25 and 56 have ≥ 100.
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frequency in near-optimal solutions to the maximal coverage problem
(MCP; Cabeza & Moilanen 2001). Given a watershed budget (b), the
globally optimum solution to the MCP is the set of b watersheds that
together cover more species than any other set of b watersheds. Solving
the MCP gives a set of watersheds that together perform well as a
conservation strategy. It does not automatically give a means to rank
individual watersheds. However, Pressey, Johnson & Wilson (1994)
introduced the idea of irreplaceability, defined as “the frequency of
occurrence of individual [watersheds] in the range of possible
representative systems.” Irreplaceable watersheds are those that have a
high potential to contribute to the conservation goal under many realized
priority sets. We drew on this concept when deciding how to rank
complementary watersheds.
The algorithm we used to rank watersheds has two parts. In the
first part, we used a genetic algorithm optimizer to choose one set of b
watersheds that maximizes the number of species covered. The difficulty
of the MCP means that the genetic algorithm optimizer guarantees, at
worst, locally optimum solutions. In conservation the local optimality of
solutions can be a strength, because finding many near-optimal
solutions rather than the one best solution lends flexibility to the
decision making process. For a given budget, we ran the genetic
algorithm optimizer 500 times and kept those solutions that achieved ≥
95% of the richness of the best solution. In the second part, we ranked
watersheds by the number of times they appeared across those topscoring solutions (irreplaceability). In total, we examined 11 sensitivity
tests corresponding to 11 watershed budgets (b): 1, 5, 10, 20, …, and 90
watersheds.
In Appendix S1 we also explore the sensitivity of our results to
other ranking methods. Namely, we assess prioritization based on the
local richness of watersheds when ignoring complementarity in order to
explore how sensitive our results are to the particular choice of
conservation objective that we examine. We also assess variations on this
local richness case to the number of watersheds prioritized, controls for
data reliability and a control for sampling bias. All ranking was carried
out in Python v2.5.4.

1.3.4 Measuring Changes in Priorities
We measured by how much additional species observations cause
watershed rankings to change. We used Spearman’s rank correlation
statistic, ρ, to measure the similarity of two different rankings of
candidate watersheds for conservation, where the ranking of watersheds
in a year is based on the observed assemblages of species in those
16

watersheds. Our measure of priority change (V) is the difference between
rankings, or
(

)

We subtract the rank correlation from 1 to ease explanation such that
larger values of V correspond to larger changes in priorities. Because ρ
can take values between -1 and 1, V can vary between 0 and 2. We would
typically expect V to take values between zero – where the rankings are
identical – and one – where the two rankings have no relation to one
another.
Below, we describe the entire process of ranking watersheds and
calculating V with a budget of 10 watersheds:
1. Initialize: Using data from 1900–1909, the genetic algorithm
optimizer chooses 10 watersheds that maximally cover present
species. This is repeated 500 times. Watersheds are ranked by
their frequency in the top 95% of the 500 solutions.
2. Update Records: Add records from the next year. In the first
iteration, we added records from 1910 so that the irreplaceability
and ranking of watersheds in 1910 was based on EOs from 19001910. The ranking in the second iteration (1911) was based on
EOs from 1900-1911, and so on.
3. Rank Watersheds: Repeat Step 1 with the updated dataset from
Step 2.
4. Calculate Vt: Calculate the difference between the rankings
between the current year and previous year as defined above (1 Spearman’s ρ). This gives the magnitude of change in priorities for
the current year. In the first iteration, we get V1910 by comparing
the rankings from 1910 and 1909. In Fig. S 1.2, we summarize the
result of delaying updates of records and priorities.
5. Repeat: Repeat Steps 2–4 through the year 2010, adding the most
recent records for each iteration such that
V1910 = 1-ρ(ranking in 1910, ranking in 1909)
V1911 = 1-ρ(ranking in 1911, ranking in 1910)
⋮
V2010 = 1-ρ(ranking in 2010, ranking in 2009)
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1.3.5 Statistical Analyses
To test if additional data have a significant effect on priorities, we tested
whether the 5% confidence limit (5% CL) about the median of V
contained zero. To calculate the 5% CL, we used bias-corrected
accelerated bootstrapping from 10 000 samples of the same size as the
original sample (usually 101 data points, one from each year within
1910–2010). Bootstrapping was performed in MATLAB r2012b.
We examined trends in priority changes over time or dataset size
using ordinary least squares regression. In this dataset, time and
log10(dataset size) are highly collinear (R2 = 0.99), indicating they cannot
be included in the same regression (Quinn & Keough 2002). Therefore,
we regressed priority changes against time and dataset size separately.
Due to the similarity of results when regressing against time or dataset
size, we focus on regressions in time in the main text (but see Table S 1.3
for dataset size results). We expected changes in priorities to decrease as
we accumulated data. To confirm this, we tested that the 95% confidence
intervals of the slopes of the above regressions are negative.
For some of the watershed budgets, we observed that the data could be
clearly separated into two distinct segments (e.g. Fig. 1.3a,b). Thus, we
created piecewise regressions using the segmented package in R v2.12.1
to further examine the results (Muggeo 2008). The piecewise regression
optimization is sensitive to initial guesses of breakpoints, so we visually
estimated the breakpoints and then used the piecewise model with the
convergence closest to our estimations (Muggeo 2008). For each
sensitivity test, we tested piecewise models with one or two segments and
compared AICc scores to determine which offered the more parsimonious
fit to the data. AICc model comparison explicitly considers the trade-off
between model fit using maximum likelihood and parsimony through the
number of parameters (Crawley 2007).
We also wanted to know if changes in priorities might be sustained
over the near future. This was primarily determined by interpolating the
predicted value of V and its 5% significance in 2010 using the one or
two-segment model chosen by AICc competition. We also extrapolated to
2030 to assess a more distant level of change if current conditions hold.

1.4 Results
We found that spatial conservation priorities are generally sensitive to
additional data and the number of watersheds in which conservation can
take place (Table 1.1: column 2). We also found that the sensitivity of
priorities decreased over time (Table 1.1: columns 4,5; Fig. 1.3a,b), but
that the trend levelled out after some time and the point at which this
occurred depended on the watershed budget (Table 1.1: columns 4,5,6;
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Fig. 1.3. Representative results of ranking watersheds by their frequency in nearoptimal solutions to the Maximal Coverage Problem (MCP; Cabeza & Moilanen 2001).
Solutions to the MCP choose a fixed subset of all watersheds that maximally cover
known species. Conservation priorities are sensitive to additional data, but that
sensitivity declines with a smaller watershed budget and over time and eventually
levels out. Panels (a) and (c) correspond to rankings created by choosing 20
watersheds to solve the MCP; panels (b) and (d) correspond to a 70-watershed
solution. (a), (b) effect of one year of additional element occurrences, from 1910 to
2010. (c), (d) range of species covered by solutions to the MCP. Bottoms and tops of
vertical, lower, black bars are minimum and maximum number of species covered by
solutions to the MCP. Horizontal, higher grey bars are the number of species with at
least one occurrence by that year.
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Fig. 1.3a,b). Finally, we found that additional data may continue to affect
priorities in the future if current collection conditions hold (Table 1.1:
columns 9,10).
Taking two exemplar budgets from those shown in Table 1.1 for
illustrative purposes (20 watersheds and 70 watersheds), Fig. 1.3a,b
illustrates the magnitude of change in priorities over time and Fig. 3c,d
shows the number of species covered over time indicating the
performance of the conservation planning process (see also Fig. S 1.3).In
Fig. 1.3c,d, the lower set of vertical, black bars shows the numbers of
species covered by solutions to the MCP over time. Compare this to the
higher, horizontal, grey bars, which show how many species were known
to occur in Tennessee in that year. The height of the lower bars relative
to the higher bars shows how well the prioritization performed in each
year. A comparison between Fig. 1.3c,d shows that a watershed budget of
70 led to greater coverage of known species than using a lower budget of
20 watersheds. We also assess the performance of prioritizations relative
to the full dataset in Fig. S 1.3.
In the first part of our analysis, we wanted to know if, in general,
one year of additional EOs affects conservation priorities. Provided more
than one watershed is being considered for conservation action, we found
that one year of additional EOs significantly changed the ranking of
watersheds (Table 1.1: second column). Values in the second column of
Table 1.1 reveal the magnitude of overall changes in priorities brought on
by additional EOs, with larger values indicating more change per year of
additional EOs. Note that the overall magnitude of change brought on by
additional EOs increases with the watershed budget (moving down
second column in Table 1.1).
Next, we assessed how changes in priorities changed over time.
Changes in priorities over time were pronounced (Fig. 1.3a,b, Table 1.1,
Fig. S 1.4 maps the spatial changes in priorities through time). The
exemplar budgets shown in Fig. 1.3a,b reveal how large changes in
priorities near the beginning of the time period are followed by a steep
decline earlier and steadier decline later, but differ in how steep that
initial decline is and when it occurs. These differences are quantified in
Table 1.1. The fourth and fifth columns in Table 1.1 show the main
results of our analysis of trends in changing priorities. In eight sensitivity
tests, the degree to which priorities changed with one year of additional
EOs decreased over time (Table 1.1: column 4). In seven of those eight
tests, this result was true in both the first and second time periods
(Table 1.1: columns 4,5).
We also explored in more detail how trends in changing priorities
differed between the first and second time periods in each sensitivity test.
We did this by comparing the values in the fourth and fifth columns of
Table 1.1 and illustrate this in Fig. 1.3a,b. There was support in most
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Table 1.1. Effect of additional data on priorities overall and when regressed against time. Conservation priorities are
sensitive to additional data, but that sensitivity declines with a smaller watershed budget and over time and may level out
in the future. Sensitivity of the ranking method to the number of sites used in the prioritization was tested. Subsequently,
(column 2) the overall magnitude of change brought on by one year of additional element occurrences (EOs) was tested, as
well as (columns 3-8) the trend of changing priorities over time. Finally, the regression models were used to predict the
change in priorities from additional EOs in (column 9) 2010 and (column 10) 2030 if current collection conditions hold.
Sensitivity tests without [slope2] and [break] fields use a one-segment regression

test
med(V)
intercept
slope1
slope2
break
R2
ΔAICc
V2010
V2030
1-watershed
0
5-watersheds
0.14
-1.0
0.6
0.03
2
0.17
0.18
10-watersheds 0.18
0.2
0.6
-0.01 1
0.19
0.19
20-watersheds 0.20
84.6
-43.9
-1.3
1920
0.73
83
0.16
0.13
30-watersheds 0.19
40.4
-20.7
-1.5
1937
0.88
118
0.13
0.10
40-watersheds 0.22
37.9
-19.4
-1.3
1944
0.94
165
0.14
0.12
50-watersheds 0.21
35.0
-17.8
-0.9
1954
0.97
199
0.14
0.12
60-watersheds 0.20
29.8
-15.1
-0.1
1965
0.98
203
0.14
0.14
70-watersheds 0.31
27.6
-13.9
-1.7
1971
0.98
177
0.09
0.06
80-watersheds 0.37
24.9
-12.5
-2.0
1977
0.99
173
0.08
0.04
90-watersheds 0.40
23.8
-12.0
-2.3
1978
0.99
146
0.09
0.05
Table columns are [med(V)] = median of V across all years; [intercept] = model intercept; [slope1(2)] =
slope of the first (second) segment in V ∙ yr-1 ∙ 10-3; [break] = breakpoint (year) of the two segments; [R2]
= adjusted R2; [ΔAICc] = ΔAICc of the piecewise model not chosen.; [V2010] = predicted value of V in
2010; [V2030] = predicted value of V in 2030
Values in bold are significant at the 95% confidence level.
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cases for distinguishing the two time periods evident in each sensitivity
test, as can be seen in Fig. 1.3a,b and tested by AICc competition in
column eight in Table 1.1. When using a watershed budget larger than
10, there was a larger negative trend in changing priorities in the earlier
time period than the later (Fig. 1.3a,b, Table 1.1: columns 4,5). Last, as
we increased the watershed budget, the changing effect of additional EOs
on priorities decreased more gradually in the first time period (moving
down fourth column in Table 1.1).
Finally, we tested if the continuing change in priorities apparent in
Fig. 1.3a,b might continue into the future if data collection conditions
persist. The results of this analysis can be seen in the last two columns
of Table 1.1. Bold values in the last two columns of Table 1.1 reveal that
under several sensitivity tests we expect additional EOs to continue to
affect priorities if collection conditions persist. For instance, when we
used a watershed budget of 60, we predicted an effect of one year of EOs
in both 2010 and 2030. Contrarily, in four cases additional EOs affected
priorities in 2010 (Table 1.1: column 9) but are not predicted to do so in
2030 (Table 1.1: last column). The even split in the results of this part of
our analysis, along with the fact that we performed extrapolation, makes
it unclear how common the continuing effect of additional EOs will be in
the future for our study system.
In Appendix S1 we describe results for other sensitivity tests
including our choice of conservation objective and controls for data
reliability and sampling bias.

1.5 Discussion
How do additional observations of species change spatial conservation
priorities? The importance of this question should be evident by the
growing spatial prioritization literature (Kukkala & Moilanen 2013) as
well as the ongoing use of opportunistically collected element
occurrences (EOs) for prioritization. We addressed this question by
examining how the ranking of watersheds in the U.S. state of Tennessee
changed as species observations were recorded over the past century. We
ranked watersheds by their complementary contribution to conserving
species richness and assessed how our results were affected by the
number of watersheds considered for conservation action. Our methods
and results can give insight into state-level prioritizations for watershed
actions that focus on across-watershed complementary richness, to
areas early in data collection and to those with a long history of species
observations.
Perhaps our most important finding is that when additional data
have a significant effect on priorities in 2010, additional data are also
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likely (54% of cases) to have a significant effect in the future if data
collection conditions hold. Because our complementarity analysis uses
species identities to determine priorities, small additions of infrequently
occurring species have a larger effect on priorities than when prioritizing
by local species richness only (e.g. Appendix S1), and we expect this to
persist in the future as long as data collection conditions continue.
Another key take-home message from our analysis is that
additional observations tended to have a decreasing effect on priorities as
we amassed data. While this phenomenon is well documented in studies
focusing on the accuracy of prioritizations (Grantham et al. 2008), we
offer a novel data context and explanation for why this occurs. The
causal mechanism is due to the complementarity goal we used:
additional observations increased the evenness of assemblages across
watersheds, lowering the probability that one more observation in a
watershed made that watershed necessary for a high-richness solution.
Our results have multiple competing consequences for
conservation. In cases similar to ours, new observations may continue to
significantly determine current spatial priorities and thus should be
collected for that purpose. At the same time, current prioritizations will
not necessarily match those for next year, so we do not expect additional
observations to determine, on their own, long-term priorities. Our results
also suggest that initial observations in data-poor regions will have the
greatest effect on determining priorities. Subsequent observations then
serve to refine those priorities. Finally, we found that our results were
sensitive to conservation goals and to controls for data reliability and
sampling bias (Appendix S1). Specifically, when ranking by local
richness, the degree of decrease in priority changes over time was
smaller as was the overall magnitude. Similarly, when ranking by local
richness, future priorities are only expected to be affected by additional
EOs when using a low tolerance for data reliability. The weaker effect of
additional EOs on priorities when ranking by local richness is because
the local richness objective ignores what is unique about different
watersheds and thus misses influential variation in the data. Taking our
results in aggregate, we suggest that the most effort in species
observation be put forth early when a conservation group enters a new
area. However, species observations should not cease since new
observations will help refine priorities and update them as conditions
change. In locations other than Tennessee, we expect similar patterns.
The time in the collection record at which the qualitative shift from large
changes in priorities with a rapid decrease in changes to smaller, but
persistent changes in priorities – characterized in Fig. 1.3a,b – will
depend on the conservation context. Managers in other locations could
therefore use an analysis such as ours to determine the balance of data
collection and conservation actions over time.
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Measures of performance of conservation plans enable decision
makers to assess whether more information is needed before acting
(Polasky & Solow 2001), what management actions to take (Walters &
Hilborn 1978), and to rank methods for creating new plans (Grantham et
al. 2010). While we did focus on differences between priorities over time,
the number of species covered by choices of watersheds for conservation
drove the prioritization process (Fig. 3c,d, Fig. S 1.3). As such, our
analysis is most similar to passive adaptive management (Walters &
Hilborn 1978; Williams 2011), in that the decisions we make are refined
as we gain information, but differs in that we do not assume that choices
in one year affect those in the next year.
We necessarily made several decisions that may have affected our
results. First, priorities were updated annually, which may partially
explain small priority changes overall. Longer update periods increase
the median change in priorities (Fig. S 1.2). Second, we chose to use raw
point occurrences rather than modelled data to prioritize watersheds. As
a result, conservation actions focusing on the highest priority watersheds
in any one year would be under-representative of potentially important
areas (Rondinini et al. 2006). Aims to create comprehensive conservation
plans should, when possible, use a mix of raw point occurrences and
modelled data (Rondinini et al. 2006). That being said, we anticipate
many of the effects we find will carry over to cases where practitioners
are combining the two data types. Third, our ranking method used two
pieces of information to come up with relative rankings of watersheds:
the spatial locations and species identities of EOs. This was done
intentionally so we could directly relate changes in species observations
to changes in priorities. Additional information would increase the direct
applicability of our results to Tennessee. For instance, the costs and
patterns of land use change and management over time would have
made apparent in priority setting the trade-off of these factors with
species coverage. We could have also chosen to base our analyses on the
un-ranked irreplaceabilities or local richnesses of watersheds rather than
transforming to ranks first. Our assumption was that all decision
variables required for a ranking of watersheds were encompassed in their
irreplaceabilities and thus keeping additional information was
unnecessary. In reality, conservation actions will rely on relationships
among players, detailed site histories, short-term opportunity, and other
such information which is rarely recorded over such long time-spans.
Finally, our statistical choices affect the inferences that can be drawn
from our analyses. For example, the change in priorities in one year was
calculated on two watershed rankings whose datasets overlapped
substantially, and the overlap grew over time. Therefore, each ranking
was not independent of the earlier rankings. As such, particular
significance levels should be interpreted cautiously.
24

Prioritization is a common and necessary part of conservation
planning. Here, we have provided insight into how regular updating of
priorities is affected by additional data. Unlike previous studies, our
study used a conservation-relevant dataset that spans 111 years, which
enabled us to explore long-term trends others could not. Additionally, we
used simple prioritizations that did not account for data weaknesses. As
such, our results may reflect practice more closely than other studies.
Our results suggest that conservation planners can expect additional
observations to alter priorities when conservation goals are
complementarity-based.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Appendix S1. Additional sensitivity tests.
To examine how the choice of conservation objective affected our results,
we present variations to the complementarity-based analyses in the main
text. These additional tests are based on the local species richness of
sites; we thus name the ranking method and related sensitivity tests as
Local Richness sensitivity tests. As with the complementarity case, there
are multiple ways to construct sensitivity tests. Within the Local Richness
ranking method are variations on the number of watersheds prioritized, a
control for sampling bias, and controls for data reliability.
Note, Fig. S1, S2, S3 and S4 are all separate from the Local
Richness sensitivity tests and supplement the main text on
complementarity based ranking.

1.6.2 Ranking Watersheds by Local Species Richness
1.6.2.1 Local Richness
We first ranked all 925 watersheds by the number of unique species
found within each watershed regardless of the abundance of that
species. This is our base case for the Local Richness ranking method and
we call it 925-watersheds (Table S 1.1).
1.6.2.2 Number of Watersheds
We also looked at sensitivity tests with fewer watersheds and did so for
two reasons. First, the number of watersheds affects the size of the
dataset in any one year and consequently the relative contribution of one
year’s data to the current ranking of watersheds. Second, the
distribution of EOs across any one subset of watersheds may be
substantially different from the entire distribution and could
consequently alter the effect of new observations on priorities. To come
up with a subset of watersheds, we simulated a conservation plan in
which only the most species-rich places are ever considered for
conservation (Williams et al. 1996). We chose three subsets of
watersheds from the total set of 925. We chose watersheds based on the
worst ranking they achieved in the base case just described, such that
we were left with close to 5, 50 and 100 watersheds. We used the 4, 48
and 93 watersheds that ever achieved, at worst, a rank of 1.5, 12.5 and
22.0, respectively in Local Richness: 925-watersheds.
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Table S 1.1. Detailed list of sensitivity tests performed for the (1) Local Richness
ranking method, in which watersheds were ranked by their unique species richness.
Sensitivity of the ranking method to (2) the number of sites used in the prioritization
process, (3) sampling bias, and (4) data reliability, was tested.

Code
(1) 925-watersheds
(2) 4-, 48-, 93watersheds
(3) control-bias
(3) no-control-bias
(4) 1-, 2-, 10-, 25-,
50-year

Description
all watersheds (n = 925)
4, 48 and 93 best-ranked watersheds from 925watersheds
85 watersheds with at least 50 records by 2010,
using rarefied datasets
85 watersheds from control-bias without
controlling for sampling bias
Data older than 1, 2, 10, 25 and 50 years are
discarded

1.6.2.3 Sampling Bias
In the above four scenarios, the data are not standardized by sampling
effort. Heterogeneous sampling effort could bias estimates of the relative
richness of watersheds (Walther et al. 1995) and would consequently
reduce the extent to which additional data change priorities. To explore
the sensitivity of our results to spatial and taxonomic sampling bias, we
performed rarefaction by systematically subsampling records in a subset
of watersheds and repeating the prior analysis (Gotelli & Colwell 2001).
Because many watersheds in our dataset have too few records to perform
rarefaction effectively, we chose to look at only those watersheds (n = 85)
which have at least 50 unique records by 2010. We started with the data
for those 85 watersheds over the entire 111 year period. From these data,
we chose 50 unique EOs from each watershed to create a rarefied dataset
with 4250 unique EOs. These were used to rank watersheds by richness
as we did before. We repeated this process 1000 times, creating 1000
rarefied datasets, each with a new choice of 50 EOs from each
watershed. Statistics were then averaged over all 1000 repeats. Finally,
to make direct comparisons between the rarefied datasets and the
original dataset, we performed the same ranking with the full set of data
(each watershed had at least 50 unique EOs) from the 85 watersheds
chosen for the rarefaction process.
1.6.2.4 Data Reliability
Observations made very early in the data record may be less reliable
indicators of current presences of species than observations made more
recently. This happens because technology improves, individuals and
populations die and move, and entire species ranges shift. As such, a
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conservation group may choose to weight early EOs differently to more
recent ones. To examine the sensitivity of our results to this practice, we
removed old data while repeating the same ranking exercises. We
considered five sensitivity tests which vary by their tolerance for data
age. In the strictest test, only the most recent year’s data are kept. For
instance, in 1950 we assumed that the only relevant data were those
collected in 1950. In 1951, we used only the data from 1951, and so on.
We call this the 1-year test (Table S 1.1). In the most lenient test, we kept
all data, regardless of age. This test is the same as Local Richness: 925watersheds. The other tests kept the most recent 2, 10, 25 and 50 years
of data. Other than removing old data from the dataset, the ranking
process was the same as before.
1.6.2.5 Statistics for the Local Richness tests
All values of V from Local Species Richness sensitivity tests (Table S 1.1)
were arcsine transformed to increase the normality of regression
residuals. We found that V almost never exceeded 1. In the few cases this
occurred – 16 data points from Local Species Richness: 1-year (85 data
points) and 3 data points from 2-year (98 data points) – we withheld
those data points to satisfy the upper bound of the arcsine transform.
Finally, we did not perform piecewise regressions for Local Richness
sensitivity tests because they did not show two distinct periods.

1.6.3 Results for the Local Richness Tests
1.6.3.1 Overall Results
For any one sensitivity test, one year of additional element occurrences
(EOs) significantly changed the ranking of watersheds (Table S 1.2:
column 2). This was true for all sensitivity tests except the 4-watershed
test for which sequential rankings were usually identical. Further, the
overall magnitude of change brought on by additional observations grew
with the number of watersheds prioritized (moving down column 2 in
Table S 1.2). Of the ten sensitivity tests for which we assessed priority
changes over time, nine showed a decreasing effect of additional EOs
over time.
1.6.3.2 Number of Watersheds
Reducing the number of watersheds ranked by local richness reduced
the overall effect of additional EOs on priorities (Table S 1.2: column 2),
but had little other effect on the results (Table S 1.2). When we reduced
the number of watersheds being ranked to 4, there was a qualitative
change in priority changes over time (Table S 1.2).
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Table S 1.2. Effect of additional data on priorities and when regressed against time for (1) Local Richness sensitivity tests.
Sensitivity of the ranking method to (2) the number of sites used in the prioritization process, (3) sampling bias, and (4) data
reliability, was tested. Subsequently, (5) the overall magnitude of change brought on by one year of additional element
occurrences (EOs) was tested, as well as (6) the change in that value over time. Finally, the regression model used to create (6)
was used to predict the change in priorities from additional EOs in (7) 2010 and (8) 2030 if current collection conditions hold.

5. med(V)

intercept

6. slope

R2

7. V2010

8. V2030

0.13

2.1

-1.0

0.20

0.08

0.06

2. Number of
Watersheds
4-watersheds
48-watersheds
93-watersheds

0
0.07
0.08

1.9
2.5

-0.9
-1.2

0.09
0.21

0.05
0.04

0.03
0.02

3. Sampling Bias
no-control-bias
control-bias

0.01
0.11

2.9
1.0

-1.5
-0.5

0.22
0.02

-0.01
0.10

-0.03
0.09

test
1. Local Richness
925-watersheds

4. Data Reliability
1-year
1.07
4.9
-2.0
0.07
0.98
0.94
2-year
0.65
2.8
-1.1
0.05
0.62
0.59
10-year
0.26
2.2
-0.9
0.13
0.22
0.20
25-year
0.16
1.4
-0.6
0.07
0.14
0.12
50-year
0.13
1.7
-0.8
0.15
0.10
0.08
Table columns are [med(V)] = median of V across all years; [intercept] = model intercept; [slope] = slope of the
regression in V ∙ yr-1 ∙ 10-3; [R2] = adjusted R2; [V2010] = predicted value of V in 2010; [V2030] = predicted value of V in
2030
Values in bold are significant at the 5% confidence level.

29

1.6.3.3 Sampling Bias
Controlling for sampling bias had two notable effects on the results.
First, there was a large increase in the overall effect of one year of EOs on
priorities (Table S 1.2: column 2). Second, controlling for sampling bias
erased the negative trend in changing priorities over time (Table S 1.2:
column 4).
1.6.3.4 Data Reliability
Removing data older than some age produced more qualitative and
quantitative changes than any other Local Richness sensitivity test. First,
a low tolerance for data age produced the largest increase in the overall
effect of additional EOs (Table S 1.2: column 2). This effect was lost by
the time we allowed for data up to 50 years old since at that point most
data were being kept. Second, controlling for data reliability led to
stronger declines in the effect of additional EOs, though this was more of
a quantitative result (Table S 1.2: column 2) and the result is not
apparent inTable S 1.2. Finally, controlling for data reliability may
increase the overall effect of additional data on priorities enough to
maintain that effect into the future (Table S 1.2: last two columns).
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Fig. S 1.1. Figures showing V plotted against time for all sensitivity tests. See main text
and Table S 1.1 for test definitions
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Fig. S 1.1 Continued
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Fig. S 1.1 Continued
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Fig. S 1.2. Changes in priorities over time when budgeting 70 watersheds for
complementarity as the length of delay between priority updates changes. top panel
Each line represents a different update period between 1 and 101 years. The bottom
blue line is the same as 70-watersheds in the main text where we update priorities
annually. Higher lines use increasingly longer delays between updating priorities. For
instance, the blue line labeled “15” represents the situation where we reassess priorities
every 15 years. Intervals of 5-year update periods are labeled with colored numbers.
bottom panel Median (point), 25% and 75% quartile (error-bars) of the lines in the top
panel. Larger update periods have too few points to have an IQR.
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Fig. S 1.3. Performance of conservation prioritizations as element occurrences (EOs)
accumulate over time. The measure of performance is the proportion of species with at
least one occurrence in Tennessee in (a) the current year or (b) 2010 that were covered
by solutions to the Maximal Coverage Problem (MCP). The bottoms and tops of vertical
bars correspond to the minimum and maximum proportions of species covered,
respectively. For instance, the blue bar at 1910 in (a), which corresponds to a
watershed budget of 10, shows that solutions to the MCP covered ~73-79% of species
known to occur in Tennessee in 1910. Note that the ranges of some watershed budgets
are partially hidden due to plotting multiple budgets on one figure. The range is always
narrow since we kept only the top 5% performing solutions to the MCP.
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Fig. S 1.4. Spatial distribution of watershed (top) irreplaceabilities and (bottom)
richnesses at six snapshots in time. (top) Irreplaceabilities come from the sensitivity test
where we choose 70 watersheds to solve the Maximal Coverage Problem and represent
the proportion of a sample of near-optimal solutions in which a watershed occurred.
The solution to the Maximal Coverage Problem in each year is based on the assemblage
of species accumulated in each watershed since 1900 (see main text for details).
(bottom) Richnesses are the number of unique species accumulated in that watershed
since 1900.
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Table S 1.3. Overall effect of additional data on priorities and when regressed against
log10(size of dataset). Sensitivity of the ranking method to the number of sites used in
the prioritization was tested. Subsequently, (column 2) the overall magnitude of
change brought on by one year of additional element occurrences (EOs) was tested, as
well as (columns 3-8) the trend of changing priorities as the dataset grew. Sensitivity
tests without [slope2] and [break] fields use a one-segment regression. Values of V were
natural logarithm transformed for Local Richness tests.

test
Comp.
Richness
1-watershed
5-watersheds
10-watersheds
20-watersheds
30-watersheds
40-watersheds
50-watersheds
60-watersheds
70-watersheds
80-watersheds
90-watersheds
Local Richness
4-watersheds
48-watersheds
93-watersheds
925watersheds
no-control-bias
control-bias
1-year
2-year
10-year
25-year
50-year

med(V)

intercept

slope1

slope2

break

R2

ΔAICc

0
0.14
0.18
0.20
0.19
0.22
0.21
0.20
0.31
0.37
0.40

0.04
0.54
-2.18
2.02
2.11
1.77
1.87
1.84
1.84
1.74

-0.21
1.34
-0.80
-0.75
-0.53
-0.52
-0.49
-0.47
-0.42
-0.41

0.03
-0.02
-0.04
-0.07
-0.05
-0.05
+0.00
-0.08
-0.05
-0.08

2.12
1.79
2.12
2.49
2.93
3.18
3.49
3.60
3.83
3.84

0.04
0.10
0.73
0.91
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.96
0.97
0.97

0
10
80
127
154
143
136
80
55
49

0
0.07
0.08

0.21
0.25

-0.03
-0.05

-

-

0.10
0.20

-

0.13
0.01
0.11
1.07
0.65
0.26
0.16
0.13

0.24
0.24
0.18
1.31
0.79
0.39
0.23
0.23

-0.03
-0.05
-0.02
-0.07
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
-0.03

-

-

0.17
0.21
0.02
0.06
0.04
0.13
0.06
0.12

-
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Chapter 2: Synergies and tradeoffs among
environmental impacts under conservation
planning of shale gas surface infrastructure
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2.1 Abstract
Hydraulic fracturing and related ground water issues are growing
features in public discourse. Few have given as much attention to
surface impacts from shale gas development that result from building
necessary surface infrastructure. One way to reduce future impacts from
gas surface development without radically changing industry practice is
by formulating simple, conservation-oriented planning guidelines. We
explore how four such guidelines affect the locations of well pads, access
roads, and gathering pipelines on state lands in Pennsylvania. Our four
guidelines aim to (1) reduce impacts on water, reduce impacts from (2)
gathering pipelines and (3) access roads, and (4) reduce impacts on
forests. We assessed whether the use of such guidelines accompanies
tradeoffs among impacts, and if any guidelines perform better than
others at avoiding impacts. We find that impacts are mostly synergistic,
such that avoiding one impact will result in avoiding others. However, we
found that avoiding forest fragmentation may result in increased impacts
on other environmental features. We also found that single simple
planning guidelines can be effective in targeted situations, but no one
guideline was universally best at avoiding all impacts. As such, we
suggest that when multiple environmental features are important in an
area, more comprehensive planning strategies and tools should be used.

2.2 Introduction
High-volume hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling combined with
higher gas prices in the late 2000s led to the boom of shale gas
development in the eastern United States. Hydrofracking is the highpressure pumping of water and sand to break shale and release gas.
Horizontal drilling allows multiple wells to be drilled laterally from a
location rather than a single well. In Central Appalachia, especially West
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Fig. 2.1. Well pads (rectangular clearings), access roads (linear clearings in bottomright), and gathering pipelines (other linear clearings) pose many impacts on habitats
in the Marcellus formation, including forest and wetland loss and fragmentation,
displacement of species of conservation concern, erosion, and freshwater
sedimentation and fragmentation. Courtesy of M. Godfrey, The Nature Conservancy.

Virginia and Pennsylvania, U.S.A., where we illustrate a case study, over
14,000 horizontal well permits have been granted since 2008. Many of
these (~60%) have yet to be drilled (West Virginia TAGIS Unit 2014;
Whitacre 2014), and many additional permits and wells are expected
(Evans & Kiesecker 2014). Development of worldwide shale gas reserves
(U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013) and accompanying
surface infrastructure (Fig. 2.1) should raise concerns about associated
environmental impacts. Since much of the potential gas development has
not been realized, there are still significant opportunities to reduce future
impacts through careful planning.
Terrestrial impacts resulting from the spatial locations of gas
surface infrastructure are an understudied and important issue. Impacts
occur at all stages of the development process, from pre-production
through post-production (Burton et al. 2014). Here we focus exclusively
on pre-production activities and specifically the construction of well
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines, the impacts of which may
play out at different rates and spatial extents. The magnitudes and types
of impacts change from stage to stage, but it is clear that site
construction incurs the most direct and thus quantifiable land use
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changes, which here are our focus. To date, most attention has been
given to groundwater, surface water, and air quality (Howarth, Ingraffea
& Engelder 2011; Entrekin et al. 2011; Clark et al. 2012; Smith et al.
2012; Olmstead et al. 2013). Attention to surface impacts has been less
common, but is growing (Johnson et al. 2010; Davis & Robinson 2012;
Slonecker et al. 2012; Drohan et al. 2012; Evans & Kiesecker 2014).
Because the Marcellus shale formation is roughly uniform within a
development site (Fig. S 2.1 in Appendix) and because horizontal drilling
allows for many wells per pad, shale gas surface infrastructure in the
Appalachian region can be evenly spaced and of low density. As such,
terrestrial impacts from surface infrastructure are similar to low-density,
rural housing development. Like houses, well pads are spaced hundreds
of meters apart and connected by gravel roads (Fig. 2.1). Pipeline
corridors are similar in width and surface maintenance requirements to
underground electric transmission corridors. During construction,
drilling, and hydraulic fracturing, gas development may have much
larger cumulative impacts than other types of development because of
high-traffic trucking of materials, the size of temporary well pad staging
areas, and the intensity of drilling noise and light.
Much of shale gas development is occurring in areas of high
biological diversity (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013). In the Central
Appalachian region, especially Pennsylvania, there are large areas of
relatively intact forest on protected and unprotected lands. As of late
2013, 32% of state-owned public land area in Pennsylvania host well
permits (Whitacre 2014). More development is occurring on private,
unprotected lands, much of which have high conservation value (Robles
et al. 2008). At lease-hold and larger scales, the spatial configuration of
gas surface infrastructure may greatly fragment forests (Slonecker et al.
2012; Drohan et al. 2012; Racicot et al. 2014). Stream crossings for
roads and pipelines may reduce stream connectivity and increase
sediment delivery and risk of spills to streams. The construction of
surface infrastructure disturbs soils, which changes local topography
and may lead to increased erosion. When erosion and sedimentation
controls are inadequate or fail, runoff can increase sedimentation in
streams. In the event of hazardous waste spills, soils and streams may
be contaminated and experience large die-offs of biota (Lustgarten 2009;
Detrow 2012). For more details on potential environmental impacts of
shale gas surface infrastructure, see Gillen and Kiviat (2012), Slonecker
et al. (2012), Kiviat (2013) and others.
In this paper we explore how multiple environmental impacts are
associated with one another in shale gas infrastructure development. We
specifically focus on using simple practices to plan well pads, access
roads, and gathering pipelines, and we also assess the relative
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effectiveness of our planning practices at avoiding impacts. Simple
planning practices, which focus on achieving one or a few goals, may
help developers incorporate additional environmental objectives into
surface development without having to radically change practices.
However, there is the risk that following simple practices will exacerbate
tradeoffs among multiple environmental objectives since simple practices
must be, by definition, narrowly defined. We use the Marcellus shale play
in Pennsylvania as a case study. We planned well pad footprint locations,
access road routes and gathering pipeline routes for twenty state forests
and game lands, where shale gas development could occur. We
attempted to follow the same planning steps in the order the gas industry
uses and adhered to construction constraints imposed by state laws and
development practices (Appendix). For each development site, we created
four infrastructure layouts corresponding to four simple siting practices.
For each infrastructure layout, we computed eight impact metrics that
reflect the conservation objectives of stakeholders in the region. We
looked for synergies and tradeoffs among impacts, i.e. whether some
impacts were positively or negatively correlated. We also assessed
whether some of our planning practices performed better than the others
for some impacts, i.e. an impact metric was significantly lower when
using one practice versus the others.
Similar articles have focused on the hydraulic fracturing process
(Kargbo, Wilhelm & Campbell 2010) at relatively small scales (Slonecker
et al. 2012). Racicot et al. (2014) undertook a similar planning exercise
in which they planned well pads, access roads, and pipelines for a small
region in Quebec, Canada. They looked at the potential impacts of
surface infrastructure under various regulatory constraints, focusing on
impacts with, versus without, additional ecological restrictions. Racicot
et al. (2014) also analyzed the extent to which fairly simple ways of
affecting development patterns in turn affected potential environmental
impacts of that development. Our paper is novel in several ways. First,
we look at impacts on a larger suite of environmental and human
features, choosing to explore the broad spectrum of potential impacts
since features will vary in importance from place to place. Second, we
assess the synergies and tradeoffs among our suite of impacts and
explore how our findings may affect more general planning of gas
infrastructure. Third, we look at impacts over a large spatial extent,
which may allow us to draw more general conclusions for the greater
Appalachian region. Finally, we assess the relative effectiveness of simple
planning practices across the suite of metrics, enabling us to see how
simple practices may target one or several impacts.
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2.3 Methods and Materials
2.3.1 Shale Energy Industry Reference
In planning surface infrastructure within our study sites, we attempted
to follow the planning practices of the shale energy industry. Our main
contact was Triana Energy, LLC, which is a privately held oil and gas
exploration and production company based in Charleston, West Virginia,
USA and operating in both West Virginia and Pennsylvania. We used
Triana’s experience with shale energy development to inform the
dimensions of production units, construction limits such as road grades,
and surface infrastructure planning more generally.

2.3.2 Study Site Selection
We chose twenty case study sites from the 319 State Forests, State
Parks, and State Game Lands underlain by Marcellus Shale in
Pennsylvania (Fig. 2.2). Selection of study sites was done independently
of current development status, severed mineral ownership, and the
probability of future shale development. We chose Pennsylvania state
lands as study sites for a few reasons. First, these public lands are
managed by the state and are large tracts of consolidated land, which
makes large-scale planning for multiple pads and thus potential gains
from our study larger than in other areas. At the same time, mineral
rights are severed from surface ownership on some public lands in
Pennsylvania, which means that shale gas development can and is
occurring on these lands. In areas with intact surface and subsurface
ownership, some state forest lands and state game lands have also been
leased for shale gas development. Finally, we chose to use highly forested
public lands in a state with a large forest system because we wanted to
highlight the potential impacts on relatively intact terrestrial habitats.
State lands were first buffered by 100 m to remove small gaps
between otherwise contiguous lands. We then combined any buffered
lands that overlapped. We reduced our set of lands to those that could
support between one and five full-size production units. A production
unit is not physical infrastructure, but represents the area drained of gas
by the wells of a single well pad (Fig. S 2.1). To reduce the set of lands,
we first reduced the set of combined lands to those between 3 km2 and
30 km2 (n=216). Next, we maximally covered each buffered land with 914
⨉ 3352-m (3000 ⨉ 11,000-ft) production units rotated 27° (Triana
Energy, LLC pers. comm.); the size of the production units is based on an
assumption of 6 wells per pad. We considered a production unit
economically feasible if at least 90% of its area was within the buffered
land. Production unit placement was done visually and by hand. We
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categorized the buffered lands into one of five size classes by the number
of full-size production units we estimated they would support. Finally, we
chose at random four buffered lands from each size class as our study
sites. We note that the number of production units we visually estimated
would fit in each buffered land is usually smaller than the total number
we later placed when implementing our four siting practices. All GIS
analysis was done in ArcMap 10.1 (ESRI).
Cultural features were mapped using 2008 National Agricultural
Imagery Program aerial images. All non-industrial cultural features, such
as homes, agricultural buildings, retail businesses, and recreational
fields overlapping the 20 chosen sites were mapped with free-hand drawn
polygons. These were used to calculate distance to cultural features
within the study sites.

Fig. 2.2. (large map) Pennsylvania State Forests, State Parks, and State Game Lands
(green or darker gray) within the Marcellus gas formation (beige or lighter gray) serve
as candidate lease areas from which we chose twenty public lands (black outlines)
for our analysis. We chose to use state lands that could support one to five full-size
production units after buffering individual lands and combining overlapping lands.
(small maps) chosen sites with numbers corresponding to large map and site areas
in km2.

2.3.3 Siting Practices
We chose to use four siting practices that are easy to understand, easy to
implement, and that we expected to differentially achieve conservation
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goals. Our four siting practices are 1) site pads close to roads to reduce
the impacts of access roads, 2) site pads close to pipelines to reduce the
impacts of gathering pipelines, 3) site infrastructure away from water to
reduce risks to aquatic systems, and 4) site infrastructure in disturbed
areas to reduce impacts on intact habitats. We sited infrastructure four
times at each study site, once per siting practice. In addition to following
these practices, we adhered to existing regulatory and construction
constraints (Appendix). We also attempted to follow existing industry
planning practices, which are to site well pads/production units first,
then to select routes for access roads and gathering pipelines (Triana
Energy, LLC, pers. comm.).
Before implementing a siting practice, we placed production units
to maximally cover the study site. We started by placing full-size
production units in the manner described in Study Site Selection. We
then placed half-size production units in the same fashion. There is
subjectivity in exactly where production units are placed, but we expect a
human will find the maximum number of production units and nearoptimal locations.
Next, well pads were placed within pad envelopes in the production
units. A pad envelope is a smaller area within a static production unit
that represents potential locations for a well pad while still draining the
production unit (Fig. S 2.1). Moving the pad within its envelope changes
the routes of wells. In a full-size production unit, the pad envelopes are
1524 ⨉ 122 m. In a half-size production unit, pad envelopes are 122 ⨉
122 m. After restricting ourselves to the pad envelopes, we sited pad
points (at the center of a raster pixel) to primarily adhere to the given
siting practice. Secondarily, well pads were placed to center on the
envelopes (or one envelope in the half-sized production unit), which
reflects the developer practice of making all lateral wells close to a
desired length (Triana Energy, LLC pers. comm.). Finally, if there were
still options (especially in the case of half-production units) we put the
well pads in the location closest to the nearest pad (siting done by visual
inspection). We also adhere to Pennsylvania regulatory setbacks for well
pads and other infrastructure.
In most production units (63 of 93 or 68%), the “in disturbed
areas” practice gave no direction about where to place well pads, because
there were no cultivated or developed areas to bias placement. As such,
most of the placement for these was done based on trying to center the
pad in the envelope and/or put it near other pads. However, subsequent
road and pipeline routes did depend on this practice.
Well pads were connected to the existing road network using a
least cost path method (ESRI 2013). The cost surface varied depending
on the siting practice. When siting pads close to (1) existing roads or (2)
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existing pipelines, the road cost surface was determined by the distance,
elevation, and slope over which the road was built. These two factors
reflect monetary costs of road construction materials and soil movement.
When siting infrastructure (3) away from water, the cost surface was the
inverse of the Euclidean distance from the water, such that cost
increased with proximity. Where the distance to water was 0, we set the
inverse distance to be 100 times larger than the maximum value in the
rest of the raster. Finally, when siting infrastructure (4) in disturbed
areas, we used the 2006 National Land Coverage Dataset to weight
disturbed classes (Developed, Planted/Cultivated) as 100 times less
costly than undisturbed classes and used that as the cost surface.
Because the existing pipeline network is sparse, some study sites do not
intersect with the network. We therefore buffered the study sites by 15
km – chosen to ensure every study site intersects with at least one
pipeline – before creating the placement regions for the pipelines and
roads. We then built pipelines and roads outside of study sites where
needed to complete the line, but clipped them off at the study site
boundary and measured impacts only inside the study site. Pipelines and
roads were sited using the same methods. Finally, we note that because
the least-cost path method checks for a spatially additive impact, there is
an implicit assumption that placing more infrastructures is always more
impacting. As such, the placement algorithm is biased towards shorter
roads and pipelines. In reality, some impacts like forest frag 1 below are
spatially non-additive such that lower impacts can be achieved with more
infrastructure in some cases.

2.3.4 Environment Impact Metrics
For each infrastructure layout, we calculated several environmental and
cultural impact metrics. Metrics were calculated on a rasterized version
of the study area, where cells are 30x30 m. We calculated the following
metrics after each siting practice was implemented in a study site:
1. cultural – risk to human cultural features; sum over the raster of
proximity to cultural features, where proximity is defined as the
inverse of the Euclidean distance of infrastructure to the nearest
mapped cultural feature.
2. erosion – erosion potential; sum over the slope raster of all cells
occupied by infrastructure.
3. forest loss – total number of previously forested cells in which
infrastructure is developed
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4. forest frag 1 – effective mesh size; area of each patch if all the
forest were combined and then divided into S equally sized patches
with the same degree of landscape division as the original set of
patches; similar to average patch size, but with more consistent
responses to fragmentation (Jaeger 2000);
∑
where
is the number of cells in the analysis region, and
area of each forest patch after fragmentation.

is the

5. forest frag 2 – perimeter to area ratio; number of forest edge cells –
those which border a non-forest cell – divided by total number of
forest cells after development.
6. rare spp – risk of displacing rare or other target species; sum over
raster of expected number of occurrences of known locations (EOs)
of rare species. To create this surface, a map of habitat types from
the Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat Mapping Project () was
overlaid with EOs from the Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program
(Table S 2.1). Each habitat type was assigned the number of EOs it
contained. This was done without regard to species identity. This
number was then divided by the total area of the habitat type to
reduce areal effects. Finally, values were multiplied by one million
to aid understanding.
7. water 1 – reduction of stream connectivity; number of stream
crossings; number of stream cells occupied by infrastructure.
8. water 2 – risk to aquatic systems; sum over raster of proximity to
water bodies, where proximity is defined as the inverse of the
distance a liquid would flow from a cell over the surface to reach
the first-encountered water body. This was calculated using
ArcGIS’s Flow Direction tool.

2.3.5 Analyses
We tested two major hypotheses:
1. Siting practices differentially affect metrics of impact. The goals
here were to assess whether the choice of practice is important and
if some practices are more generally effective than others.
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2. Impacts are correlated across sites and practices. The goal here
was to assess which impacts trade-off when planning
infrastructure by simple planning guidelines.
Before performing the tests below, we square-root transformed forest loss
and cultural and log10 transformed all other data to increase normality.
To test the first hypothesis, we built eight repeated measures ANOVAs,
one for each metric as the response, where the study site was the
“individual” on which repeated measures were being taken. The
“treatments” on each individual were the practices themselves, and the
ANOVA was used to test if practices created significant variation in the
impact response of the site. We then used a post-hoc Tukey HSD test to
determine, for those significant models, which practices differentially
affected each impact metric. The ANOVAs were carried out using
ezANOVA in R (v3).
To test the second hypothesis, we calculated Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between each pair of impact metrics, within each practice. For
instance, one correlation was between forest loss and erosion when siting
infrastructure in disturbed areas. We used a Bonferroni corrected alpha
of 0.0018 (alpha = 0.05/28 = 0.0018) to test significance. We focused
only on post-development correlations of impacts, but do explore the
marginal change in impacts associated with following these simple
planning practices in Appendix.

2.4 Results
Infrastructure layouts were qualitatively different based on which
simple planning practice was followed (Fig. 2.3). For instance, Fig. 2.3
shows four layouts resulting from our four planning practices for one
development site. Note especially the lengths of gathering pipelines and
that their routes differed markedly based on the locations of well pads,
which were themselves in markedly different locations based on the
planning practice. These same patterns hold for the other development
sites (Fig. S 2.3).
Differences in the locations of infrastructure led to varying
impacts. While placing infrastructure away from water generally
performed better across impacts than placing pads near existing roads or
pipelines, or placing infrastructure in disturbed areas, no one practice
was universally better across impacts than the others (Fig. 2.4). This
should be expected since our simple practices purposefully target one or
two objectives and cannot accommodate more without becoming
intractable. Further, most impact metrics we measured were positively
correlated, such that doing better at avoiding one impact meant doing
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Fig. 2.3. Four layouts of well pads (■), roads (−), and pipelines (--) at one of our
twenty sites (medium gray --). Other layouts presented in the Appendix. Existing
roads are medium gray dots (…); proposed infrastructure is black. Each layout is the
result of following a different simple siting practice (codes here). Each layout, if
developed, would result in different impacts on forests (green or light gray), aquatic
habitats (blue or medium gray), erosion, and cultural features (orange or dark gray
with black outline) (Table S 2.2 for values).
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better with others. However, one measure of forest fragmentation had
consistent tradeoffs with other impacts (Fig. 2.4). This is an important
caveat for Pennsylvania, where potential forest fragmentation is large
(Johnson et al. 2010; Evans & Kiesecker 2014).
We found that for this study region, set of impact metrics, and
simple siting practices, impacts are more synergistic than antagonistic.
This is revealed in Fig. 2.4 by the dominance of positive correlations (+)
between impacts. The strongest and most numerous positive correlations
occurred between the water 2 impact metric, a measure of proximity of
infrastructure to water bodies, and other metrics. Conversely, there were
no significant positive correlations between the rare spp metric and other
metrics. However, there is a negative correlation between forest frag 1, a
measure of forest fragmentation, and both forest loss and erosion
potential. There is also a less strong but persistent tradeoff with water
impacts. Tradeoffs involving forest fragmentation are especially important
in Pennsylvania, where there are large areas of intact forest. Thus, if we
prioritize minimizing forest fragmentation, this may come at the cost of
increasing forest loss, erosion, and stream impacts.
The bar charts and letters in the bottom of Fig. 2.4 reveal that
while practices differ in how they affect each impact metric (different
groups within each impact metric), no practice performed better (had
lower means) than others across all impacts. This is expected, since our
simple practices were chosen to achieve specific goals. For instance,
putting infrastructure away from water (Fig. 2.4 “p1”) produced the
lowest water impacts, but some higher forest impacts. That example also
reveals that simple planning practices can be relatively effective at
avoiding targeted impacts. Another example is that putting infrastructure
in disturbed areas resulted in relatively lower levels of forest frag 2 and
forest loss. Putting infrastructure close to (p2) existing pipelines or (p3)
existing roads did not produce clear patterns in impacts relative to the
other practices. This may indicate that planning practices that do not
clearly target an environmental feature like water or forest are less likely
to be effective in a predictable manner. That said, both practices
performed the best with regards to erosion potential. Finally, the blank
bars in Fig. 2.4 show that there was no significant difference in
performance of planning practices with regards to forest frag 1 or rare
spp. Both forest frag 1 and rare spp are metrics that will respond to fairly
large landscape changes. Effective mesh size (forest frag 1) responds
most when large patches are divided, which is relatively unlikely in this
context. The rare spp metric is a coarse resolution metric.
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Fig. 2.4. Synergies and tradeoffs among impacts and practices. (grid) Correlations between impact metrics across all 20
sites. Negative correlations (-) are tradeoffs; synergies are +. Symbol size reflects correlation magnitude. Significant
correlations (black) were assessed with Bonferroni corrections. (bar charts) Performance of practices. Bars are mean
values (+/- Tukey HSD confidence intervals) within the impact listed above on the diagonal, e.g. the left set of bars
corresponds to the cultural impact of different siting practices. Non-overlapping errors bars and group letters indicate
significant differences. Values are scaled 0 to 1, where 1 is worst. forest frag 1 and rare spp repeated measures ANOVAs
were not significant, so no Tukey HSD tests were performed.
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2.5 Discussion
To inform the use of simple guidelines for planning shale gas surface
infrastructure, we wanted to know if the use of such guidelines
accompanies tradeoffs among environmental impacts. We also sought to
assess the relative effectiveness of guidelines for avoiding impacts. Using
Pennsylvania public lands as a case study, we sited well pads, access
roads, and gathering pipelines according to four guidelines that are easy
to understand and implement. We calculated and correlated eight proxies
for environmental impacts that would result from developing such
infrastructure.
We found mostly weak positive correlations between impacts,
indicating that for our study area, multiple impacts could be avoided
simultaneously with environmentally-oriented planning. More generally,
some impacts will be negatively correlated – i.e. trade-off – in that trying
to avoid one impact by changing the location of infrastructure necessarily
leads to increasing another impact. In those cases, the best strategy to
avoid impacts is to choose locations that balance antagonistic impacts.
In this study, one measure of forest fragmentation - effective mesh size was negatively correlated with several other impacts. This is likely due to
both spatially intrinsic tradeoffs between impacts and the use of
simplified planning guidelines (Fig. S 2.2). This result is important in
Pennsylvania where reducing impacts on forest fragmentation are highly
important and may come at the cost of increasing other impacts,
regardless of planning practices. These patterns generally hold when
looking at marginal – as opposed to absolute – changes brought on by
development (Fig. S 2.2).
We also found that simple guidelines for planning surface
infrastructure can be relatively effective when focusing on one or a few
impacts. For instance, our analysis revealed that, for this context,
putting infrastructure away from water was more effective at avoiding
water and cultural impacts than other simple planning guidelines.
Unfortunately, no one simple guideline was universally better at avoiding
impacts than all other guidelines. As such, when more targeted, sitespecific planning is possible, simple planning guidelines that encompass
the planning context may be good enough.
Since our results suggest that regulations targeting single impacts
will not be universally effective, new regulations either need to be more
comprehensive or site specific, e.g. through a review process similar to
Pennsylvania’s Natural Diversity Inventory Environmental Review Tool
(http://www.gis.dcnr.state.pa.us/hgis-er/Login.aspx). For instance, our
results indicate actions that target reductions in forest impacts by
placing infrastructure in disturbed areas (e.g. Fig. 2.3) will actually
increase erosion potential, stream crossings, and cultural impacts
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relative to alternative strategies (Fig. 2.4). Actions that incentivize
developers to take an impact-comprehensive planning approach could be
more effective, but will be more challenging to design and implement
than simpler, targeted ones. Alternatively, implementing a site-level
review process where regulator and developer work together to identify
potential impacts and avoid them could be effective, though at an
increased time and resource commitment for both sides.
Our study joins the large and growing body of work on measuring
and assessing the relationships between multiple indicators of
environment and society for decision making. Increasingly common are
studies of tradeoffs among ecosystem services (Bennett, Peterson &
Gordon 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne, Peterson & Bennett 2010; Moilanen et
al. 2011; Maskell et al. 2013; Howe et al. 2014). At the same time, multiobjective planning is an essential part of conservation more generally
(Cattaneo et al. 2006). Our study incorporates elements of land use
decision making, another arena in which ongoing research highlights
that understanding the effects of land use on multiple indicators is
important (Phalan et al. 2011; Sayer et al. 2013).
We chose impact metrics to cover features and topics of concern to
stakeholders and to illustrate synergies and tradeoffs between multiple
objectives. These are clearly not exhaustive. We focused on impacts at
one particular stage – site development – while impacts occur at all
stages. In reality, impacts from surface infrastructure development
extend beyond the scope of our study, and include both positive and
negative effects. For instance, while we focus on known rare species,
development also impacts common species and species not prioritized by
conservation. We focus on known rare species because these are a
greater focus for decision makers. Indeed, developers in Pennsylvania are
required to avoid known locations of rare species through the
Pennsylvania’s Natural Diversity Inventory Environmental Review
process mentioned above. We also use a simple measure of impacts on
humans that ignores some positive and negative socioeconomic effects of
development (Sovacool 2014).Many such effects play out over scales
largely independent of the scale of analysis here, while others could form
alternative or additional components of a more comprehensive analysis
at this study’s scale. Regardless, we were able to identify some synergies
and tradeoffs with the impacts we did include.
Future analyses similar to ours could benefit from a few
methodological changes. First, while public lands served as an
informative case study for testing impacts from development, shale gas is
being extracted all over the Central Appalachian region, including private
lands. Private lands tend to be more fragmented in ownership and land
use, which would likely affect the resulting infrastructure layouts and
impacts from that development. It is unclear how transferrable our
results are to the private lands context. Second, we did not rigorously
test the change in impact correlations before versus after surface
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infrastructure was placed, choosing to qualitatively assess the change in
correlations (Fig. S 2.2). While this does not affect our practice-specific
conclusions described above, it does affect our ability to say with
statistical confidence whether simple guidelines induced tradeoffs and
synergies among impacts.
Multiple routes can be taken to reduce impacts from development
including regulation, land protection, and changing industry practices.
Each of these routes is currently underutilized in the Central
Appalachian region, but we expect this study will help inform future
actions in each. First, federal and state regulations exist to restrict the
placement of surface infrastructure but do not address some important
ecological impacts such as habitat fragmentation. Furthermore, most of
Pennsylvania’s current setback requirements that aim to protect
sensitive habitats potentially can be waived with a request and
justification by the gas developer. Second, the efficacy of traditional land
acquisition and easement is uncertain in shale gas development sites
where surface and subsurface rights to land are sometimes separately
owned. Our results suggest an effective strategy for conservation groups
and landowners - in conjunction with willing gas industry partners - is to
inform site-specific planning where priority environmental or biological
features are present. Third and finally, the gas industry currently does
not have strong incentives to go above and beyond regulation to further
reduce impacts. Increasing environmentally-oriented planning will
require some effort to lower the threshold of entry for the gas industry.
Simple planning practices can be more easily assimilated into existing
planning than more complex tools and practices. However, more
advanced tools and methods may be needed to help industry planners
incorporate environmental objectives into their planning, especially when
tradeoffs exist among impacts.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Change in impacts due to development
In the main text we focus on correlations between impact metrics after
development has occurred. In doing so we put emphasis on the absolute
tradeoffs/synergies between impacts and consequently take a more
holistic approach to reducing impacts rather than focusing on the
practice-specific effects of development on impact metrics. Another
relevant approach is to test the change in correlations between impacts
induced by following our four simple planning practices. We briefly
explored how correlations between impact metrics changed from before
to after development occurred.
Our methods for measuring correlations before development were
very similar to that presented in the Analyses section in the main text:
we measured the values of our impact metrics at each of the twenty
development sites and assessed correlations between them. There are
two important aspects that differ here. First, six of our eight impact
metrics always have a value of 0 before development. Only forest frag 1
and forest frag 2 have a non-zero value before development. In order to
measure correlations between impacts for the six other metrics, we
calculated, for each development site, the average value of the impact
surface raster, since those six metrics are just spatially additive
functions of the surface rasters. For instance, for the erosion metric, we
took the average value of the slope raster. We only included in the
average those values in the raster that were feasible locations for roads
since the feasible road area is an intermediate between the pad and
pipeline areas and we wanted to include those areas that might actually
be developed. The second difference from our main text analysis is we did
not differentiate between planning practices before development, since
there would be no difference anyway.
After calculating pre-development values and correlations, we
looked at the difference in correlations between post and predevelopment. Since we did not differentiate between planning practices
before development, we combined the post-development metric values
across planning practices so there is only a single comparison for each
pair of metrics.
Fig. S 2.2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Before
development (top of Fig. S 2.2), many impacts trade-off with one another,
probably necessarily due to being affected in spatially disjoint areas. As
the Difference table reveals (bottom of Fig. S 2.2), planned development
would often increase synergies (red, positive correlations) between
impacts (in 16 of 28 comparisons). At the same time, planned
development would lead to relative tradeoffs (blue, negative correlations)
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between impacts (in 12 of 28 comparisons). For the most part, the
general patterns that we present in the main text (somewhat summarized
in the After sub-table in Fig. S 2.2) hold when looking at marginal
changes brought on by development (summarized in the Difference subtable).
In some cases (e.g. forest frag 2 vs. forest loss), planned
development could reverse the correlation between impacts (e.g. from -95
to +13). Finally, the green, italicized numbers indicate that very few
correlations were significant after Bonferroni correction. We did not do
statistical testing for the significance of the Difference table values.

2.6.2 Minimum Development Constraints
We adhered to existing regulatory and construction constraints on the
placement of gas surface infrastructure. Namely,
2.6.2.1 pads
 0 m from lease boundary
 0 m from pad zones
 100 m from wetlands > 1 acre
 30 m from stream
 152 m from cultural feature
2.6.2.2 roads
 0 m (but not in) wetlands > 1 acre
 slope < 10000%. Note that generally roads would not be graded to
larger than 15% slope and in steep places, construction of roads
on steep slopes would be accomplished by switchbacks, which the
least-cost path algorithm in ArcMap is not able to accomplish. As
such, a few planned roads in our analysis may have been
unrealistically steep.
2.6.2.3 pipes
 0 m (but not in) wetlands > 1 acre
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Fig. S 2.1. Illustration of production units (pink rectangles), pad envelopes (white
rectangles with black outline) and how they relate to the well pad (black squares)
and associated well laterals (red lines) within a development site (dot-dash gray line).
The larger, full-sized production unit has six wells, while the half-sized drainage unit
has only three. As a result, the full-sized unit places the well pad in the center, while
the half-sized unit places the well pad one of the ends. Note that regulations require
wells to stay within the development site boundary, so one well from the full-sized
unit is cut-off. We did not explicitly site well laterals, so the production unit
boundaries do not correspond to what would be the final well trajectories. We
include the well laterals here for illustration.
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Fig. S 2.2. Results of comparison of impact correlations before and after development. Red cells are positive correlations. Blue cells
are negative correlations. Bold, green, italicized text denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. Correlation coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation
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Table S 2.1. Datasets used to place infrastructure and calculate impact metrics.

Dataset
contiguous
forest
patches
Wetlands
in PA

habitat
classificati
ons for NE
USA
Spatial
locations
of rare
species
observatio
ns in PA
Streams,
rivers,
lakes

Digital
Elevation
Model,
elevation
at a point
in raster
format
“cultural”
features,
i.e.
schools,
recreation
al fields,
dwellings,
reservatio
ns, etc.

Used for
siting
infrastruct
ure, forest
metrics
restricting
infrastruct
ure, siting
infrastruct
ure, water
2 metric
rare spp
metric

rare spp
metric

restricting
infrastruct
ure, siting
infrastruct
ure, water
metrics
restricting
infrastruct
ure, siting
infrastruct
ure,
erosion
metric
restricting
infrastruct
ure,
cultural
metric

Source
National Land Cover Dataset 2006 (classes 41,
42, 43, 90):
http://www.mrlc.gov/nlcd06_data.php
National Wetlands Inventory:
http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Data/DataDownload.html

Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat Mapping
Project:
http://conserveonline.org/workspaces/ecs/do
cuments/ne-terrestrial-habitat-mappingproject
Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program data
request. Data only available through PNHP
formal request.

Pennsylvania State University (via PASDA):
Networked streams of Pennsylvania
http://www.pasda.psu.edu/default.asp

USGS (1 arc second ~30 m):
http://ned.usgs.gov/

Pennsylvania National Agricultural Imagery
Program 2008, 1m resolution aerial imagery
http://www.pasda.psu.edu/default.asp
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Dataset
existing
roads
existing
pipelines
conservati
on lands
in PA

Table S 2.1 Continued
Used for
Source
siting
US Census Bureau TIGER/Line 2008 (all
infrastruct counties All Lines RDFLAG = “Y”):
ure
http://www.pasda.psu.edu/default.asp
siting
MapSearch pipelines. Propriety data.
infrastruct
ure
choosing
PASDA-Pennsylvania Conservation
sites, siting Stewardship (1998):
infrastruct http://www.pasda.psu.edu/default.asp
ure

Fig. S 2.3. In this series of figures we show the infrastructure configurations created for
3 representative development sites. Each figure contains four layouts of well pads (■),
roads (−), and pipelines (--) at one of our twenty sites (gray). Existing roads and
pipelines are brown; proposed infrastructure is black. Each layout is the result of
following a different simple siting practice. Each layout, if developed, would result in
different impacts on forests (green), aquatic habitats (blue), erosion, and cultural
features (orange).
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Fig. S 2.3 Continued
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Fig. S 2.3 Continued
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2.6.3 Analyses Results
Table S 2.2. Impact metric values for each of the layouts shown above and including the “no-development” scenario (practice “pre”).
Note the pre-development values are not measured the same way as post-development values (see Additional Methods above). These
are untransformed values.
Table S 2.3. Continued
impact metrics
site

practice

cultural

erosion

forest loss

forest frag 1

forest frag 2

rare spp

water 1

water 2

1

p1

0.74

9511.66

317

21739.13

0.256

6241.51

0

0.97

1

p2

0.62

3630.59

189

21739.13

0.251

2545.89

67

2.10

1

p3

1.30

4000.03

249

21739.13

0.252

2145.84

170

3.59

1

p4

1.41

8078.43

165

21739.13

0.250

2277.06

82

3.55

1

pre

0.001

18.796

0.478

22222.22

0.248

2.894

0.056

0.007

2

p1

0.22

2401.26

159

15151.52

0.111

2061.91

0

0.30

2

p2

0.11

2045.48

168

14492.75

0.111

1869.36

0

0.24

2

p3

0.40

1602.99

202

14925.37

0.116

2540.80

34

1.57

2

p4

0.49

2466.99

138

15151.52

0.103

2173.17

8

0.84

2

pre

0.001

10.317

0.810

15384.62

0.088

5.434

0.026

0.004

3

p1

1.81

12048.07

519

52631.58

0.163

3350.06

3

1.83

3

p2

1.21

6698.81

542

52631.58

0.164

4812.26

251

4.35

3

p3

1.74

6857.29

499

52631.58

0.162

2980.85

249

3.58

3

p4

1.91

13684.22

340

52631.58

0.153

2313.02

85

5.55

3

pre

0.001

18.063

0.676

52631.58

0.146

2.363

0.047

0.006

4

p1

1.09

2875.96

211

16129.03

0.189

4421.34

0

0.42

4

p2

1.19

2456.47

233

15873.02

0.190

4311.15

20

0.97

4

p3

0.80

3845.82

315

16949.15

0.199

5655.39

78

1.53

4

p4

0.90

3884.77

113

15873.02

0.178

2227.30

9

1.32

4

pre

0.001

14.505

0.595

17543.86

0.172

3.250

0.042

0.006
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Table S 2.3. Continued
impact metrics
site

practice

cultural

erosion

forest loss

forest frag 1

forest frag 2

rare spp

water 1

water 2

5

p1

0.70

5258.18

286

4424.78

0.277

5

p2

1.18

1764.74

184

4347.83

0.264

1974.14

4

0.81

2001.67

48

1.72

5

p3

1.36

2051.58

288

4366.81

0.273

647381.94

84

3.45

5

p4

0.98

4700.61

118

4310.34

0.255

216134.83

24

2.31

5

pre

0.002

8.333

6

p1

0.14

3020.49

0.444

4545.45

0.249

3.203

0.052

0.005

81

13333.33

0.124

655.23

0

0.12

6

p2

0.07

598.92

63

13157.89

0.123

1339.40

0

0.14

6

p3

0.11

1055.46

72

13333.33

0.124

1030.55

0

0.15

6

p4

0.10

1894.63

12

13333.33

0.120

184.30

7

0.65

6

pre

0.001

14.574

0.717

13333.33

0.120

4.975

0.038

0.005

7

p1

0.41

2799.89

340

35714.29

0.169

6299.90

2

0.62

7

p2

0.42

2563.12

350

35714.29

0.171

22066.97

11

0.94

7

p3

0.48

3034.22

361

35714.29

0.170

82877.62

24

1.45

7

p4

1.64

7882.51

175

35714.29

0.160

77877.20

15

3.06

7

pre

0.001

9.227

0.664

37037.04

0.155

5.241

0.040

0.005

8

p1

1.02

3084.90

220

7518.80

0.284

18796.90

0

0.55

8

p2

0.96

1034.21

156

7692.31

0.280

353768.56

35

1.10

8

p3

1.26

1445.75

197

7692.31

0.285

370628.50

52

1.41

8

p4

0.95

5759.22

111

5952.38

0.270

170054.69

21

3.11

8

pre

0.002

9.944

0.516

7874.02

0.266

3.827

0.048

0.006

9

p1

0.13

3450.25

127

10101.01

0.110

1829.85

0

0.15

9

p2

0.04

973.69

60

10204.08

0.098

757.35

5

0.32

9

p3

0.12

1132.58

74

10204.08

0.102

1333.76

7

0.61

9

p4

0.04

1223.11

57

10204.08

0.098

660.54

3

0.22

9

pre

0.002

14.545

0.797

10309.28

0.090

5.222

0.034

0.005
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Table S 2.3. Continued
impact metrics
site

practice

cultural

erosion

forest loss

forest frag 1

forest frag 2

rare spp

water 1

water 2

10

p1

0.16

1961.45

202

23255.81

0.135

10

p2

0.15

1620.88

232

23255.81

0.138

3519.31

0

0.31

3556.95

38

1.38

10

p3

0.17

1713.43

188

23809.52

0.134

2609.62

40

0.94

10

p4

0.20

2591.10

190

23255.81

0.134

2181.54

8

0.99

10

pre

0.001

8.693

11

p1

0.19

1664.89

0.718

23809.52

0.124

6.660

0.041

0.006

169

41666.67

0.075

2359.23

0

0.47

11

p2

0.15

1641.51

143

41666.67

0.073

2017.07

22

0.78

11

p3

0.25

1429.56

143

41666.67

0.073

1140.00

43

0.87

11

p4

0.15

3040.84

127

41666.67

0.072

801.58

17

1.43

11

pre

0.001

8.208

0.851

41666.67

0.067

6.698

0.035

0.005

12

p1

0.44

12666.93

485

25641.03

0.114

2431.98

4

1.16

12

p2

0.50

5597.44

458

25641.03

0.102

1365.40

150

2.49

12

p3

0.53

4871.99

374

25641.03

0.095

1091.21

138

2.54

12

p4

0.28

10429.01

224

25641.03

0.085

289.85

34

2.90

12

pre

0.001

25.140

0.872

26315.79

0.069

0.762

0.046

0.006

13

p1

0.09

1059.29

132

12500.00

0.122

1832.60

0

0.14

13

p2

0.23

1348.39

215

12345.68

0.132

5484.25

21

0.86

13

p3

0.11

881.23

166

12345.68

0.127

2872.77

2

0.29

13

p4

1.53

3905.93

153

12345.68

0.119

3148.98

8

1.14

13

pre

0.002

8.363

0.753

12658.23

0.108

6.427

0.030

0.004

14

p1

0.44

11737.51

617

58823.53

0.102

8313.79

3

1.11

14

p2

0.58

8949.48

685

58823.53

0.105

9147.52

83

3.41

14

p3

0.74

7990.75

684

58823.53

0.106

9351.45

112

3.82

14

p4

1.74

17552.61

557

40000.00

0.101

18896.08

68

5.48

14

pre

0.001

16.131

0.805

58823.53

0.080

1.990

0.035

0.005
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Table S 2.3. Continued
impact metrics
site

practice

cultural

erosion

forest loss

forest frag 1

forest frag 2

rare spp

water 1

water 2

15

p1

0.45

8437.78

446

66666.67

0.149

15

p2

0.78

6223.11

704

66666.67

0.156

790.53

0

1.57

745.11

96

3.59

15

p3

0.53

4550.11

551

66666.67

0.152

572.20

89

2.23

15

p4

0.99

9245.37

352

66666.67

0.146

745.94

32

3.52

15

pre

0.000

16.526

16

p1

2.29

12147.42

0.698

71428.57

0.137

0.825

0.048

0.006

963

29411.76

0.150

18662.62

5

1.76

16

p2

1.57

5443.25

615

28571.43

0.136

24734.86

54

3.60

16

p3

1.89

5108.42

713

29411.76

0.140

25629.98

91

4.65

16

p4

2.89

8104.22

365

29411.76

0.125

126910.11

22

3.44

16

pre

0.001

8.541

0.719

30303.03

0.116

6.552

0.021

0.004

17

p1

0.17

4283.59

365

20000.00

0.111

4162.54

0

0.48

17

p2

0.16

1700.87

335

20000.00

0.108

5030.55

0

0.46

17

p3

0.18

2199.23

353

20000.00

0.110

5172.63

0

0.56

17

p4

0.51

8496.39

260

10526.32

0.102

32221.05

23

2.68

17

pre

0.001

18.599

0.747

20408.16

0.088

1.540

0.024

0.004

18

p1

0.67

7658.05

508

30303.03

0.242

5762.46

6

1.13

18

p2

1.36

5157.50

573

28571.43

0.245

78492.70

190

4.58

18

p3

1.44

5279.11

742

27027.03

0.256

2969.75

326

6.60

18

p4

1.02

9820.28

249

29411.76

0.227

18051.86

27

4.18

18

pre

0.001

9.923

0.481

30303.03

0.217

2.988

0.028

0.004

19

p1

0.65

6139.97

477

43478.26

0.172

6276.80

0

0.79

19

p2

1.08

3558.60

510

43478.26

0.174

34686.67

84

2.33

19

p3

1.11

4106.18

582

41666.67

0.177

66242.91

170

3.41

19

p4

1.23

7077.80

353

43478.26

0.164

50512.85

27

3.66

19

pre

0.001

9.296

0.655

43478.26

0.151

4.238

0.028

0.004
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Table S 2.3. Continued
impact metrics
site

practice

cultural

erosion

forest loss

forest frag 1

forest frag 2

rare spp

water 1

water 2

20

p1

0.44

3992.51

301

22727.27

0.253

20

p2

0.77

3079.36

344

22222.22

0.255

3108.47

0

0.64

4552.39

125

3.04

20

p3

0.70

2865.79

345

22727.27

0.255

3511.98

146

3.11

20

p4

0.85

7910.96

160

22727.27

0.244

1394.25

81

5.04

20

pre

0.001

10.247

0.366

23255.81

0.240

1.446

0.043

0.005
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Fig. S 2.4. (above diagonal) Pearson’s correlations between impacts within practices. Each correlation is taken across all 20 sites.
Colors correspond to the strength and direction of the correlation. Numbers are correlation coefficients multiplied by 100.
Significance of correlations was computed using a Bonferroni correction where k = 28. Significant correlations are in bold. (below
diagonal) Scatter plots of impacts within practices and impacts. These were used to create the correlation coefficients above the
diagonal. Practice codes are p1: put infrastructure away from water, p2: put pads close to existing pipelines, p3: put pads close to
existing roads, p4: put infrastructure in disturbed areas.
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Table S 2.3. Results of repeated measures ANOVAs and Tukey HSD tests for practices
within impacts. Note, for “forest frag 1” and “rare spp,” the non-significant ANOVA does
not mean that development had no effect on those metrics. It only means that different
practices did not differentially affect the metric.

Metric
cultural

p1
p2
p3
p4

mean
0.71
0.74
0.81
0.92
Metric
erosion

p1
p2
p3
p4

mean
3.66
3.41
3.43
3.75
Metric
forest loss

p1
p2
p3
p4

mean
17.84
17.49
18.01
13.83
Metric
forest frag 1

p1
p2

mean
4.35
4.35

p3
p4

4.35
4.32

SS Error
1.48
2.5%
CL†
0.65
0.67
0.74
0.85

p-value
9.31E-04

SS Error
0.95
2.5%
CL†
3.61
3.36
3.38
3.70

p-value
1.37E-12

SS Error
173.03
2.5%
CL†
17.11
16.76
17.28
13.10

p-value
9.76E-11

97.5% CL†
0.78
0.81
0.87
0.98

97.5% CL†
3.71
3.47
3.49
3.80

97.5% CL†
18.57
18.22
18.74
14.55

Group
a
a
ab
b

Group
b
a
a
b

Group
a
a
a
b

SS Error p-value
0.08
5.78E-02
2.5%
CL†
97.5% CL† Group
model was not significant, so no
Tukey HSD test performed
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Table S 2.3 Continued

p1
p2
p3
p4

Metric
forest frag 2

SS Error
0.01

mean
-0.81
-0.82
-0.81
-0.84

2.5% CL†
-0.82
-0.82
-0.82
-0.85

Metric
rare spp

SS Error
11.11

p1
p2

mean
3.55
3.75

p3
p4

3.80
3.75

p1
p2
p3
p4

p1
p2
p3
p4

p-value
3.12E-08
97.5%
CL†
-0.81
-0.81
-0.81
-0.83

p-value
3.02E-01
97.5%
2.5% CL† CL†
Group
model p-value is >0.05, so no
Tukey HSD test performed

Metric
water 1

SS Error
8.95

p-value
3.51E-16

mean
0.24
1.45
1.64
1.34

2.5% CL†
0.07
1.29
1.47
1.18

97.5% CL†
0.40
1.62
1.81
1.51

Metric
water 2

SS Error
1.66

p-value
3.40E-14

mean
-0.23
0.12
0.21
0.33

Group
a
a
a
b

2.5% CL†
-0.30
0.05
0.14
0.26

97.5% CL†
-0.16
0.19
0.29
0.40

Grou
p
b
a
a
a

Grou
p
b
a
a
a

† These confidence limits are derived from the Tukey HSD test. They represent half the
confidence interval based on the standardized error of the repeated measures ANOVA
and the critical value from the studentized range distribution, which depends on the
critical p value (0.05), the number of degrees of freedom in the model error (57), and the
number of practices being compared (4). The Tukey HSD test could produce different
confidence ranges for each pair of practices being compared, but all confidence ranges
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are the same in this case because we have equal sample sizes (n=20) across all
practices. The relationship between the model mean squared error (SS Error / 57 [deg.
freedom]) and the confidence intervals when comparing two practices is.

̅

̅

(

)√

(

)

where ̅ ̅ are the means of impact values for practices and , q is the critical value
from the studentized range distribution,
is the mean squared error of the withingroups mean squared error, and
are the number of data points from practices .
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Chapter 3: The cost of avoiding
environmental impacts from shale gas
surface infrastructure at the lease-hold level
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A version of this article will be submitted for peer reviewed publication.
Austin W. Milt, Tamara D. Gagnolet, and Paul R. Armsworth. “The
cost of avoiding environmental impacts from shale gas surface
infrastructure at the lease-hold level.”
Austin Milt performed the secondary data collection, data processing,
analysis, interpretation, and writing for this article. Tamara Gagnolet
assisted in data collection, and both co-authors contributed intellectually
to the design, interpretation, and revision of the article.

3.1 Abstract
Shale energy development is receiving increasing attention due to its
potential to supply short term domestic fossil energy and due to concerns
about its environmental impacts. All energy development harms the
environment, but surface impacts from shale energy development might
be minimized through careful spatial planning of infrastructure at the
lease-hold level. Doing so would come at some financial cost. Here we
estimate the relative financial cost of reducing impacts on forests,
wetlands, rare species, and flowing freshwater from shale energy
development within lease-hold scale sites. At a median site, up to 40% of
impacts could be avoided before further avoidance became cost
prohibitive. However, this aggregation conceals considerable variation
among sites. Low-cost reductions in impacts are possible in many areas
and not others, such that increasingly ambitious commitments to
avoiding potential impacts could drive many sites out of production.
Feasible regulations may be able to target one or two impacts that
dominate aggregate impacts, though this depends on the choice of
metrics and expected impacts in a region. Our results indicate that
regulations seeking to reduce impacts from future development may be
possible for moderate reductions in impacts and doing so may be
relatively inexpensive, though not extremely so. Cost effective regulations
will need to account for heterogeneity in the ability of and relative cost at
sites to avoid impacts. Our analysis is unique in its combination of
scale, comprehensiveness in surface infrastructure planning, and explicit
consideration of the tradeoffs between reducing impacts and increasing
construction costs. As such, we are uniquely able to inform the
implications of reducing environmental impacts from shale gas surface
infrastructure and regulations that seek to do so.
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3.2 Introduction
Shale gas production in the U.S. has grown markedly since the start of
the boom around 2008 and as of 2012 made up a larger portion of
overall gas production than any other source (Annual Energy Outlook
2014 2014). Countries other than the U.S., most notably the U.K. (Hays
et al. 2015) and China, are currently deciding on how to proceed with
their own unconventional gas development. Rising with shale gas
production and exploration are concerns about its environmental,
human health, social, and economic consequences (Hays et al. 2015).
Unconventional gas surface infrastructure can negatively affect
terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity through habitat loss and
fragmentation (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and
pollution and sedimentation (Kassotis et al. 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013).
All energy infrastructure development produces environmental
impacts, but the amount of impact and ability to avoid impacts are
important factors in determining how much development, if any, is
permissible. Types and amounts of impact will be context specific. Here,
we focus on the surface terrestrial and freshwater impacts of well pads,
access roads, and gathering pipelines accompanying directional drilling
and hydraulic fracturing at the lease-hold level. Lease-holds are
aggregations of tens of adjacent mineral and/or other subsurface rights
of land parcel size into single planning units. Our sites are
approximations of lease-holds. More specifically, we quantify and plan
infrastructure to avoid forest loss and fragmentation, reductions in
stream quality, wetland encroachment, and risk to rare species. Because
we suspect most readers have not visited shale gas construction sites
(Fig. 3.1), we invite the reader to imagine them as similar rural home
development. Well pads are dispersed in space, separated by hundreds to
thousands of meters. Access roads, which connect well pads to the
existing road network, are generally short (~0.1 km here), narrow (12 m
here), gravel roads. And gathering pipelines, which allow gas to be
transported off-site, are similar in corridor size and straightness to
buried electrical transmission lines.
When relatively large areas are planned as a single unit, there may
be scope to move planned well pads, access roads, and gathering
pipelines to partially avoid local impacts. The spatial planning problem
this presents is not trivial to solve. A cost- or impact-minimizing
configuration of wells, well pads, access roads, gathering pipelines, and
other infrastructure requires the spatial coordination of all these
infrastructures. Here, we present an analysis using spatial optimization
software that plans surface infrastructure locations with the
interdependence of infrastructure in mind, and does so while reducing
potential impacts on the environment.
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Fig. 3.1. Well pads (rectangular clearings), access roads (linear clearings in bottomright), and gathering pipelines (other linear clearings) pose many impacts on habitats
in the Marcellus formation, including forest and wetland loss and fragmentation,
displacement of species of conservation concern, erosion, and freshwater
sedimentation and fragmentation. Courtesy of M. Godfrey, The Nature Conservancy.

75

Reducing impacts from surface infrastructure is likely to increase
construction costs. While infrastructure planning practices will vary by
place and planner, planning is unlikely to fully assimilate environmental
objectives. Further, costs and impacts may be negatively correlated in
space, such that reducing one increases the others, as is commonly the
case with multiple spatial objectives (e.g. Raudsepp-Hearne, Peterson &
Bennett 2010; Ruijs et al. 2013; Qiu & Turner 2013). As with other
financially focused endeavors, infrastructure planning will focus on
minimizing costs while adhering to constraints imposed by regulation
and construction limitations, some of which are oriented towards
protecting the environment. More environmentally-oriented planning will
move the gas industry away from the financial bottom-line. Therefore,
quantifying the costs of reducing environmental impacts may be vital to
changing industry practice. In Pennsylvania where our study
concentrates, directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing are the most
expensive parts of development (Hefley & Seydor 2015), but these costs
do not vary much in space under normal development conditions. We
concentrate on major costs that vary with the spatial locations of surface
infrastructure: moving earth, clearing land, stream crossing
infrastructure, and construction materials plus any associated labor
(Triana energy, pers. comm.).
With the quantification of site-level costs of reducing
environmental impacts as a goal, we present a case study of
environmentally-oriented shale energy surface infrastructure planning in
Pennsylvania. In particular, we (1) developed a novel, advanced spatial
optimization algorithm to plan well pad locations and access road and
pipeline routes at 84 sites in 5 counties in Pennsylvania (Fig. 3.2), and
(2) quantified the tradeoff between reducing environmental impacts and
increasing construction costs of alternative development plans. We
aggregated the site-level tradeoffs between impacts and costs to arrive at
a general tradeoff graph for our Pennsylvania sites that shows the
relative cost of reducing impacts by a specific amount.
When the results of our analysis revealed overall promising but
heterogeneous potential to reduce impacts at reasonable costs, we
further explored causes for site-level differences in cost-impact tradeoffs.
There are many possible sources of heterogeneity of costs and impacts
across sites, all of which play out by affecting two things: the cost of
moving infrastructure relative to the resulting change in impacts and the
number of alternative configurations of infrastructure. For instance,
larger sites may have more potential locations for infrastructure and
thus increase the amount that impacts can be avoided. Some impacts
may dominate others in a site, but may be limited in the potential to
avoid them, and this would result in little scope to reduce impacts. Some
impacts may trade off with others, such that moving infrastructure has
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Fig. 3.2. Development sites (green polygons), with grouped well permits (gray) and
the Marcellus shale play (beige). Sites were derived by overlaying production units on
existing well permits and taking contiguous land parcels under those production
units by a single operator. In all, 84 sites were developed.
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little effect on aggregate impacts. Finally, there may be attributes of the
financial bottom-line configuration of infrastructure that prevent large
reductions in potential impacts, such as that configuration is already in
a low-impact area. We explore all these possibilities and others.

3.3 Methods
We used Pennsylvania as a representative state for shale energy
development in the eastern U.S. Over 9,620 horizontal wells were drilled
in Pennsylvania between 2008 and 2014 according to the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection’s permit reporting database. As
we discuss in Chapter 2, Pennsylvania is an ideal state to study
development because of the large amount of development that has
occurred, especially since it overlaps with areas of high conservation
priority.
We planned and analyzed shale energy development at the leasehold scale. This is the scale at which well pads, access roads, and
gathering pipelines are currently planned. As such, it is the planning
scale which most directly affects the terrestrial and freshwater
environment. The lease-hold scale is larger than parcel scale and tends
to be several hundred to 10,000 hectares.
Our sites were derived from locations of horizontal wells drilled
from 2008-2013 (Table S 3.2). Grouped well points were merged into a
single point to estimate locations of well pads. Each well pad point was
overlaid with a 6-well production unit 3352.8 m tall by 914.4 m wide
(3000 by 11000 ft) and rotated 27° counter-clockwise (Triana Energy,
LLC, pers. comm.). The Production Unit is the area under each well pad
that can be drained of its gas when using a six-well configuration. The
angle of rotation matches the grain of the shale. Though this angle
changes from place to place, it takes geologic surveys to know what the
angle should be, and so we use an angle representative of examples we
have seen from the gas industry. Production units were overlaid on land
parcels. The set of contiguous land parcels shared by the production
units of a single operator became one site. In all, this process produced
176 sites, 84 of which the software was successfully able to place
infrastructure in (Fig. 3.2). Those areas which the software failed to place
infrastructure in typically had no feasible layouts possible because of
lack of road or pipeline access to potential well sites or existing road and
pipeline networks.
Several additional datasets are needed to place infrastructure in a
site, including environmental data that inform infrastructure constraints,
impacts, and construction costs (Table S 3.2). One such dataset is the
existing pipeline network, which serves as connection points for
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gathering pipelines. In our experience, there are no sufficiently complete
pipeline datasets that can be acquired for a state-wide, multi-company,
site-level analysis such as ours. Instead, we used an admittedly sparse
pipeline dataset and rather than force gathering pipelines to connect to
existing pipelines far outside of the development boundary, we required
they connect to a portion of the development boundary in the direction of
the nearest existing pipeline. This served our analysis well, since our
focus is on costs and impacts within single sites.
The Impact Score of a layout is a weighted sum of individual,
normalized impact metrics (p. 94) and which we used to place
infrastructure. We used five metrics in our planning and analyses. First
we calculated the amount of forest acreage lost (forest loss) by
development of forest pixels. Second, we calculated the total edge-to-area
ratio (forest frag.) of forest after construction as one measure of forest
fragmentation. Third, we calculated wetland encroachment (wetlands) as
the percent of a 61-91 m (200-300 ft) buffer around wetlands occupied
by infrastructure. Fourth, we calculated potential sedimentation in water
bodies (sediment; p. 98). Fifth and finally, we calculated the expected
impact on rare species (rare spp.) as the expected number of known rare
species occurrences impacted by infrastructure based on habitat
associations across the state. For this analysis, impact metrics were
weighted equally, except for forest acreage lost and forest perimeter to
area ratio. Each of these received half the weight of the others such that
each category of impacted features was given equal weight. We describe
how impact metrics were normalized on p. 108. Bungee – spatial
planning software described in the next paragraph – allows users to
adjust the weights of impact metrics, thereby tailoring the behavior of the
tool to the priorities of stakeholders in the planning area. Such weights
could come from valuation exercises or other studies (e.g. Banzhaf et al.
2014).
We developed novel spatial planning software – Bungee – with the
chief aim of informing the gas industry of ways to reduce environmental
impacts from surface infrastructure at reasonable costs. Bungee stands
for “Balancing Unconventional Natural Gas Extraction and the
Environment,” but we use it colloquially without capitalization. Bungee
performs spatial optimization of surface infrastructure at the lease-hold
level (p. 107). Bungee attempts to minimize environmental impacts from
infrastructure while limiting the total construction budget. For a single
site, Bungee proposes multiple alternative layouts – configurations of
well pad locations and access road and gathering pipeline routes – that
differ in their impacts and costs (e.g. Fig. 3.3). Associated with an
infrastructure layout are summary statistics about the individual impact
metrics over which the software optimized as well as the estimated
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Fig. 3.3. Example layouts and their estimated impacts produced by our
infrastructure planning software. The choice of layouts was made to illustrate how
layouts differ spatially when going from (left column) lower costs and higher impacts
to (right column) higher costs and lower impacts. (table) Spatial differences in
layouts lead to differences in impact and costs. Individual impact metrics (p. 94) are
rare spp. – expected number of known rare species locations encountered, wetlands
– percent of buffer around wetlands occupied by infrastructure, sediment – sediment
load in moving water bodies by disturbing soil, forest loss – area of forest cleared,
forest frag. – forest edge-to-area ratio after development. Impact Score is an aggregate
of the individual impact metrics. Impact Scores at different sites are not comparable.
We use a monotonic, non-linear color scaling on the impact surface to enhance
heterogeneity of impact values.
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construction costs. Impact metric values and costs are based on GIS
layers and consultation with The Nature Conservancy and the gas
industry. Our main gas industry contact for this study was Triana
Energy, LLC, which is a privately held oil and gas exploration and
production company based in Charleston, West Virginia, USA and
operating in both West Virginia and Pennsylvania. We used Triana’s
experience with shale energy development to inform the dimensions of
production units, construction limits such as road grades, and surface
infrastructure planning more generally.
Infrastructure layouts were planned using our hierarchical,
heuristic, least-cost based spatial optimization software, Bungee. Before
placing well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines, Bungee
determines both the number and approximate locations of well pads in a
site by maximally packing production units within the site polygon. As
such, the final number and locations of well pads was not directly
determined by the existing well permits. To pack production units into
sites, Bungee iteratively adds production units to the site and uses a
simulated annealing algorithm to make room for new production units.
Production units were allowed to partially overlap other production units
as well as go outside the site as long as the total unused area of each
production unit did not exceed 20%. We further explain the packing
process on p. 109 and Bungee documentation (available upon request).
Infrastructure layouts were placed after production units, which
determine the approximate areas where well pads will go. Each
infrastructure layout consists of a set of pad locations, access road
connection routes, and gathering pipeline connection routes (e.g. Fig.
3.3). The infrastructure layout creation portion of Bungee relies on (1)
feasible locations for infrastructure, (2) an impact objective, and (3) cost
constraints. The first of these requirements is determined by regulatory
setbacks and technological constraints. The impact objective is the
Impact Score, which we have already described. The third requirement is
determined by the cost of an estimated least-monetary-cost layout. All
layouts are produced by first proposing locations of well pads. Once
locations are chosen, well pads become terminals for roads and
pipelines. Roads and pipelines are routed using a least-cost path
algorithm that is a modified version of Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra
1959). The surface over which access roads and pipelines are routed is a
spatially additive approximation of the Impact Score, which is nonadditive in nature. Access roads and gathering pipelines must connect to
their respective existing infrastructure networks. Each layout must
adhere to a monetary construction budget which is iteratively relaxed to
trace the tradeoff curve for a site. The optimal layout at one construction
budget is determined by a genetic algorithm optimization of the locations
of well pads and order of construction of linear infrastructure (p. 107).
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This method will likely produce local (rather than global) optima, so we
planned layouts five times for each site and took those layouts that were
not simultaneously more impacting and more costly than any other
layout, i.e. they are closer to the Pareto-frontier.

3.4 Results
3.4.1 Infrastructure Layouts
Using existing well locations to approximate lease-hold scale site
boundaries, we planned shale energy surface infrastructure in 84 sites in
5 counties in Pennsylvania (Fig. 3.2). We were limited to five counties
with shale energy development because of limits on parcel data. At each
site, we used Bungee to automatically assess the tradeoffs between
reducing environmental impacts and increasing construction costs. The
software produced 2-20 layouts at each site. This number varies because
(1) the software is heuristic, (2) the flexibility of planning at each site
differs, and (3) the shape of the tradeoff curve varies by site.
There are spatial patterns in layouts across sites (Fig. 3.3). At low
costs, access roads and pipelines tend to be straight (Fig. 3.3a,c) and
short. As the amount spent increases, the routes of linear infrastructure
begin to meander as the software tracks the lower-impact areas (Fig.
3.3b,d). These differences between layouts are often subtle, but even
subtle differences can greatly affect impacts and costs. For instance, in
the table in Fig. 3.3 we show how the differences in layouts (a) and (b)
increase costs by ~1.5 million USD while reducing most impacts, but
increasing impacts on wetlands. Sites differ by the number of pads since
sites have different sizes and shapes. All layouts within a site are
constrained to have the same number of pads.

3.4.2 Tradeoff Curves
We used an aggregate measure of environmental impact (p. 100) along
with estimated construction costs of each layout to produce a tradeoff
curve for a site (Fig. 3.4). We linearly interpolated between points
corresponding to the infrastructure layouts to construct each site’s
tradeoff curve. Although tradeoff curves are generally thought of as
smoothly concave or convex, our tradeoff curves are by nature of their
construction not smooth and vary in their convexity. Discontinuity is
created by the discreteness of layouts, which produce the points used to
construct the tradeoff curves. The set of Pareto-improved layouts within
a site tend to be separable into subsets, where each subset contains
similarly planned infrastructure. Small variations on layouts produce
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Fig. 3.4. Cost of reducing impacts at the development-area scale as the commitment
to reducing impact increases. (gray lines) Tradeoff curves for individual sites,
illustrating that the general shape of tradeoff curves, the maximum reduction in
Impact Score and the resulting increase in construction costs all vary across sites.
The lines are interpolated between individual layouts and are shown for clarity, while
in reality the tradeoff curves will not be smooth. (blue line) Median of the tradeoff
curves where truncated curves are given a very high cost at higher levels of impact
reduction. This illustrates the overall cost of reducing the Impact Score by some
amount when using one type of uniform policy across sites.
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small Pareto-improvements, such that points in the tradeoff curve for
similar layouts are close together. Spatial differences between subsets of
layouts tend to be large and result in large changes in Pareto-optimality.
Thus, tradeoff curves tend to be characterized by clusters of points
separated by large gaps, i.e. are not smooth. Variations in tradeoff curve
convexity arise from a complex combination of the spatial relationship
between costs and impacts in a site, as well as environmental,
developmental, and regulatory constraints on infrastructure placement,
which in combination are difficult to tease apart. In order to compare
across sites, which may have very different costs and impacts, we
calculated the percent increase in construction costs and percent
reduction in Impact Score relative to the least-cost layout; the ratio of the
first value to the second gives the impact elasticity of cost for a particular
layout. As such, the dotted line in Fig. 3.4 is the line of unit elasticity,
along which a 1% decrease in the Impact Score requires a 1% increase in
construction costs. Layouts above the unit elasticity line are
proportionally more expensive than the resulting reduction in impact,
while layouts below are proportionally cheaper for the impact reduction.
As Fig. 3.4 shows, sites varied markedly by the shape of their tradeoff
curves. Some curves lie primarily above the unit elasticity, while most lie
below. Some curves are concave overall, while most are convex. The
variation in the shapes of the tradeoff curves is to be expected, since our
sites may differ by how constrained infrastructure locations are, to what
degree impacts and costs vary over the site, and the relative magnitude
of change in impacts and costs brought on by moving infrastructure (i.e.
% change). Below we do more analyses to understand what caused the
general patterns we observed.

3.4.3 Cost of Reducing Impacts
On average, we found that although large reductions in Impact Score can
often be achieved for little cost, this was true only for some sites. In Fig.
3.4 (gray lines), we plot the distribution of tradeoff curves showing the
cost of reducing the Impact Score by a specific amount. We also plot a
summary tradeoff curve that aggregates across sites. The blue line in Fig.
3.4 shows the median value of the cost of reducing the Impact Score
when we artificially assign a very high cost to reducing impacts for
curves that have no layout at the current impact reduction. This line
represents overall costs of reducing impacts when using a median-based
uniform regulation across sites. The median increase in construction
cost increases almost linearly up to ~38%, such that a given percent
reduction in the Impact Score requires half that percent increase in costs.
The median escalates quickly around 40% reduction in the Impact Score.
Further reductions in the Impact Score would require an inordinate
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amount of money on the median site. In other words, the impact
elasticity of costs is about one-half up to ~38% and becomes almost
perfectly elastic after 40%. Of our 84 sites, 43 could achieve this 40%
reduction in impact at a cost of 0.8-3.8 million USD per pad.
There was considerable variation in site-level ability to and relative
cost of reducing potential impacts. Note that raw Impact Scores cannot be
directly compared across sites, so we summarize by percentage changes
relative to the least-cost layout. The site with the largest potential to
avoid impacts could reduce the Impact Score up to 75% for 4.1 million
USD (1 million USD per pad). At the other extreme, another site could
reduce the Impact Score only 2% at a cost of 7.7 million USD (1.1 million
USD per pad). Most sites (75 of 84 or 89%) had tradeoff curves mostly
below the line of unit elasticity, indicating it is relatively cheaper to
reduce potential impacts by some amount in those sites. However, as can
be seen in Fig. 3.4, curves below the line of unit elasticity are fairly
evenly distributed in their overall shapes.

3.4.4 Understanding Causes of Heterogeneity of Tradeoff
Curves
What site-level differences distinguish those sites with short versus
long tradeoff curves and cheap versus expensive reductions in impacts,
and which, in aggregate, lead to the median line in Fig. 3.4? We chose to
explore our results in three additional ways. First, we explored how site
characteristics might influence our results. Second, we looked at the
breakdown of impact metrics contributing to reductions in the Impact
Score to see which impacts are responding the most to moving
infrastructure. Third, we qualitatively assessed the spatial characteristics
of impact surfaces and least-cost layouts at sites to determine the
amount of reduction likely at a site and thus the shape of the site’s
tradeoff curve.
Simple ordinary least-square regression revealed tenuous support
that site attributes reflecting the flexibility of planning can predict the
amount that impacts can be avoided or a combination of the cost and
impact without planning infrastructure (p. 92). The strongest of these
results relied on site-level cost and impact surfaces. The cost surfaces
are pixel-by-pixel estimates of construction cost at a site, with one cost
surface for each type of infrastructure. The impact surfaces are pixel-bypixel approximations of the Impact Score made by assuming each pixel is
developed independently of others (p. 108). We found that higher
variation in the impact surface as well as higher variation in the ratio of
impact to cost (return on investment; ROI) surfaces explained larger
impact reductions and lower relative costs of avoiding impacts (p. 92 and
Table S 3.1). With R2=15% for both models, variation in the impact
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surface explained most of the variation in our two responses (p<0.001).
However, there was obvious uneven sampling over the range of values of
the variation in the impact surface (Fig. S 3.2). We accounted for this by
splitting the data into two parts with even sampling and modeling the
parts separately. We then compared the original one- and new two-part
models using AICc competition, which evaluates the parsimony of models
by rewarding models for higher explanation of variance and punishes
them for using more parameters (Crawley 2007). Model competition
supported the two-part model, which was non-significant. This result
weakens support that variation in the impact surface can be used to
explain our responses. Variation in the ROI surface explained 9% of the
variation in our responses (p≈0.004). Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons did not reverse the significance of the ROI models. Thus,
areas with higher variation in ROI will, on average, be able to reduce
impacts further and at lower relative costs. Other site attributes,
including site area, number of well pads, the slope and correlation
between impact and cost surfaces, and existing road and pipeline density
were unrelated to our responses (Table S 3.1).
Individual impact metrics differentially contributed to reductions in
the Impact Score relative to the least-cost layout (Fig. S 3.3). Since the
Impact Score is a sum of the (normalized) impact metrics, we can
attribute changes to the Impact Score to changes in each of the impact
metrics. Reductions in the rare spp. metric contributed to 40% +/- 5%
(mean +/- std. err.) reduction in the Impact Score across sites (Fig. S 3.3).
Following rare spp. were sediment yield (25% +/- 5%), forest loss (19%
+/- 3%), forest p2a (-0.1 % +/- 0.2%), and wetlands (-1.2% +/- 0.8%).
Three things explain the variable contributions of impact metrics to
reductions in the Impact Score. First and foremost, the disparity between
rare spp. and other metrics is likely due to the large variance of rare spp.
over small spatial scales. The pixel values of rare spp. may vary multiple
orders of magnitude between adjacent pixels, such that a small shift in
infrastructure results in a large reduction in impacts. Couple this with
the lack of a direct cost analog to the rare spp. metric – unlike forest loss,
whose cost analog is forest clearing costs – and relatively inexpensive
reductions to rare spp. can be made with small changes to
infrastructure. Similarly, some of the contribution of forest loss can be
attributed to high variance over small scales, though it has a cost analog,
such that the least-cost layout already avoids those areas to some extent.
Second, some impacts are small in the least-cost layout, such that there
is little scope to reduce those impacts further. The wetlands
encroachment metric is restricted to areas surrounding wetlands, which
are relatively sparse. As a result, wetlands encroachment impacts from
the least-cost layout tend to be small and as a result impact-reducing
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layouts have little scope to reduce this metric. Finally, but rarely,
reductions in one impact metric resulted in increases in another relative
to the least-cost layout, which explains why, on average, wetlands
encroachment had a negative contribution to reductions in the Impact
Score.
In most cases, the difference between sites that could achieve large
reductions in the Impact Score for little cost (25 of 84 or 29%), i.e. those
with tradeoff curves in the lower right of Fig. 3.4, and those sites which
could do very little (17 of 84 or 20 %), could be explained by visually
comparing layouts overlaid on the spatially additive impact surface. The
spatially-additive impact surface approximates the Impact Score on a perpixel basis, while the true Impact Score depends on the entire layout.
From this exercise, two conditions distinguish the aforementioned
groups: first, whether the least-cost layout has at least some
infrastructure in high-impact areas, and second, whether there are
lower-impact areas for infrastructure to be placed. Those 25 sites in the
first group tended to have roads or pipelines in high-impact areas in the
least-cost layout (21 of 25 sites). Much less often (4 of 25 sites) well pads,
but not roads or pipelines, were in high-impact areas in the least-cost
layout. Those 17 sites in the second group, which achieved either no
large or very costly reductions in the Impact Score, tended to be
constrained by impacts in one way or another. Many sites (9 of 17) were
constrained by a lack of low-impact alternatives for pipelines and pads.
Often, sparse existing pipeline infrastructure, to which gathering
pipelines had to connect, forced gathering pipelines through high-impact
areas. Alternatively or in addition, feasible well pad locations, from which
gathering pipelines start and well pads are located, were in high-impact
areas. In other sites (6 of 17), reductions in some impacts led to
increases in others, such that the aggregate Impact Score did not change
much. Finally, in 3 of 17 sites, the least-cost layout was already in a lowimpact area such that there was little scope to reduce impacts further.

3.5 Discussion
Shale gas development will continue worldwide, but there are
opportunities to reduce potential impacts through environmentally
oriented planning. Here we presented an analysis that looks at the
monetary cost of such planning at the site level, and found scope to
reduce impacts, though doing so is not generally cheap. More
specifically, we found that most sites do not have the scope to reduce the
Impact Score more than ~40%. For those sites, reducing the Impact Score
up to ~38% requires <20% additional investment, but further reductions
become very expensive. For many of those sites that can achieve larger
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reductions in impact at reasonable costs, doing so is inexpensive. For
instance, a reduction in the Impact Score of up to 60% required <5%
increase in costs at several sites (Fig. 3.4). There was only marginal
support that simple statistics on the spatial variation of impacts and
costs within a site can be used alone to partially predict the nature of
tradeoffs in a site, while other site characteristics do not appear to be
informative. Some impact metrics dominated others in their contribution
to avoiding aggregate impacts.
Our results can be used most directly by policy makers. There is
scope to reduce the aggregate Impact Score up to ~38% with ~20%
increase in costs when following a median-based uniform policy.
However, a 20% increase in costs is not small, requiring ~400,000 USD
per well pad to reduce impacts by 38% in our case study. That said, the
construction costs represented here are for surface infrastructure alone,
so total costs to a developer would increase by less than 20%. As such,
regulations that target a 38% reduction in aggregate impacts without
compensating developers need not result in a 20% increase in gas prices.
Regulations that target one or two impacts independently may do fairly
well at reducing aggregate impacts. We found that ~65% of reductions
across sites in the Impact Score over the least-cost baseline were
attributable to just two impact metrics, which measured impacts on
high-quality habitats and freshwater sedimentation (Fig. S 3.3). Further,
only very rarely did impacts trade-off with one another when compared to
the least-cost layout. This is a qualitatively similar result to Chapter 2
even though the assessment and set of impacts differ somewhat. As
such, it is possible that regulations could target one or two metrics to
reduce aggregate impacts in a predictable way up to a point. In
Pennsylvania, for instance, restrictions on the amount of infrastructure
placed in high-quality habitats and high-slope areas could be feasibly
implemented, since these data can be at least partially remotely sensed
and impacts assessed by overlaying planned infrastructure with these
data. There is already a minimum setback requirement for infrastructure
placed in high-quality watersheds in Pennsylvania. Outside of our study
area, it will be important to assess potential impacts before implementing
such a regulation, since the necessary qualities of the impacts here may
not extend elsewhere. Finally, we found that some site attributes
partially explain the ability to reduce impacts at a site as well as the
relative cost of doing so. However, the low (R2~9%) explanatory power of
these attributes likely precludes them from being used independently
from other analyses to predict potential tradeoffs at a site.
It may be possible to regulate aggregate impacts efficiently, i.e. to
simultaneously reduce multiple distinct impacts with a single regulation.
If this can be done, it presents two major advantages. First, regulating
aggregate impacts enables regulators and/or developers to tailor
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individual impacts at the site level rather than be forced to focus on
impacts they may not be able to avoid. Second, a general regulatory tool
for aggregate impacts could work in multiple regions where regulating
single impacts might not. As our results show (Fig. 3.4), uniform policies,
e.g. that require all sites reduce impacts by a certain amount, may be
unnecessarily costly. More flexible regulations may be able to take
advantage of the heterogeneity of site-level tradeoffs between cost and
impact to reduce impacts across all sites. There are many economic tools
and existing programs that can cost efficiently allocate single impacts
across sites and can serve as a basis in this context (Ferraro 2008).
Market-based mechanisms such as cap and trade can exploit
heterogeneity across sties, incentivizing those who cannot reduce
impacts by much or for cheap to compensate those who can and will. We
explore this further in Chapter 4.
There are two major barriers to implementing any aggregate impact
regulation in this context. First, there must be some information
exchange between regulators and developers. We think at minimum that
regulators must share their environmental priorities in order for
developers to assess alternative infrastructure layouts that may reduce
aggregate impacts. Existing command-and-control regulations do this to
some degree by restricting infrastructure in areas of high environmental
value. To avoid aggregate impacts, regulators would need to make
explicit how infrastructure layouts are used to evaluate aggregate
impacts. In addition to sharing environmental objectives, we think
developers will need to share some layouts, which is already done for
other permits. Regulators need such layouts to estimate impacts in the
absence of additional regulations so they can effectively limit impacts. In
the cap and trade system we explore in Chapter 4, regulators would not
need to know construction costs, though this additional information may
be helpful. Bungee, the planning software we presented here, provides an
existing system for this information exchange and is set up in such a
way that planning and monitoring would be very inexpensive.
The second barrier to implementing a regulation of aggregate
impacts is the difficulty of finding and using a metric of aggregate
impact. The Impact Score – the measure of aggregate impact we use here
– is a site-specific metric. It lends itself well to optimization at the sitelevel and could be used to implement a uniform policy such as described
above, but it could not be used in its present form to allocate allowed
impacts across sites. We return to this point in Chapter 4, in which we
faced this issue. One example of a aggregate score currently used to
allocate conservation funds is the Conservation Reserve Program’s
Environmental Benefits Index (United States Department of Agriculture
Farm Service Agency 2011). The Environmental Benefits Index is
measured qualitatively and is used to rank applicants, whereas a metric
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better suited to our system would be calculated directly from estimated
impacts and that could be traded or allocated continuously across sites.
Bungee can be used by regulators, policy makers, conservation
NGOs, large land owners, and the shale energy industry to reduce
potential impacts from future development. Regulators whose job it is to
assess development plans for permits could use our software to evaluate
the relative impacts of a proposed infrastructure layout to a lowerimpact, more “ideal” layout. Then, threshold allowances could be applied
to judge with some objectivity if the proposed layout meets environmental
standards. Policy makers could use the software to estimate potential
gains from new regulations. Applied in a new context, Bungee could
inform the magnitude of subsidies or taxes to affect a target level of
impact avoidance by the shale energy industry. Conservation groups who
are working in collaboration with the gas industry can use Bungee to
inform planning practices at a site. Such collaborations between
conservation and industry may be necessary since conservation groups
will be better informed about the important impacts in an area and how
to evaluate them. Large landowners who have access to ArcGIS can use
our software to propose alternative layouts when shale development
plans clash with site features the landowner wants protected. That said,
our experience has been that the shale energy industry is attuned to
such conflicts and, when well informed, wants to avoid them. Finally, the
gas industry is perhaps the best positioned to benefit from the use of our
software. The scale at which it operates, its flexibility in use, and its
incorporation of costs mean that Bungee can be an effective tool for going
above and beyond for a progressive company.
Our study is a novel contribution to the shale energy policy
literature. In addition, Bungee is a novel planning software in multiple
regards. Our methods focus on site-level planning, which is the scale at
which decisions about shale gas development most directly affect the
environment. As such, we are uniquely able to inform policies and
actions at this scale. Bungee attempts to simultaneously site multiple
types of infrastructure with very different planning characteristics. The
spatial optimization problem it solves and the methods used to do so
have, to our knowledge, never been so comprehensively attempted in
conservation planning. While the software is specialized to work in the
shale gas planning context, the methods could be easily transferred to
other development problems that involve connecting potential
development sites to infrastructure networks while considering costs and
impacts.
Several steps could be taken to improve future analyses such as
ours. First, we feel that a more informative analysis would explicitly
compare existing shale gas development to proposed layouts at the
development-area scale. Such an analysis would require having site
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boundaries from many shale energy companies as well as more complete
pipeline data. Both datasets are difficult to come by and cannot be easily
derived from available remotely sensed data. As a compromise, we used
publicly available well permit locations and our knowledge of drilling
practices to estimate development boundaries. This enabled us to plan in
locations where development has occurred, but not to compare to
existing development directly. Second, the planning framework and
methods in Bungee are advanced, but the software performs a fairly
narrow heuristic search for potential infrastructure layouts. We were
forced to compromise known optimality for reasonable run speeds. Our
results must therefore be interpreted as conservative, since it is likely the
layouts produced are not Pareto-optimal. Improvements to the
optimization method could improve the optimality of results without
prohibitively increasing the run time.

3.6 Conclusion
Shale energy development will likely play an increasingly important role
in energy production over the coming decades. Our study and others like
it can contribute to a conservation oriented development paradigm, in
which the cost of impacting the environment is explicitly accounted for
and which factors into decision making on a large scale.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Additional/Detailed Methods and Results
3.7.1.1 Regressions to explain impact reductions
We wanted to know if site attributes related to the flexibility of
infrastructure planning would explain how much impacts could be
reduced, what this would cost, or a combination of the two. In other
words, can we predict the end-points of the tradeoff curves in Fig. 3.4
without planning infrastructure? Addressing this question would allow
us to understand what makes some sites able to avoid impacts cheaply
as opposed to not being able to avoid impacts at all or for it to be very
expensive to do so.
To answer the above question, we identified several predictors
related to the flexibility of planning of infrastructure. We define flexible
sites as those where there are many feasible, spatially distinct
infrastructure layouts with a wide range of Impact Scores. An inflexible
site is one where feasible layouts are tightly constrained to specific areas
or where there is little heterogeneity in impacts and costs. First and
second, we used the density of existing road and pipeline networks as
predictors since larger/denser existing infrastructure provides more
connection points for proposed infrastructure. This was calculated as the
number of pixels of existing road (or pipeline) infrastructure per pixel of
the site. Third, we used the variation of the pipeline impact surface
across pixels (see 3.7.7.5 Estimate additive impact surfaces), since
higher variation of impacts might create more alternative routes for
pipelines and roads. This was calculated as
( )
.̅ We used the
pipeline impact surface because it covered the entire site and the spatial
structure of the impact surfaces are very similar across types of
infrastructure. Fourth, we use the variation of the pipeline cost surface
for a similar reason to the pipeline impact surface and calculated the
same way. Fifth, we used variation in the ROI surface, which is the ratio
of the impact surface to the cost surface. We expected the ROI surface to
be the strongest predictor since Bungee is planning according to impacts
and costs (see 3.7.7.6 Create final layouts and 3.7.9.3 Linear
infrastructure route optimization). Sixth, we used the correlation
between the impact and cost surfaces. Highly negatively correlated
impact and cost surfaces might lead to costly avoidance of impacts,
whereas highly positively correlated surfaces might lead to an inability to
reduce impacts since the least-cost layout would already be in lowimpact areas (Babcock et al. 1997). Seventh and eighth, we used the size
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Fig. S 3.1. Example showing how response variables for regressions were derived.
The relative cost (Y) and impact reduction (X) of the least-impact layout are
calculated proportionally to the least-cost layout represented by (0, 0).

(in hectares and number of well pads) of sites, since larger areas, by
definition, have more locations for infrastructure to be placed.
For the regressions, two response variables were identified that
describe attributes of the least-impact layout relative to the least-cost
layout. These two layouts form the end-points of the tradeoff curves in
Fig. 3.4 (see Fig. S 3.1 for example). First, we used the impact reduction
of the least-impact layout measured as the X position of the least-impact
layout (Fig. S 3.1). Second, we calculated the ratio of the cost increase
and impact reduction of the least-impact layout, also known as the
impact elasticity of cost of the least-impact layout (Y/X in Fig. S 3.1).
As Table S 3.1 below shows, four models were significant (p<0.05). Visual
inspection of the plots using log10(CV(impact)) as a predictor (Fig. S 3.2)
show uneven sampling across the values of log10(CV(impact)). We explored
the effects of treating the dataset as composed of two parts, each with
even sampling across log10(CV(impact)). To do so, we split the dataset at
log10(CV(impact)) = -1.0 and ran separate ordinary least-squares
regressions on each part. In both cases, the two-part model had an AICc
score more than five units below the one-part model (titles in Fig. S 3.2),
indicating a two-part model is more parsimonious. Combined with the
non-significance of the two-part model, this result weakens support that
log10(CV(impact)) explains variation in our responses.
3.7.1.2 Summary of metric contributions to reductions in Impact Score
We wanted to see if reductions in the Impact Score relative to the leastcost layout were being driven mainly by one or a few impact metrics. If
so, then regulations concentrating on those most responsive metrics
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could reduce aggregate impacts. In addition, if there was little scope to
reduce one of those metrics at a site, then there may be little scope to
reduce the Impact Score. We also wanted to see if some metrics tended to
trade off with others, which would reduce the effectiveness of some
impact-specific regulations and would explain why some sites have short
tradeoff curves.
To address these interests, we broke down the Impact Score for
each infrastructure layout into its weighted, normalized impact metric
constituents. We calculated the proportional change of a metric in each
layout from the least-cost layout. Next, we divided this proportional
change for each metric by the total change across metrics for the layout
to get each metric’s contribution to the reduction in Impact Score. To
partially control for site differences, we averaged across layouts within a
site to get the site’s mean contribution to reductions in the Impact Score
(gray circles in Fig. S 3.3). We then averaged across sites to get the mean
contribution of each impact metric across all sites (bars in Fig. S 3.3).

3.7.2 Impact Metrics
This section contains detailed descriptions of each impact metric used in
the analysis, including how each metric is calculated. Metrics were
chosen based on their likelihood to occur, their magnitude when they do
occur, and their priority for Pennsylvania.
3.7.2.1 forest frag
This is a measure of forest fragmentation, specifically edge-to-area ratio.
We chose this metric because of the high potential for forest
fragmentation caused primarily by new pipelines and access roads. We
calculate forest frag as follows:
1. forested areas overlain by proposed infrastructure are removed
from the forest raster (Table S 3.2) the number of pixel edges
joining a forested area and non-forested area are tallied
2. the total number of forested pixels are tallied
3. forest frag = [step 2] / [step 3]
3.7.2.2 forest loss
This is a measure of direct forest habitat loss from clearing forested
areas. We chose this metric because of the high potential for forest loss
caused by surface development. We calculate forest loss as the total
number of forested cells in the forest raster overlain by proposed
infrastructure (Table S 3.2). This value is converted into hectares for
statistical analyses and reporting.
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Table S 3.1. Simple ordinary least-squares regressions of attributes of the least-impacting layout relative to the least-cost
layout against site attributes. Predictors are log10(CV(impact)) = log-transformed coefficient of variation of the pipe impact
surface, CV(ROI) = coefficient of variation of ROI surface, and CV(cost) = coefficient of variation of cost surface. Responses are
impact reduction = percent impact reduction of least-impact layout as in Fig. 3.4, log10(elast(impact, cost)) = log-transformed
ratio of least-impact layout cost to least-impact layout impact relative to least-cost layout in Fig. 3.4, cost increase = percent
cost increase of least-impact layout as in Fig. 3.4, corr(impact, cost) = Pearson’s correlation of the pipe impact surface with
the pipe cost surface, CV(cost) = coefficient of variation of the pipe cost surface, pipe density = density of existing pipeline
network (# pipe pixels / area of site in pixels), road density = density of existing road network (# road pixels / area of site in
pixels), log10(# pads) = log-transformed number of well pads in site, and log10(area) = log-transformed area of site in hectares.
Several variables were log-transformed to increase normality of regression residuals.

Predictor

Response

log10(CV(impact))

impact reduction

log10(CV(impact))

log10(elast(impact,
cost))

CV(ROI)

impact reduction

CV(ROI)

log10(elast(impact,
cost))

Rationale

Slope

Std.
Error

R2

p

layouts produced at sites with larger
variation in impact will span a
greater range of impact including
relatively lower impact options
the average – represented by leastimpact layout – unit cost of reducing
impacts at a site is constrained by
impact, and layouts produced at sites
with larger variation in impact will
span a larger range of impact
the maximum amount of impact
reduction at a site is constrained by
low cost options for reducing impacts
the average – represented by leastimpact layout – unit cost of reducing
impacts at a site is constrained by
low cost options for reducing impacts

0.25

0.066

0.15

0.0003*

0.21

0.055

0.15

0.0003*

0.77

0.264

0.09

0.0044

0.64

0.221

0.09

0.0049

* Results for one-part model. Two-part model favored by AICc competition was not significant.

Predictor
corr(impact,
cost)

Response
impact reduction

Rationale (all results non-significant)
sites where low-cost pixels are also low-impact will not be able to reduce
impacts much because the lowest-cost layout will also be low-impact
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Table S 3.1 Continued

Predictor

Response

CV(cost)

impact reduction

pipe density

impact reduction

road density

impact reduction

log10(# pads)

impact reduction

log10(area)

impact reduction

CV(cost)

log10(elast(impact,
cost))

pipe density

log10(elast(impact,
cost))

road density

log10(elast(impact,
cost))

log10(# pads)

log10(elast(impact,
cost))
log10(elast(impact,
cost))

log10(area)

Rationale (all results non-significant)
layouts produced at sites with larger variation in cost will span a greater
range of impact including relatively low-impact options
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for gathering
pipelines, so sites with more pipeline connection options will be able to
reduce impacts more
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for access
roads, so sites with more road connection options will be able to reduce
impacts more
larger sites (that support more pads) will have a larger number of feasible
layouts that can span a larger range of impacts, including relatively lowimpact options
larger sites will have a larger number of feasible layouts that can span a
larger range of impacts, including relatively low-impact options
the average – represented by least-impact layout – unit cost of reducing
impacts at a site is constrained by cost, and layouts produced at sites with
larger variation in cost will span a larger range of costs
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for gathering
pipelines, so sites with more pipeline connection options will be able to
reduce impacts cheaply
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for access
roads, so sites with more road connection options will be able to reduce
impacts cheaply
larger sites (that support more pads) will have a larger number of feasible
layouts that can span a larger range of impacts and do so at lower costs
larger sites will have a larger number of feasible layouts that can span a
larger range of impacts and do so at lower costs
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Fig. S 3.2. Illustrating uneven sampling present in regressions of the variation in the
additive impact surface with a) maximum impact reduction, and b) the impact
elasticity of cost. Blue lines show regression lines for full dataset, while red lines
show regression lines when splitting data into two parts to explore effects of treating
data in two separate parts. Two-part regressions are not significant. Residuals on
right are for the full dataset.
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3.7.2.3 sediment yield
This is a measure of potential sediment mobilization and load on streams
caused by disturbing soil during construction. We chose this metric
because of the high biodiversity value of streams in Pennsylvania and
their sensitivity to changes in quality. This sediment yield rasters differ
between well pads and linear infrastructure. For linear infrastructure,
sediment yield in a pixel is calculated as the number of metric tons per
year of sediment resulting from replacing existing land cover with a well
pad for each individual pixel. This was modeled using the methodology
described in Fernandez et al., 2003.1 For well pads, the sediment yield in
a pixel is the sum of the previous raster’s pixels covered by a well pad
centered on that pixel.
3.7.2.4 wetlands encroachment
This is a measure of indirect impacts on wetlands through degradation or
removal of buffering habitat. We chose this metric because of the
importance of wetlands in Pennsylvania. We calculate wetlands
encroachment as follows:
1. wetlands (Table S 3.2) are buffered by different amounts for each
type of infrastructure. For well pads, the buffer is 61 m. For roads
and pipelines, the buffer is 91 m. This produces three presenceabsence rasters that include the buffer and original wetlands.
2. Each present pixel from step 1 is given the same value, which is
the percentage of all buffers that each pixel represents, such that
the sum across all three rasters is 100%.
3. Each infrastructure type is overlaid with its corresponding raster
from step 2 and the sum of those pixels is calculated.
4. wetlands encroachment = [sum of three values from step 3]
3.7.2.5 rare spp.
This is a measure of risk to rare species in Pennsylvania, or alternatively
to the habitats in which rare species are found. We chose this metric
because of the high priority of rare species in Pennsylvania. This metric
is calculated as follows:

1

Fernandez C, Wu JQ, McCool DK, Stöckle CO (2003) Estimating water erosion and sediment yield with
GIS, RUSLE, and SEDD. J Soil Water Conserv 58 (3 ):128–136. Available at:
http://www.jswconline.org/content/58/3/128.abstract.
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Fig. S 3.3. Contributions of individual impact metrics to reductions in the Impact
Score relative to the least-cost layout (n=84 per bar). Bar heights are means of site
mean contributions (gray circles) along with the standard error (red error bars).
Significant differences are rare spp. > sediment ≈ forest loss > forest frag. ≈ 0 >
wetlands. Jitter was added to gray circles to ease interpretation.
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A map of habitat types from the Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat
Mapping Project (Table S 3.2) was overlaid with element
occurrences from the Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program
(Table S 3.2). Each habitat type was assigned the number of
element occurrences it contained. This was done without regard to
species identity. This number was then divided by the total area of
the habitat type to reduce areal effects. Finally, values were
multiplied by one million to aid understanding.
rare spp. = [sum of pixels of raster from step 1 overlain by any
infrastructure]

3.7.2.6 Impact Score
This metric is an aggregation of the others and is used for the
optimization of infrastructure layouts, as well as a summary of the total
potential impact of a layout. Because individual impact metrics may be
spatially non-additive, the Impact Score is generally spatially nonadditive. In other words, it cannot be calculated exactly until all
infrastructure has been planned. The Impact Score is basically a
weighted sum of the individual impact metrics. However, several
requirements of the optimization process cause the final form of the
equation for the Impact Score to be more complex. Below, we describe
each of these requirements and describe how they affect the Impact
Score. Further down we summarize and show mathematically how each
requirement affects the Impact Score.
Strictly positive values
Dijkstra’s least-cost-path algorithm, on which road and pipeline route
planning is based, requires strictly positive values in each pixel of the
planning surface. We required the Impact Score to be non-negative. When
using the spatially additive approximation of the Impact Score to plan
road and pipeline routes (see Additive Layout Creation Methods), we
added a small constant to all pixels so that any zero values would
become positive.
Direction of impact undetermined
In this study, all metrics are worse when the values are larger. However,
built-in to Bungee is the potential to handle metrics that are worse when
they are smaller. We assumed that ‘impact’ is always either
monotonically increasing or decreasing with metric values. To handle the
direction of impacts somewhat generally, Bungee compares metric values
to a baseline value, which is the best-case or, alternatively, the no100

impact scenario. In this analysis, we use a no-impact baseline for all
metrics, such that the baseline values for all metrics are zero.
Metric scales differ
Because metric scales differ, they cannot be directly combined. Instead,
they are first normalized by dividing by a normalization constant (see
3.7.7.4 Determine normalization constants), which puts them on a
similar scale close to one.
Impact priorities differ
The conservation priorities of impacts are different, since some are more
important to stakeholders than others. We account for this in Bungee by
allowing for metric weights to be specified. In this study, we weight each
category of impacted features equally: forest loss and forest frag each
received a weight of 0.5, while all others received a weight of 1.0. Bungee
automatically makes all impact weights sum to 1, so this results in
weights of 0.125 and 0.25.
Normality of values
Although not a requirement of the optimization process, impact metrics
that are more normally distributed – as opposed to highly skewed or
multi-modal – enable the optimization algorithm to explore more of the
solution space. We used a natural-log transform to help make metrics
more normally distributed.
Impact Score calculation
With the above considerations in mind, the Impact Score is calculated as
follows:
∑

| (
(
|

)

|
|

)

where impact in the set of impact metrics is evaluated using the
function . The function , as described for each impact in the sections
above, operates on the Boolean rasters and well pad centroids for the
infrastructure layout and the set of additional inputs
needed for the
metric. The metric is compared to its baseline value, , and that quantity
is divided by the normalization constant, . Finally, the metric is
weighted by its priority .
The considerations described in the previous subsections of 3.7.2.6
Impact Score enter into the formula in various places:



comes from Impact priorities differ
comes from Direction of impact undetermined
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comes from Normality of values
The natural-logarithm comes from Normality of values
The three ones come from Strictly positive values. The one in the
denominator avoids divide-by-zero issues. The one in the
numerator reduces skewing caused by the one in the denominator.
The furthest-right one ensures the normalized metric will be nonnegative after the natural-log transform.

3.7.3 Cost Metrics
There are many costs associated with shale energy surface infrastructure
development. For our analysis, the important ones are those that vary in
space or with changing amounts of infrastructure, since this produces
variable costs with changing infrastructure locations. Bungee also
includes other non-spatial, large costs associated with surface
infrastructure. This serves two purposes: to produce more accurate
estimates of development cost and two more realistically bound
construction costs when reducing impacts.
In describing the cost metrics, we will refer to both a standard cost
per some unit and the per-pixel cost. The former cost is easier to
interpret and translates directly from the construction action incurring
that cost, while the latter is used by Bungee to estimate the cumulative
cost of a layout by summing over the pixels occupied by infrastructure.
In general, we assume that well pads pixels occupy the entire 30 × 30 m
pixel, while road and pipeline pixels occupy the entire length of a pixel,
but only part of its width. The width of road and pipeline corridors was
set to 15 m such that each type of infrastructure occupies 50% of a pixel.
We make note where these assumptions do not hold.
Unlike the impact metrics, cost metrics are assumed to be a)
spatially additive, and b) independent across infrastructure types. As
such, each type of infrastructure has its own cost surface, which is a
summation of the individual cost metrics. All cost values are taken from
discussion and data sharing with Triana Energy, LLC.
3.7.3.1 base
Base costs are the costs of construction materials and labor beyond all
other costs. Generally we think of base costs as the cost of infrastructure
in flat areas without trees or other significant features that require
special construction. This cost includes things like the cost of gravel, pad
materials, etc. This cost surface does not vary in space, but is different
for each type of infrastructure. The base costs of well pads, access roads,
and gathering pipelines was 35.84 USD m-2 (32,256.00 USD pixel-1),
18.84 USD m-2 (8,478 USD pixel-1), and 656.18 USD m-1 (19,685.4 USD
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pixel-1) respectively. Note that pipeline base cost is defined on a perlength rather than per-area basis.
3.7.3.2 slope
Slope costs are the costs of construction and materials over and above
base costs when developing on non-flat areas. These costs typically just
apply to roads and pipelines, which may be developed in non-flat areas.
They are analogous to cut-and-fill costs for well pads, although the two
types of costs may only partially overlap. The slope costs are defined by
how much additional cost is incurred by developing on an increasingly
steep slope. The slope costs for both access roads and gathering pipelines
was 0.22 USD %-1 m-2 (100.90 USD %-1 pixel-1). The slope cost is
multiplied by a percent-slope raster to get the spatially variable slope
cost surface.
3.7.3.3 forest clearing and timber
Forest clearing and timber costs are the costs of clearing trees and
reimbursing landowners for foregone timber profits. We used the binary
forest (Table S 3.2) raster to assess whether a cost is incurred and an
equal cost per-area (16,679.61 USD ha-1) for all types of infrastructure,
though the size of infrastructure types produces different per-pixel costs.
The forest clearing and timber costs for well pads, access roads, and
gathering pipelines was 1,501.16 USD pixel-1, 750.58 USD pixel-1, and
750.58 USD pixel-1 respectively.
3.7.3.4 stream crossing
Stream crossing costs include the cost of materials, labor, and permits for
construction of stream-crossing infrastructure such as culverts or small
bridges for access roads and pipelines. We assumed that each pixel of
water incurred the same stream crossing cost. The stream crossing cost
for both access roads and gathering pipelines was 50,000 USD crossing-1
(50,000 USD pixel-1).
3.7.3.5 cut and fill
Cut and fill costs are the equipment rental and labor costs of moving soil
around within a site in order to flatten construction areas. Though the
construction of access roads and gathering pipelines does require cut
and fill, we assumed these costs were sufficiently described by the slope
costs. As such, only well pads were assumed to incur a cut and fill cost,
which was set to 6.54 USD m-3 (5,885.74 USD m-1 pixel-1). This cost was
then multiplied by a cut-and-fill depth raster to get the spatially varying
cut and fill cost. The cut-and-fill depth raster is based on the DEM raster
(Table S 3.2) and was calculated as the height of soil added to or removed
from a pixel to bring it to the average height of its eight neighbors.
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3.7.3.6 pad and well permit
Pad and well permit costs are the costs of permitting wells on a well pad.
In our analysis, each unique well pad is always assumed to have the
same number of wells regardless of where Bungee proposes to place it.
As such, this cost does not vary in space. However, it does vary with the
number of wells. We set the well permit cost to be a baseline of 65,000
USD pad-1 with an additional 6,000 USD well-1. In our analysis, all well
pads had six wells such that the total pad and well permit cost was
101,000 USD pad-1.

3.7.4 Setbacks and Other Restrictions
Pennsylvania regulations prevent the placement of some surface
infrastructure in certain areas. Often times it is difficult to assess a
priori whether a particular restriction will be activated, and in general,
most such restrictions can be waived upon application from the
developer. Regardless, we implemented several setbacks and other
restrictions under the assumption that developers would follow existing
regulations without applying for exceptions. In all, we implemented the
following setbacks and other restrictions:








pads 30 m from water bodies (Table S 3.2)
pads 30 m from wetlands (Table S 3.2)
pads 100 m from development-area boundaries
pads 152 m from buildings and other ‘cultural’ features (Table S
3.2)
roads and pipelines 15 m from buildings and other ‘cultural’
features (Table S 3.2). Note this is to ensure realistic construction
rather than adhere to a regulation.
pads and roads sited in areas between 0 and 20% slope (Table S
3.2). Note this is to ensure realistic construction rather than
adhere to a regulation.

3.7.5 Derived Pipeline Methods
Gas wells must be connected to the existing pipeline network to transmit
gas to the market. Many of our derived sites are many kilometers away
from the nearest gas pipeline; a distance unrealistically far for
development due to its cost and logistical difficulty. We know that the
derived sites have been partially developed because we use only active or
once-active wells to derive them. Because gas pipeline data are
proprietary, no GIS data warehouse has complete pipeline data. The
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3.7.6 Datasets
Table S 3.2. Description of datasets used in the analysis, including those used by
default in Bungee and those specific to this analysis.

Dataset

Used for

Source

well
permits

estimating
development
boundaries

Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection: Office of Oil and
Gas Management:
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/

forest
patches

siting infrastructure,
forest metrics

National Land Cover Database 2006
(classes 41, 42, 43, 90):
http://www.mrlc.gov/nlcd06_data.php

wetlands
in PA

restricting
infrastructure, siting
infrastructure,
wetlands
encroachment metric

National Wetlands Inventory and National
Land Cover Database 2006

habitat
classificat
ions for
NE USA

rare spp. metric

Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat Mapping
Project:
http://conserveonline.org/workspaces/ecs
/documents/ne-terrestrial-habitatmapping-project

spatial
locations
of rare
species
observatio
ns in PA

rare spp. metric

Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program
data request. Cannot release data.

streams,
rivers,
lakes

restricting
infrastructure, siting
infrastructure, water
metrics, sediment
yield raster

National Hydrography Dataset:
ftp://nhdftp.usgs.gov/DataSets/Staged/St
ates/FileGDB/HighResolution/

Digital
Elevation
Model
(dem),
elevation
at a point
in raster

restricting
infrastructure, siting
infrastructure, cutand fill cost, percentslope raster, sediment
yield raster

National Elevation Dataset within the
National Hydrography Dataset:
http://www.horizonsystems.com/NHDPlus/NHDPlusV2_data.p
hp

http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Data/Mapp
er.html

105

Table S 3.2 Continued
Dataset

Used for

Source

‘cultural’
features,
i.e.
schools,
recreation
al fields,
dwellings,
reservatio
ns, etc.

restricting
infrastructure

U.S. Board on Geographic Names’
Geographic Names Information System
(GNIS):
http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/down
load_data.htm

existing
roads

siting infrastructure

US Census Bureau TIGER/Line 2008 (all
counties All Lines RDFLAG = “Y”):
http://www.pasda.psu.edu/default.asp

existing
pipelines

siting infrastructure

MapSearch pipelines. Propriety data.
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pipeline dataset we purchased from MapSearch has many larger
pipelines that could be connected to, but misses many of the other
available tie-ins (Table S 3.2).
To get around the sparsity of our pipeline dataset, we made the
assumption that new gathering pipelines would be developed in the
direction of the nearest known pipeline in our dataset. We based our
pipeline connections on the rectangle bounding the site with its sides
parallel to the cardinal directions (“bounding rectangle” hereafter). First,
we assumed any gathering pipelines could connect to any existing
pipelines intersecting the bounding rectangle. When no known pipelines
intersected the bounding rectangle, we assumed new gathering pipelines
would be developed in the direction of the known pipeline closest to the
centroid of the site. In some cases, the nearest pipeline was over ten
kilometers away. We forced gathering pipelines in this latter category to
connect to a section of the bounding rectangle intersected by a 45° wide
wedge oriented with its point in the centroid of the site and the angle
towards the nearest pipeline.

3.7.7 Bungee Workflow
Bungee is software that combines variations of many well known
optimization techniques to plan locations of well pads, access roads, and
gathering pipelines in a way to avoid some environmental impacts while
explicitly accounting for and limiting construction costs. Due to its size,
we cannot fully document Bungee here. Instead, we describe the
optimization components of Bungee and how these components fit
together. We refer the reader to the Bungee user guide and technical
documentation for a more complete understanding of its methods.
The Bungee code is a set of Python scripts written almost
exclusively in Python 2.7.2, with some optimized code written in Cython
0.19.1. Bungee consists of two major parts: a) the Python module, which
can be imported and used like any other Python module, and b) Bungee
GIS, which is a Python toolbox for ArcGIS. Both require ArcGIS 10.1+
with the Spatial Analyst Extension. The module structure of Bungee is
similar to ArcGIS’s arcpy module, with major tools composing the main
steps of the workflow as well as some minor but useful tools all directly
accessible within the Python environment. Using Bungee GIS with
default settings, analyses take on the order of hours to days, where the
scaling of runtime increases nonlinearly with the size of the analysis
area. Runtime also increases with the number of well pads, but less
closely. For instance, Bungee placed infrastructure in a 12 km2 area in
45 min on a typical desktop computer. By comparison, Bungee required
multiple days but less than one week to plan infrastructure in the largest
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of the sites in this analysis (area=72 km2). At the time of writing, access
to Bungee can be obtained by emailing the corresponding author.
The Bungee optimization workflow for a single site consists of six
major steps:
3.7.7.1 Place production units
Production units (or Drainage units) – the area being drained by a single
pad – are placed in the lease-hold to maximally drain gas while
minimizing the number of pads being developed. The output of this step
is a set of 1) production unit polygons and 2) pad envelopes, which show
the restricted area within each drainage unit where a well pad may be
placed. See 3.7.8 Production Unit Packing Methods.
3.7.7.2 Set up infrastructure restrictions
Constraints on the locations of well pads, access roads, and gathering
pipelines are set up. In this analysis, we follow those constraints
described in 3.7.4 Setbacks and Other Restrictions. This step produces
rasters which denote allowable areas for each type of infrastructure.
3.7.7.3 Determine construction budget
Bungee creates an infrastructure layout that attempts to minimize
construction costs. For this analysis, Bungee then enforced a maximum
budget that was twice as large as the least-cost layout. During the
optimization, Bungee actually incrementally increases the budget, from
the least-cost amount up to the maximum budget and creates layouts at
each incremental budget. In 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methodswe
describe the algorithm used to create layouts. To get the least-cost
layout, Bungee uses the cost surfaces in place of impact surfaces and
uses an unlimited budget.
3.7.7.4 Determine normalization constants
As described in Impact Score calculation, each impact metric is
normalized using a normalization constant. To determine this constant
for a single impact metric and site, Bungee creates many layouts
(n=1000 in this analysis) that attempt to minimize the value of the
current impact metric. The minimum value of the metric across those
layouts is the normalization constant. In 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation
Methods we describe the algorithm used to create layouts. In addition,
the average construction cost across metrics from this step is used as a
normalization constant for costs.
3.7.7.5 Estimate additive impact surfaces
After step 4, Bungee can calculate the Impact Score. At this point,
Bungee estimates spatially additive surfaces of the Impact Score, one for
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each type of infrastructure, and which are important inputs into the final
step. In each pixel of one such surface for a single infrastructure type is
the Impact Score if only that infrastructure were developed only in that
pixel. As such, the true aggregate Impact Score is underestimated in
each pixel, since non-additivity among multiple pixels of one
infrastructure or multiple infrastructures is not taken into account.
3.7.7.6 Create final layouts
The outputs of the previous steps enable Bungee to create feasible
layouts, which adhere to setbacks and construction budgets. At this
point, Bungee creates layouts that attempt to minimize the aggregate
Impact Score. To do so, Bungee incrementally increases the construction
budget from the least-cost-layout’s cost up to the maximum cost. For
this analysis, we used 40 increments. At each increment, the additive
impact surfaces and normalized cost surfaces are weighted and added
together to form a hybrid objective surface. This hybrid surface
encourages Bungee to balance impacts and costs. The impact weight in
each increment is given by

where is the construction budget at the current increment,
is the
cost of the least-cost layout, and
is the maximum construction
budget, which here was
. The weight of the normalized cost surface
is
.
Bungee plans layouts according to the hybrid objective surfaces
(see 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methods). At the same time, it uses
the aggregate Impact Score to judge each layout once the full layout has
been proposed. It also limits the layout’s budget and calculates
construction costs based on the non-normalized cost surfaces.
Finally, Bungee keeps only those layouts that are not simultaneously
more impacting and more costly than any other layouts, i.e. are Paretoimprovements. This forms the set of final layouts for each site. In our
analysis, we ran 3.7.7.6 Create final layouts five times and repeating the
Pareto-optimality filtering across runs to increase the chances Bungee
actually found Pareto-optimal solutions.

3.7.8 Production Unit Packing Methods
Production units are sited as a means to determine the number and
approximate locations of well pads within a site. A production unit is the
potential area drained by a well pad once all its wells have been drilled.
Since real well pads have variable numbers of wells in variable
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configurations, production units must also be various shapes. Bungee is
able to accommodate a range of number of wells per pad and optimizes
the number of wells within this range, their configurations, and locations
of the production units accordingly. In this analysis, we took a simplified
approach and had Bungee place only 6-well production units 3352.8 m
tall by 914.4 m wide (3000 by 11000 ft) and rotated 27° counterclockwise. As such, we also simplify the explanation of the production
unit packing algorithm for brevity and clarity.
Production units are packed into the site by iteratively adding
production units to the site and then using simulated annealing to
shuffle them and free up space. The objective of the optimization is to
minimize the un-drained area of the site. The optimization acts on a
raster/array basis, such that production units, the site, production unit
locations, and the objective function all operate on a pixel-by-pixel basis.
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Add a 6-well production unit in the location that minimizes its bad
overlap. ‘bad overlap’ for a single production unit is its area of
overlap with a) other production units and b) areas outside the
site.
2. If any present production units exceed the overlap threshold
(v=10% of production unit area), proceed to step 3. Otherwise,
return to step 1.
3. Perform simulated annealing. Shuffle production units to free up
space in the site. For a fixed number of iterations (n=5000):
a. For each production unit:
i. Move it one pixel in a random direction and calculate
its bad overlap.
ii. If the bad overlap is reduced from its previous
position, keep the new position. Otherwise, keep the
new position with some probability (pstart=0.1).
b. Calculate the un-drained area of the site. If the un-drained
area decreased, keep this new configuration of production
units. Otherwise, keep the new configuration with some
probability (same as 3.a.ii.).
c. Decrease the probability that worse solutions are kept such
that by the end of step 3, the probability of keeping worse
solutions is zero.
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4. Repeat the check in step 2. If it still fails, remove the last
production unit and return the set of production units placed.
Otherwise, return to step 1.
The optimization determines the number of production units and their
locations. To get the pad envelopes, which define the regions where a pad
may be placed before setbacks are enforced, we center a 304.8 m wide by
1524 m tall (1000 by 5000 ft) rectangle in each production unit. Note
that, like the production units, the shapes of pad envelopes vary with the
number and configurations of wells per pad.

3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methods
3.7.9.1 Simplifying assumptions
Bungee simplifies the infrastructure planning problem so that impactavoiding layouts can be proposed on a desktop computer in a reasonable
amount of time (one to several hours or days). There are two important
characteristics of the planning problem which Bungee’s algorithm
partially avoids. An explanation of these is necessary to understand the
approach we took in deriving Bungee’s layout planning methods. First,
the Impact Score is a spatially non-additive function of infrastructure
layouts, such that it cannot be fully assessed without the entire layout.
This poses a difficulty due to the large solution space of layouts and few
ways to narrow down proposed layouts to avoid searching the whole
solution space. Second, the optimal (i.e. Impact Score minimizing)
positions of well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines are all
interdependent since each type of infrastructure can affect the locations
of others. This difficulty occurs even if the Impact Score were spatially
additive. We programmed Bungee to deal with these difficulties by
simplifying the infrastructure planning algorithm. We make the following
assumptions



The Impact Score can be estimated on a pixel-by-pixel basis by
treating each pixel as if it were developed independently of others.
The optimal route of an access road or gathering pipeline depends
only on infrastructure that has already been proposed and on the
pixel-by-pixel estimate of the Impact Score.

Since layouts are based on the spatially additive approximation of the
Impact Score, we call them additive layouts.

111

3.7.9.2 Additive layout attribute optimization
With these assumptions in mind, we developed a hierarchical algorithm
for planning infrastructure layouts. In the higher level, a genetic
algorithm is used to optimize the attributes of a layout - well pad
locations and the order of planning of access roads and gathering
pipelines. For instance, in a site with two well pads, the attributes might
look like
Attribute

Ya

Xa

Yb

Xb

L1

L2

L3

L4

Example

41° N

80°
W

42° N

81°
W

Roadb

Pipea

Pipeb

Roada

where Y and X are the vertical and horizontal positions of well pads a
and b, and Li denotes the order of development of linear infrastructure
corresponding to each well pad. Note that the order of linear
infrastructure is important because Bungee “fixes” each planned route –
treats it as already developed -such that subsequent linear infrastructure
can be co-located with or terminated at that infrastructure (see Bungee
documentation for more).
The objective of the optimization is to minimize the Impact Score given
a budget constraint. Bungee uses a least-cost path algorithm in the lower
level to plan the routes of access roads and gathering pipelines, which
provides the information needed to evaluate the layout for its Impact
Score. We describe the higher level of the algorithm in the paragraphs
below and the lower level in 3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route
optimization. We use an asterisk (*) to denote details further described in
the Bungee documentation.
1. Propose parent population (n=20) of layout attributes. Each layout
is proposed by:
a. Decide pad centroid locations. Bias pads towards lowerimpact areas.*
b. Decide the order of linear infrastructure planning by random
draw.
c. Evaluate layout:
i. Overlay pad footprint on pad centroids.
ii. Plan routes of access roads and gathering pipelines
(see 3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route optimization).
iii. Calculate Impact Score and construction cost. If too
expensive, discard the layout.
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2. Add lowest-impact layouts (n=3) to offspring population without
altering them.
3. Choose two parent layouts to crossover/mate. Bias choices to
those with lower Impact Scores.
4. Crossover parent layouts with some probability (p=0.7) to form an
offspring layout. If not crossed-over, the offspring is an identical
copy of the first parent. Otherwise:
a. Randomly draw each pad location from one parent or the
other.
b. Decide offspring’s infrastructure order. For each order slot Li:
i. Choose at random one parent to take from.
ii. Fill in the slot with the next un-used infrastructure
(e.g. Roadb) from the parent chosen in 4.b.i.
5. Mutate/alter new offspring layout created in 4:
a. Move each well pad some number of times* in one-pixel
steps.
b. Shuffle infrastructure order. Loop through each slot and
with some probability (p=0.1) swap the infrastructure in this
slot with the next slot.
6. Evaluate offspring layout as in 1.c.
7. If offspring layout has lower Impact Score than both parents, add it
to the offspring population. Otherwise, add it anyway with some
probability (p=0.05).
8. If some number (n=5,000) of layouts have been proposed and kept
or discarded, return the lowest-impact layout from the offspring
population. Otherwise, go to 9.
9. If the offspring population is full (n=20 layout attributes), go to 10.
Otherwise, go to 3.
10.
Check for convergence. If the lowest-impact layout in the
offspring population has not changed in some number of
generations (n=7), propose a new set of layout attributes (n=17) as
in 1, but keep the current lowest-impact layouts from 2.
Otherwise, replace the current parent population with the offspring
population and go to 2.
3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route optimization
In 3.7.9.1 Simplifying assumptions we describe assumptions that
allowed us to entirely represent a layout by the locations of well pad
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centroids and order of development of linear infrastructure. To go from
its attributes to the binary rasters necessary to calculate the Impact
Score and construction cost, we need only to overlay a well pad footprint
on the well pad centroids and plan the routes of linear infrastructure. We
can plan the route of a piece of infrastructure using a least-cost-path
algorithm.
The least-cost-path algorithm we use is a modified version of
Dijkstra’s algorithm2 and guarantees that the route found is globally
optimum given the assumptions we outlined. Due to its complexity, we
do not list the algorithm steps here, but instead describe how our
algorithm builds on Dijkstra’s algorithm. We fully describe the
optimization in the Bungee documentation.
Dijkstra’s algorithm works on raster (or array) data to find the
least-cost route from a set of source/starting pixels to a set of destination
pixels. It assumes that the total cost of traversing a complete or
incomplete route is the sum of the costs of each pixel along the route, i.e.
the cumulative cost is spatially additive. In this context, the source pixels
are well pads including their footprints and the destination pixels are
existing and already planned roads or pipelines, depending on the
infrastructure being planned. The cost surface over which a route is
planned is the hybrid impact-cost surface described in 3.7.7.6 Create
final layouts.
Our least-cost-path algorithm adds two features to Dijkstra’s
algorithm. First, we add a binary “traversability” raster which denotes
areas that are off-limits for the infrastructure being planned. This raster
includes, for instance, those pixels in high-slope areas. Those off-limit
areas are not considered when planning routes. Second, we add a
secondary cost surface which is used to invalidate routes. The secondary
cost surface is the construction cost of either road or pipeline in each
pixel. As the updating procedure central to Dijkstra’s algorithm proceeds,
the cumulative cost of the route passing through each pixel is stored. If a
pixel’s cumulative cost exceeds the cost budget, then the route passing
through that pixel is invalidated, even if that route is the lowest-impact
route. In this way, routes that are too expensive are not proposed.

2

Dijkstra EW (1959) A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs. Numer Math 1(1):269–271.
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Chapter 4: Comparing policies for the
reduction of potential environmental impacts
from shale gas surface infrastructure
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A version of this chapter will be submitted for peer-reviewed publication.
Austin W. Milt, Paul R. Armsworth. “Comparing policies for the
reduction of potential environmental impacts from shale gas surface
infrastructure.”

4.1 Abstract
Governments across the globe at multiple levels have shown interest in
avoiding the environmental and human health impacts created by shale
energy production. In areas where shale energy production is currently
allowed, regulations restricting environmental impacts tend to be limited
in scope and flexibility. We present a study looking at the cost
effectiveness of implementing a new regulation that affects the spatial
locations of well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines with an aim
at reducing aggregate environmental impacts from shale gas
development. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of two policies: (1) a
uniform and inflexible cap on site-level impacts, and (2) a cap and trade
system which allows developers to trade permits for impacts. Both of
these are also compared to optimum outcomes produced by planning by
an omniscient social planner. We measure the total cost and impact of
the system under each scenario. We analyze a case study of 56 sites in
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., a location which has experienced extensive gas
development already. We find that under ideal conditions cap and trade
performs as well as an omniscient social planner, producing lower
impact outcomes much less expensively than the uniform inflexible
policy. Cap and trade could reduce impacts by as much as ~36% at an
increased cost of 0.05% of not developing while still allowing all
development to proceed. Having found large potential gains from trade,
we explore how the cost effectiveness of a cap and trade system depends
on the ability of the regulator to estimate impacts in the absence of
additional regulation. In extreme cases, error in that estimate could
make cap and trade less cost effective than the uniform inflexible
approach. Our results clearly indicate that for intermediate levels of
impact avoidance, cap and trade is a highly cost-effective alternative to a
more traditional approach provided that the regulator is able to
accurately estimate impacts in the absence of additional regulation.

4.2 Introduction
Shale gas development is an increasingly global issue due to energy and
environmental concerns. In the United States, shale gas production has
increased steadily over the past decades and now makes up ~40% of gas
production (Annual Energy Outlook 2014 2014). Concerns have been
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raised about the environmental (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013;
Olmstead et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and human health (Perry 2012)
effects of shale energy production (see dissertation Introduction and
Chapter 2), leading to careful consideration of how to protect society and
nature from those effects (Howarth, Ingraffea & Engelder 2011; Hays et
al. 2015) and at times outright bans on development. Though policies
and regulations in regions proceeding with development do exist, new
regulations can expand their environmental scope to include priorities
currently unregulated. These new policies and regulations will differ in
their acceptability and cost effectiveness.
Shale gas production takes place in many stages (Burton et al.
2014) at multiple spatial scales. Throughout Chapters 2-4 we focus on
one stage and one scale. Specifically, we focus on the construction of
surface infrastructure at the least-hold scale. Lease-holds (“sites”
hereafter) are boundaries of development that aggregate multiple gas
leases and tend to range in size from several hundred hectares to many
thousands of hectares. Shale gas extraction requires significant belowground infrastructure which is often the focus of environmental studies
(Hays et al. 2015). However, extraction requires significant surface
infrastructure to access drilling sites, process gas, and transport it to
market. We focus on well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines,
infrastructure which is common at all gas extraction sites and which has
measurable environmental effects. The spatial planning of these three
types of infrastructure is a complex process from a cost-minimization
perspective. The cost-minimizing configuration of infrastructure relies on
the simultaneous consideration of interactions among infrastructure
locations. For instance, well pads form a terminus for access roads –
wells affect roads, but roads cannot be built on very steep slopes up to a
plateau where a well pad might be located – roads affect well pads.
Potential environmental damage (“impacts” hereafter) from shale
gas surface infrastructure can be partially avoided by informed spatial
planning (as discussed in the dissertation Introduction and Chapters 23). Many environmental features are impacted by shale gas surface
infrastructure (Gillen & Kiviat 2012). Roads and pipelines fragment
habitats, which increases habitat edges, produces dispersal barriers, and
reduces core habitats. Construction exposes and mobilizes surface soils,
potentially leading to erosion and subsequent sedimentation in water
bodies. Stream-crossing infrastructure reduces freshwater connectivity
by limiting upstream and downstream dispersal. These are a few of the
common and pervasive impacts from surface infrastructure, all of which
depend on the spatial configuration of infrastructure – “layout” hereafter
– and which can be partially avoided by changing the layout. In the
simplest case, reducing the amount of infrastructure reduces the area of
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land disturbed and thus some impacts. However, the shortest route for a
road may be more fragmenting than an alternative route which
circumnavigates an important habitat. And the least-expensive layout
may be largely unrelated to the resulting impacts. Thus, impact
avoidance through spatial planning of infrastructure can be a complex,
many-dimensional decision process.
Current environmental regulations for shale gas surface
infrastructure tend to be limited in their type and scope. In many places
globally, there are either moratoriums or outright bans on shale gas
development (http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/
visited 23 April, 2015). While these prevent environmental damage in the
short term, it is possible that development will proceed as fossil fuels
become more limited. The main form of regulation for sanctioned
development is uniform command-and-control (Richardson et al. 2013),
in which restrictions are uniform and absolute. However, the uniform
strictness of such regulations is often offset by an ability to avoid them.
For instance, in Pennsylvania well pads cannot be placed within 30 m
(100 ft) of wetlands larger than 0.4 ha (1 acre), but exceptions can be
granted at the site level when sufficient protective measures are proposed
(Pennsylvania legislation Title 58 3215(b)(3)&(4)). Other environmental
policies include performance practices which are usually not enforced
but are encouraged (Richardson et al. 2013). These current regulations
tend to focus on water features, an important part of environmental and
human health concerns but of limited scope.
Market-based regulations can solve some issues with uniform and
inflexible command-and-control approaches. First, market-based
mechanisms exploit heterogeneity across regulated participants to
achieve optimal outcomes (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). Contrarily, a
uniform command-and-control approach ignores this heterogeneity and
leads to situations where development cannot occur or exceptions are
granted, thereby achieving no effect. For instance, regulating forest loss
by limiting it to 10 ha in each site might preclude development in fullyforested areas, which may be a desirable or undesirable outcome.
Alternatively, a market-based mechanism might incentivize developers at
fully-forested sites to compensate developers at moderately-forested sites
to reduce their forest destruction even further than 10 ha. Second,
market-based mechanisms could theoretically reduce some
administrative costs of environmental regulation by reducing information
and analysis requirements. In the shale gas context, a command-andcontrol attempt to tailor restrictions at a site might require much
information about that site as well as the development process to decide
on an optimal infrastructure layout. Contrarily, a market-based
approach could incentivize developers to explore development
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alternatives using information they already have and without any need
for the regulator to be directly involved in the planning process at a site.
At the same time, regulations differ in how much information is
needed and how that information is used in implementation. First,
uniform regulations may have low information requirements. Here, for
instance, we distinguish between a scenario where caps are set uniformly
across sites and another scenario where caps are site specific. Setting
site-specific caps requires some additional information. Second, marketbased regulations may have relatively high implementation costs because
they require the regulator to institute, monitor, and regulate a market.
Most regulations will have lower information requirements and
implementation costs than an omniscient social planner. This omniscient
social planner is a hypothetical construct that optimizes the system as a
whole rather than individual sites and can be used as a benchmark for
evaluating alternative policy designs. In order to affect optimum
outcomes, the planner is assumed to have perfect information about the
system and an ability to affect all decisions. In some cases this is not far
from reality, e.g. when a sole owner holds all development rights.
Several aspects of regulating impacts in this context are of general
interest. First, we are interested in the regulation of aggregate impacts
rather than treating impacts individually. Regulating a single aggregate
metric across multiple sites requires that the metric be comparable
across sites, which may necessitate a sacrifice of the site-specific nature
of some impacts. Second, regulating an aggregate metric also permits
flexibility in which impacts are reduced and how they are reduced, e.g.
by not necessarily penalizing sites that cannot perform well in one metric
if they can offset that assumed performance with another. Note however
that our analysis would apply readily to single-impact contexts. Third,
options for how much impacts are produced in a site are discrete
because the choices of layouts are limited, with several layouts being
similar to one another followed by large changes to those layouts.
Fourth, impacts in this context are one-off since changes to the land
surface are irreversible and long-lived. As such, impacts at a site are not
regulated over time.
In a recent special issue of Ecological Economics concerned with
market-based instruments for ecosystem services, Gómez-Baggethun &
Muradian (2015) summarize some of the strengths, weaknesses, and
controversies surrounding market-based-instruments for environmental
purposes. They point out that market-based-instruments have increased
in popularity for policymakers and scientists (Pagiola & Platais 2002;
Engel, Pagiola & Wunder 2008; Miles & Kapos 2008; Lockie 2013;
Lapeyre, Froger & Hrabanski 2015) at the same time that trust in the
power of markets has fallen (Sandel 2012; Gómez-Baggethun &
Muradian 2015). Many of the issues surrounding market-based119

instruments have to do with how purported market-based-instruments
are structured and implemented and in what situations they are applied
(Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian 2015). Even when properly structured
and applied, the theoretical cost effectiveness of market-basedinstruments (Foster & Hahn 1995; Goulder et al. 1999) depends on the
ability of regulators to set optimal conditions for the market (United
Nations Development Program 2011; ten Brink et al. 2012), which itself
may require accurate estimates of benefits and costs (Salzman & Ruhl
2000; Kroeger & Casey 2007). Indeed we find that to be the case here.
Regardless, market-based-instruments can have many strengths over
rigid command-and-control approaches (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian
2015).
While other peer-reviewed studies have looked at the current
regulatory framework for shale gas development, to our knowledge none
have quantitatively analyzed the environmental and monetary effects of
implementing new regulations. Konschnik and Boling (2014) describe the
current regulatory framework for shale gas in the U.S and go on to
propose a framework for further governance of shale gas and how that
could be applied for environmental or sustainability goals. Most other
studies focus on a review of current regulations (Rahm 2011; Clark et al.
2012; Wiseman 2014) or on the assessment of risks or damages for
future regulations (Clark et al. 2012; Hays et al. 2015). We draw on the
foundational knowledge of these studies, which point to the limitations of
existing regulations, and combine that knowledge with spatial planning
of infrastructure for multiple environmental impacts at the site scale to
address the implications of an additional regulation.
In this paper we explore the cost effectiveness of different
environmental regulations for shale gas surface infrastructure, especially
how regulations compare to one another and to an idealized benchmark.
Specifically, we explore three scenarios. First, we explore a regulation
that reflects the most common type of environmental regulation, which is
a uniform - ignores site characteristics - restriction on impacts and is
inflexible in how that restriction is met. Second, we explore and focus on
how tradable permits in a cap and trade system reduces the cost of
reducing impacts compared to the first scenario while leaving
development decisions in the hands of developers. Third, we evaluate
whether and idealized cap and trade system performs as well as an
omniscient social planner, something expected in theory (Hartwick &
Olewiler 1998). As discussed earlier, the cost effectiveness of marketbased instruments depends on the market context created by the
regulator. Consequently, we then discuss how error in the ability of the
regulator to estimate impacts in the absence of an additional regulation
affects the cost effectiveness of cap and trade. We then analyze a case
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study of development in Pennsylvania and discuss its implications for
cap and trade in similar and broader contexts

4.3 Methods and Materials
4.3.1 Overview
In the following sections we describe our methods for analyzing the
costs and impacts associated with regulating shale gas surface
infrastructure using different regulations. In §4.3.2-4.3.5, we describe
our general methods for analysis of two policy scenarios and an idealized
benchmark, followed by an application of these methods to a case study
described in §4.3.5. In §4.3.2 we describe the regulatory context,
including our assumptions about the system, the goals and decisions
made by a regulator committed to reducing environmental impacts from
surface infrastructure, and the goals and decisions made by developers
attempting to make profits from extracting gas from their sites. In §4.3.3
we describe the mathematical formulation and solution methods for the
two policy scenarios and idealized benchmark. In §4.3.4 we expand our
analysis to consider the counterfactual situation where the regulator
does not perfectly know how large impacts will be in the absence of
additional regulation. This introduces error in setting the site-specific
cap for cap and trade. We discuss how three directions of error affect
outcomes of the system. Finally, in §4.3.5 we describe the application of
our methods to a case study set of 56 sites in Pennsylvania, USA. This
application requires some additional data and analyses, some of which
come from a previous study (Chapter 3); the rest is described in §4.3.5.

4.3.2 Regulatory Context
We follow several assumptions about the development context that
affect how we analyze new regulations. First, the development rights at a
site belong to only one developer and each developer has development
rights to exactly one site. Thus, decisions about how to develop a site are
site/developer specific. We change this assumption when exploring a
sole-ownership scenario. Second, every layout option – configuration of
well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines – for a site has the same
number of wells, all wells drain the same amount of gas, and all wells
cost the same to drill. Thus, layouts for a site differ only in the cost of
developing surface infrastructure. Third, the construction of
infrastructure produces many environmental externalities (impacts),
which it is the task of the regulator to internalize to the gas industry
through a new regulation. Fourth, impacts incurred at a site are
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independent such that the aggregate impact of development of the
system is just the sum of site-level impacts. Finally, all sites are
developed simultaneously such that delays in gas production do not
occur and the costs and profits from developing sites are independent of
the start of production. We recognize these are simplifying assumptions
of the system which limit our ability to fully predict outcomes of different
regulations. However we feel this study is still an important first step
toward understanding the implications of new shale gas regulations.
The regulator is responsible for creating a new regulation that
forces developers to internalize environmental impacts created by surface
infrastructure. The regulator would like to maximize social welfare by
minimizing both environmental impacts and the monetary cost of
internalizing those impacts. However, the regulator has a limited ability
to do so for two reasons. First, the regulator does not know the social
value of environmental impacts and so cannot directly maximize social
welfare. Instead, the regulator can only choose a level of impact to
achieve, which will result in some cost to the gas industry. Second, in the
cap and trade system the regulator sets an individual cap for each site
based on an estimate of the impact of the least-expensive layout at that
site, which is the layout that would be developed without the regulation.
There is error associated with that estimate, which prevents the regulator
from knowing whether the choice of cap will lead to a larger or smaller
total impact than estimated (described more in §4.3.4).
Each developer wants to maximize the net present value of his site,
which is dependent on several factors. A site contains some amount of
gas, the present value of which depends on the flow rate of gas from each
well, the number of wells, the price of gas, and the monetary discount
rate (p. 140 in Appendix for methods). To get profits from the gas, the
developer must construct infrastructure to access the site, extract the
gas, and pipe it to the market. There are many infrastructure layouts for
a site, and each layout has an associated construction cost and
environmental impact. We denote the discrete cost and impact functions
for a site by ( ) and ( ), respectively, where ( ) is the cost of
constructing layout at site . These functions are monotonically
increasing and decreasing respectively and thus their combination
adheres to one important Pareto-efficiency condition (Varian 2003). We
set up our analysis in such a way that there is no incentive to develop a
layout that is simultaneously more impacting and more costly than any
other layout. Because of the setup described here, a developer can
maximize the net present value of his site by minimizing the cost of
construction plus any additional costs from the new regulation. The
specific form changes with each scenario (Table 4.1).
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4.3.3 Scenarios and Solutions
We explore the two policy scenarios and one idealized benchmark already
described above. In every scenario, the regulator puts a cap on impacts
from development and the developer(s) choose layouts at each site to
adhere to the cap while minimizing development costs. We show the
optimization problem for developers in each scenario in Table 4.1. In
each scenario, we find solutions for a range of caps and record the total
cost – sum of costs across all sites – and total impact – sum of impacts
across all sites.
We define the layout choice with several characteristics to
facilitate solving the planning problems. First,
represents the leastexpensive and most impacting layout in a site, while
is the
layout with the highest cost and lowest impact where development still
occurs. We define a special “dummy” layout for the decision to not
develop a site. The choice to not develop occurs when the cost of
development exceeds the profits from development. The layout that
reflects this choice, denoted
, has characteristics ( )
and ( )
, where is the present value of gas in the site.
Solving the first and last problems shown in Table 4.1 is fairly
simple. In Uniform Cap without Trading, each developer chooses the
least-expensive layout that meets the cap. If the cap is lower than the
impact of the
layout then the site is not developed. In Omniscient
Social Planner, the one decision maker chooses the cumulatively leastexpensive combination of layouts across all sites that meets the cap.
Because we assume impacts are additive across sites, this is a linear
problem. To solve it, we start with all
. We then calculate the returnon-investment (ROI) of switching each site’s layout to the
layout,
where. We iteratively swap the layout at the site with the highest ROI
until the impact constraint in Eq. ( 3 ) is met. This method produced
identical solutions to a global branch-and-bound solver.
Solving the outcome of the market in Cap and Trade is somewhat
more difficult. Each developer can choose to be a supplier of permits if
̂( )
̂( )
()
or a demander of permits if ( )
, and the
optimum choice depends on the price of permits in the market (Table
4.1). Because the impact production at each site is discrete, it is
impossible in a small market to have supply exactly equal demand.
Consequently, there will always be some excess supply or demand. Our
earlier assumptions dictate that if there is excess demand, some sites are
not developed.
To find the final market price of permits ( ), the choice of layout
for each site, and the total cost and impact of the system, we perform a
two-level search for
(Fig. 4.1). We start with some additional
assumptions: 1) the market is perfectly competitive, 2) the market has
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Table 4.1. Developer optimization problems for policy scenarios, including the objective and
constraint, which is set by the regulator.

Policy
Uniform Cap without
Trading
Cap and Trade

Developer Objective
()
()

Omniscient Social
Planner

( ()
∑

()

= site/developer index
= layout index
= set of layouts at site
= set of all layouts
( ) = cost of developing layout at site
( ) = impact of developing layout at site

̂ ( ))

Impact Constraint
()
()
∑ ()

(

Eq.
(1)

)

̂( )

∑ ( )

(2)
(3)

= uniform site-level cap
= proportional cap on impacts
= price of permits in market
̂ ( ) = regulator’s estimate of impact of least-cost layout
= permits bought for site
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Fig. 4.1. Stylized illustration of the two-part process we use to estimate the final
market price ( ) of impact permits in Cap and Trade. (stepping black line) difference
between supply and demand at market price . First part of the search for
occurs
along this curve. (gray curve) total cost to all developers in the market, which may be
concave or monotonic within the range - .
is the price at the minimum of this
second curve.

been established long enough to reach an equilibrium price, and 3) all
developers simultaneously enter the market and trade. At the first level,
we find the range of where excess supply is minimized and there is no
excess demand ( - in Fig. 4.1) – to avoid forcing some sites out of
development. There is a range of that meets this condition because
layout choices are discrete and as such there will be a range of within
which changes to do not change the set of layouts chosen. At the
second level, we find the within this range that minimizes the total cost
of the system ( in Fig. 4.1). Finally, because there will still be excess
supply at the final , suppliers will lose some potential profits and we
add these lost profits (equal to excess demand times ) to the total cost of
the system. Because of the way we analyze the market, our analysis is an
optimistic estimate of the outcomes of using cap and trade.

4.3.4 Regulator’s Error in Estimating ̂ ( )
The total cost and impact of the cap and trade system depends on the
cap set for each site. To illustrate, take one site in isolation. At the
extremes, the cap may be so low or so high that the developer cannot
develop or does not reduce potential impacts, respectively. Within the
range [ (
) ( )) the cap has some effect on the developer’s choice of
layout while still allowing development. In Uniform Cap without Trade, we
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assume the regulator ignores this effect because the most common
environmental regulations currently do not tailor restrictions to each
site. However, it is reasonable that the regulator could estimate impacts
in the absence of the new regulation, e.g. by examining existing
development, and thus increase the chance that restrictions on impact
lead to development choices within the above range.
In Cap and Trade, we assume that the regulator has some ability
to estimate site-level impacts in the absence of additional regulation,
denoted ̂ ( ). This estimate has some error associated with it due to the
regulator’s lack of perfect information. In the case study below, we start
with the case where the regulator can perfectly estimate impacts in the
( )) and then perform several
absence of additional regulation ( ̂ ( )
sensitivity tests, including the regulator’s estimate is 1) systematically
( )), 2) systematically low ( ̂ ( )
( )), and 3) incorrect but
high ( ̂ ( )
without bias. We will show that error in ̂ ( ) does not change the
possible outcomes of the system, but affects which outcomes are
revealed and how the regulator’s choice (mis)matches with the outcome
produced.

4.3.5 Case Study
We applied our framework to the Marcellus shale play in Pennsylvania, a
place where enough development has occurred and enough knowledge
about the development context exists to infer with some confidence the
cost effectiveness of a cap and trade system. Over 9,000 horizontal wells
have been drilled in the Marcellus region of Pennsylvania since 2008 –
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s permit reporting
database – and many more are likely to come. The construction of well
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines is occurring in areas of high
conservation priority (Johnson et al. 2010) resulting in degradation and
destruction of many environmental features including forests, wetlands,
streams, and other features important for biodiversity and recreation in
the area (Johnson et al. 2010) (also see dissertation Introduction).
We used the results of the previous chapter for our analysis here
(Chapter 3). In our previous study, we created a spatial planning
software call Bungee to place well pads, access roads, and gathering
pipelines at 85 sites in Pennsylvania. Site boundaries were derived by
overlaying production units on existing well locations and then joining
adjacent land parcels to fully contain those production units. In that
study, production units were 914 ⨉ 3353 m (3000 ⨉ 11000 ft) rectangles
rotated 27° counter-clockwise and which represent the area of gas
extracted by a well pad with 6 wells. Bungee uses a complex spatial
optimization algorithm to find many infrastructure layouts within a site
(Chapter 3 Appendix). The first such layout is a cost-minimizing layout
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that ignores environmental impacts other than those already imposed by
regulation. Subsequent layouts reduce impacts at increasing cost, such
that no final layout is simultaneously more impacting and more costly
than any other.
We were forced to adjust the Impact Scores associated with layouts
produced by Bungee in order to use them in our analysis here. The
Impact Score aggregates across several metrics of environmental impact
to represent the total impact of a layout in a site (Chapter 3 Appendix). It
is formulated in such a way that Impact Scores at one site cannot be
directly compared to Impact Scores at another site, which violates two
conditions necessary for this analysis, including that impacts can be
added across sites and that impacts can be traded (or offset) from one
site to another. To get around this, we recalculated the Impact Scores
associated with each of our layouts to make them comparable (p. 139).
After transformation 28 sites had layouts that violated the Pareto
conditions necessary for the analysis. We chose to exclude those 28 sites,
leaving us with 56 sites in total (§4.6.1 in Appendix). Those 56 sites range
in size (1-14 well pads or 6-84 wells) and number of layouts (2-16).
We also adjusted the construction costs estimated by Bungee to fit
with this analysis. Bungee already estimates the construction cost of
surface infrastructure, but this excludes many other costs associated
with developing a site, including acquisition and leasing, below-ground
infrastructure, and processing of gas (Hefley & Seydor 2015). We used
the costs calculated for a single well and summarized in Table 8 of Hefley
and Seydor (2015), excluding ‘Permitting’ and ‘Site Preparation’, which
Bungee already includes. For most costs, we multiplied these single well
costs by the number of wells in a site and added it to the surface
infrastructure costs. For acquisition costs, we multiplied by the number
of well pads in a site since Hefley and Seydor (2015) base acquisition cost
on a single drilling unit corresponding to one pad. This approach likely
overestimates the costs of developing a site. To calculate the present
value of gas in a site which is used to create the “dummy” layout
described in §4.3.3, we used a linear estimate of the flow rate of gas from
wells in our study area and combined that with a constant market price
of gas and monetary discount rate (p. 140). Gas was assumed to flow
until the rate became zero, i.e. the gas ran out. We assumed every well
would produce the same amount of gas at the same rate and simply
multiplied the number of wells in a site by the present value of gas in a
well to get the present value of gas in the site.
We analyzed the total cost and total impact across our 56 case
study sites for various caps on impact and many sensitivity tests of the
error in ̂ ( ). For Uniform Cap without Trade, we analyzed the system for
40 values of between 0 and 5. The lower bound was chosen to
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show where zero impact was allowed, while the upper bound ensured
that the cap would exceed any single site’s maximum impact. For
Omniscient Social Planner, we analyzed the system for 40 values of
between 0 and 1 to look at the full range of impacts. For Cap and Trade,
we analyzed the system for combinations of and error in ̂ ( ). As
before, we looked at 40 values of between 0 and 1. To look at the
scenario where ̂ ( ) is high or low systematically, we added or
subtracted, respectively, some portion ( ) (Table 4.2). When looking at
Table 4.2. Analysis parameters showing various caps on impact set by the
regulator as well as error in the regulator’s estimate of impacts in the absence
of additional regulation. Cap is absolute and at the site-level for Uniform Cap
without Trading and relative to total impact and site-level impact for
Omniscient Social Planner and Cap and Trade, respectively. Error is a
proportion of the impact from the least-cost layout (
) added to that impact.

Scenario
Uniform Cap without Trading
Cap and Trade
Omniscient Social Planner

Cap (A or
0, 0.13, 0.26,
0, 0.03, 0.05,
0, 0.03, 0.05,

), n=40
…, 5
…, 1
…, 1

Cap and Trade Error Direction
Error Level ( )
Uniform Unbiased
0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
Systematic Overestimate
0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
Systematic Underestimate
-0.1, -0.25, -0.5, -0.75, -1

the effects of random error, we added ( ) by a uniformly drawn random
portion between – and , the maximum amount of error. In other words,
some sites received a positive error while others a negative error. We
repeated this process 100 times for each and summarize the range of
( ) for
results. For instance, an error of
would result in ̂ ( )
̂
( )
( )
( ) for the random case.
the systematic case and
We summarize these scenarios in Table 4.2.

4.4 Results
4.4.1 General
Fig. 4.2 summarizes our results conditioned on 1) the regulator does not
know or use site-specific information to set the cap for Uniform Cap
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without Trading , 2) the
regulator knows ( ) perfectly
for Cap and Trade, which is
benchmarked against an
Omniscient Social Planner with
perfect information. Later we
relax the assumption the
regulator knows ( ) exactly. In
the figure, outcomes in the
lower-left corner represent the
business-as usual situation
where no attempt is made to
regulate impacts and all sites
develop their least-cost,
highest-impact layout. The total
impact avoided is zero while the
total cost is ~0.05% of the
situation where no sites are
developed. In the upper-right of
Fig. 4.2a is the outcome where
no impacts are allowed and as a
result no sites are developed.
The total impact avoided is
100% while the total cost is the
cost of foregone profits from all
sites (100%). Between these
extremes developers vary the
choice of layout in their site or
choose not to develop such that
some (black) or all (gray) sites
are developed.

Fig. 4.2. Outcomes of implementing various
policies as regulator’s commitment to
reducing impacts increases over a) entire
range of possible outcomes and b) over range
of outcomes where all sites develop. Triangles
(△) are Uniform Cap without Trading, crosses
(⨉) are Omniscient Social Planner, and circles
(○) are Cap and Trade when regulator is
perfectly able to estimate impacts in the
absence of additional regulation. Vertical axis
is percent of outcome where no sites develop.
Gray symbols show where all sites are
developed. Black symbols show where at least
one site is not developed. There are three
outcomes where all sites are developed in
Uniform Cap without Trading.

Uniform Cap without Trading
There are several
interesting characteristics of
outcomes from implementing a
Uniform Cap without Trading
regulation. First, outcomes sit
near an imaginary one-to-one
line up until about 35% of
potential impacts are avoided
(Fig. 4.2a, triangles left of 35% Impact Avoided). For instance, avoiding
32% of potential impacts would require 31% of the cost of developing no
sites. After 28%, there is a large amount of potential impacts that could
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be avoided for relatively little additional cost. For instance, reducing
potential impacts from ~30% to ~50% would be ~4% more costly (Fig.
4.2a, middle plateau of triangles). After avoiding 61% of impacts, further
avoidance becomes quickly more expensive up to 100% avoidance (Fig.
4.2a, triangles right of 61% Impact Avoided). Moving down to Fig. 4.2b
reveals that there are three options for Uniform Cap without Trading
where all sites are developed and these reduce potential impacts very
little.
Cap and Trade and Omniscient Social Planner
Both Cap and Trade and Omniscient Social Planner start with very
low costs to avoiding impacts (Fig. 4.2a circles and crosses). Up to 36%
impact avoidance, the cost of avoiding impacts appears to be almost zero,
though inspection of Fig. 4.2b shows that these costs are very low
(<0.06% of maximum cost), but nonzero. Further impact avoidance
greater than 40% incurs quickly escalating costs. For instance, avoiding
impacts up to 80% requires about 40% of maximum costs (Fig. 4.2a,
circles and crosses). Nearing 100% impact avoidance greatly escalates
costs (Fig. 4.2a circles and crosses right of 80%).
Does Cap and Trade achieve minimum costs?
As expected by theory (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998), implementing
Cap and Trade results in outcomes that are nearly identical to
Omniscient Social Planner. As can be seen in Fig. 4.2b, we estimate even
lower costs at the same level of impact reduction when implementing Cap
and Trade, but this is due solely to the way we estimate the outcomes of
a cap and trade system. A more accurate analysis would show that Cap
and Trade performs no better than Omniscient Social Planner. We focus
on the comparison of Cap and Trade and Uniform Cap without Trading
hereafter.
How do policy scenarios compare when the regulator perfectly estimates
impacts in the absence of additional regulation?
There are important differences in the total cost and impact of
implementing different regulations. Cap and Trade achieves a lower cost
at a given level of impact avoidance than Uniform Cap without Trading.
This improvement is not small over most of the range of possible
outcomes, and is as large as ~30% when avoiding ~36% of total impacts
(Fig. 4.2). The two most likely regulatory scenarios differ wildly in how
much potential impacts can be avoided (Fig. 4.2b). If Cap and Trade is
implemented, up to ~36% reduction in potential impacts can be achieved
for only 0.05% of the maximum cost while still allowing all sites to be
developed. Compare this to the Uniform Cap without Trading scenario, for
which very little (~0.1%) impact avoidance is possible while allowing all
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development. In addition, there are many more options for how much
impacts are avoided while allowing all development under the Cap and
Trade scenario.
The distribution of outcomes along the horizontal axis in Fig. 4.2a
is also interesting. First, Uniform Cap without Trading exhibits a less
smooth spacing of outcomes, which is a result of the way the regulation
is implemented. Outcomes that are close together are similar in that the
set of sites developed does not change from one outcome to the next, but
only the set of layouts chosen for development. Large jumps between
clusters of outcomes are due to one or more sites being pushed out of
development by a reduction in the site-level cap. This discontinuity in
outcomes means that small regulatory adjustments may have little effect
on resulting impacts and costs. Contrarily, the other policy scenario has
a smoother distribution of outcomes because the regulation allows more
flexibility in how sites are developed. As a result, small policy
adjustments more often affect the system.

4.4.2 How is the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade affected
by the regulator’s ability to estimate ( )?
Idealized Scenarios
Having identified Cap and Trade as a potentially very cost effective
policy choice, we now explore how sensitive that finding is to our
underlying assumptions. Specifically, we focus once again on our
information assumptions. This time, though, we emphasize ( ) used to
set the site-specific cap, which is an obvious target for a sensitivity test
because it is a quantity which developers will know much better than the
regulator and which developers will have an incentive to hide. Note that
in Uniform Cap without Trading, we hold to the previous assumption that
the regulator does not know or chooses not to implement a site-specific
cap.
In Fig. 4.3, we summarize the results of our sensitivity tests to
explore how the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade is affected by error in
the regulator’s ability to estimate impacts in the absence of additional
regulation, denoted ̂ ( ). We calculated cost effectiveness as the ratio of
system total absolute impact avoidance to total cost in billion USD. To
plot all policy scenarios on the same horizontal axis, we transformed the
cap ( ) for Uniform Cap without Trading to a relative scale by dividing by
the maximum value.
Before discussing the results of the error analysis, we first orient
the reader to the idealized cost effectiveness curves (black open symbols
in Fig. 4.3a-c). At regulator choices below ~0.15, there are no outcomes
for Uniform Cap without Trading where sites are developed. The next two
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outcomes are two of the most cost effective for Uniform Cap without
Trading because they reduce impacts a little while still allowing all
development to proceed. At further commitments to reducing impacts,
Uniform Cap without Trading outcomes have a low but increasing cost
effectiveness, with a peak near (0.55, 0.01).
Cap and Trade and the idealized benchmark Omniscient Social Planner
both exhibit almost identical outcomes. Increasing commitment to
reducing impacts lead to increasingly more cost effective outcomes up to
the point just before one site is pushed out of production. Peak cost
effectiveness where all sites are developed occurs at (0.64, 8.5) in Fig.
4.3.
In the ideal case, Cap and Trade is generally more cost effective
than Uniform Cap without Trading; only at the extreme regulator choices
do the two scenarios converge, which is a necessary result. Although
both scenarios have peak effectiveness up to the point just before one
site is pushed out of production (highest triangle and circle in Fig. 4.3),
the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade at its peak is more than two
orders of magnitude more cost effective than Uniform Cap without
Trading at its peak. At higher commitments to reducing impacts (Fig. 4.3
right of ~0.4), the two scenarios have more similar cost effectiveness, but
Cap and Trade is still five times more cost effective than Uniform Cap
without Trading on average.
Error in ̂ ( ) affects the outcomes of implementing Cap and Trade.
We explored three types of error in ̂ ( ): uniformly distributed (Fig. 4.3a),
systematically high (Fig. 4.3b), and systematically low (Fig. 4.3c).
Because outcomes are based on the choice of layouts at sites and these
choices are highly discrete, error in ̂ ( ) serves mainly to stretch or
compress the distribution of outcomes as the regulator’s choice changes
rather than reveal entirely different outcomes.
Uniformly random error in ̂ ( )
When error in ̂ ( ) is uniformly random across sites, outcomes
may be more or less cost effective at a particular regulator choice. For
instance, when ̂ ( ) is up to 100% different from ( ) (lightest gray
region in Fig. 4.3a), the regulator’s decision to reduce potential impacts
by 30% may lead to a cost-effectiveness a full order of magnitude lower
than if the regulator can perfectly estimate ( ). Uniformly unbiased
error tends to lead to lower cost-efficiency outcomes rather than higher
as reflected by the wider range of outcomes below/left of the perfectestimate outcomes in Fig. 4.3a.
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Fig. 4.3. Effect of error in regulator’s estimate of impacts in the absence of additional
regulation ( ̂ ( )) for Cap and Trade when error is a) uniform but unbiased, b)
systematically high, and c) systematically low. Horizontal axis ranges from no
commitment to reducing impacts (0.0) up to no allowance of impact (1.0). In all
panels, outcomes from a zero-error estimate are shown in black, while increasingly
lighter gray shows outcomes with increasing error. Triangles (△) are Uniform Cap
without Trading, crosses (⨉) are Omniscient Social Planner, and circles (○) are Cap
and Trade. Error levels are summarized in Table 4.2. In a) shaded regions show a
range of outcomes over 100 trials of uniformly distributed error in ̂ ( ).
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Systematically overestimating ( )
Systematically overestimating ( ) compresses the possible outcomes
from Cap and Trade, which has several effects on regulation (Fig. 4.3b).
Low levels of commitment to reducing impacts may not reduce impacts
at all, since developers will not have to change their choice of layout to
meet the impact cap (leftmost points for Cap and Trade in Fig. 4.3b).
Once the cap is high enough to affect developer’s choices, a systematic
overestimate of ( ) will lead to lower cost efficiency of outcomes up to
the point where all sites are developed in the ( ) ̂ ( ) case. After this,
a systematic overestimate of ( ) leads to higher cost efficiency of
outcomes. Again, this is due to the fact that it takes larger commitments
to reducing impacts to achieve the same outcomes as when ( ) ̂ ( ).
At larger error levels, higher cost-efficiency outcomes are more likely, but
at a much increased risk of having no effect on development at lower
commitments to reducing impact.
Systematically underestimating ( )
Systematically underestimating ( ) stretches the possible
outcomes from Cap and Trade, which has several effects on regulation
(Fig. 4.3c). When error is low, lower commitments to reducing impacts
lead to higher efficiency outcomes. However, at error levels larger than
25%, any commitment to reducing impacts will lead to a lower efficiency
outcome. At very high error levels, the cost efficiency of Cap and Trade
may even be lower than Uniform Cap without Trade (lightest gray circles
are below some triangles in Fig. 4.3c). Since the regulator is
underestimating impacts at sites, caps on impact will be almost
guaranteed to affect developers’ choices of layouts and consequently lead
to lower-impact outcomes, yet this comes with a risk of lower-efficiency
outcomes and increased probability of pushing sites out of production.

4.5 Discussion
Ongoing shale gas development creates environmental externalities
which may be internalized and reduced at reasonable costs through cap
and trade. We have analyzed two policy scenarios that may be
implemented and how these compare to one another and a best-case
scenario in terms of their total resulting impact and monetary cost. We
found that the policy scenario most reflective of current regulations
(Uniform Cap without Trading), which forces developers to reduce impacts
in a uniform fashion or not develop, may lead to expensive outcomes
with few options to reduce impacts while still allowing all development to
proceed (Fig. 4.2a). In contrast, a cap and trade scenario (Cap and Trade)
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could perform as well as would an omniscient social planner by avoiding
impacts across 56 sites in Pennsylvania by ~36% for 0.05% of the cost of
not developing any sites and while still allowing all development to
proceed (Fig. 4.2b). A similar level of impact avoidance in the Uniform
Cap without Trading scenario would be close to 35 percentage points
more costly. The relative costs of Cap and Trade versus Uniform Cap
without Trading converge at higher or lower levels of avoidance. For
instance, at 20% and 80% impact avoidance the difference between the
two scenarios is 20 and 25 percentage points, respectively. However, we
also determined that the ability of a regulator to match its commitment
to reducing impacts to actual outcomes depends on the regulator’s ability
to estimate impacts in the absence of the new regulation. For instance,
Cap and Trade could be totally ineffective if the regulator systematically
overestimated those impacts and had a low commitment to reducing
impacts (Fig. 4.3b). Similarly, the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade
could be almost three orders of magnitude lower than ideal if the
regulator systematically underestimated those impacts by more than
25% (Fig. 4.3c).
Our results have several implications for policy design and
implementation. Cap and trade can offer large savings over a more
traditional uniform and inflexible approach, which agrees with theory
(Hartwick & Olewiler 1998; Goulder & Parry 2008). Further, we find it
can reduce impacts much more while allowing all development to
proceed. At the same time, implementation efforts are not the same for
the two approaches. In either scenario, the regulator needs to enable the
gas industry to evaluate impacts produced by an infrastructure layout,
which requires the regulator know what impacts are relevant, what
priority they have, and how they are calculated. Additionally, both
scenarios require the monitoring of surface development, which could be
attached to current drilling permitting processes. Intentionally cost
effective cap and trade as outlined here requires that the regulator must
be able to estimate impacts in the absence of the new regulation. This
requires some knowledge of the development process in the regulatory
region. At minimum, a regulator could evaluate existing development. A
more detailed method that models development could ensure higher cost
effectiveness. Cap and trade also relies on the distribution, tracking, and
enforcement of tradable permits, which could be accomplished with an
online market system. We expect the total cost of implementing cap and
trade at intermediate levels of impact avoidance would be compensated
by the long-term savings over the other inflexible approach we explored
(see Fig. 4.2).
Although the level of commitment to reducing impacts would
ideally be determined by society’s value of impact avoidance, our results
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do suggest that moderately low commitments will be most cost effective
(Fig. 4.3) with cap and trade. In our case study, the highest costeffectiveness was achieved by committing to impact reduction around
36%, which is contingent on being perfectly able to estimate impacts in
the absence of the cap and trade system. At commitments lower than
36%, Cap and Trade was still more cost effective than commitments
larger than 36%. Interestingly, the hump shape of the cost effectiveness
curve which leads to this outcome is due to a combination of two things.
First, our estimates of the cost of developing a site is much lower than
our estimates of the profits from gas extraction. As a result, not
developing a site leads to large increases in the cost of the system.
Second, there is large potential to reduce impacts of the system while
still allowing all development to proceed (Fig. 4.2). Combined, large
reductions in impacts can be achieved without increasing costs a lot
relative to profits gained from development (Fig. 4.2 gray circles). When
commitments to reducing impacts exceed a certain level (36% here),
some sites are forced out of production leading to large increases in cost
for relatively little change in overall impacts, which greatly reduces the
cost effectiveness of the system (Fig. 4.3: switch happens where the slope
of Cap and Trade becomes negative as regulator choice approaches 1).
One purpose of this study was to apply existing knowledge about
the relative cost effectiveness of market-based policies to inflexible
uniform policies in the shale gas context. We show clearly some of the
potential gains from trade created by a cap and trade system that
regulates an aggregate impact metric. Other approaches may also be
effective in this and other contexts. For instance, cap and trade for
individual metrics (e.g. forest clearing) might increase the transparency
and understanding of the market and increase support, though at an
increased implementation cost due to maintaining multiple markets. In
addition, a bubble-offsets approach might obviate the need for a market,
especially when there is large spatial heterogeneity in the cost of
reducing impacts at individual sites. A bubble policy would treat a subset
of sites that are close to one another or have the same developer as a
single unit (“bubble”), putting a cap on total impacts within the bubble
(Tietenberg 1985). Similarly, when development rights across all sites are
held by just a few developers, enforcing a cumulative cap for each
developer could be effective. To be effective this would require that each
developer has development rights at sites with heterogeneous costs of
impact avoidance. Many other alternatives exist. We took an approach
that should be generally applicable across regions where many sites are
ready for development, where developers have rights to one or a few sites,
and where reducing aggregate impacts is the major goal.
More complete analyses could benefit from several adjustments to
our methodology. First we assume that each developer has rights to only
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one site being developed. In Pennsylvania, there are many developers,
but the distribution of development is skewed towards developers with
many holdings (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s
permit reporting database). When combined with assumptions about
market dynamics, it is likely that those developers with many sites would
exert a measurable effect on the market and could compromise the
effectiveness of the market (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). Second, we
assume all sites are to be developed simultaneously and thus enter the
market simultaneously. A more complete analysis on a small market
would include the staggering of development over time and adjust
developer’s decisions about when to develop (i.e. enter the market).
Third, we assume impacts are independent across sites and thus can be
combined additively. One alternative approach would be to treat nearby
or adjacent sites as having dependent impacts, e.g. by combining their
development boundaries to treat them as one unit when evaluating
impacts. This approach would require a more complex decision process
as well as stricter assumptions about the simultaneity of development
across sites. Finally, we chose to focus on the direct regulation of a single
aggregate metric such that trading among individual metrics could occur
at the site level. This choice ignores one alternative approach to
regulating multiple impacts, which is to put a cap on each individual
metric. While this approach would more directly enforce local priorities
for each impact, it would limit development options within sites. Further,
because many impacts are positively correlated and some are negatively
correlated (Chapters 2 and 3), the link between an impact’s cap and the
resulting development choice could be confounded by choices driven by
other impact caps (Bennear & Stavins 2007), and thus presents a
challenge to matching environmental goals to policy outcomes. This is a
unique characteristic of regulating multiple impacts through multiple,
impact-specific caps.
We have applied existing cost effectiveness analysis methods to the
novel context of regulation of environmental impacts from shale gas
surface development and found that large gains from trade are possible.
As shale gas development proceeds globally, governments at multiple
levels should consider the environmental implications of shale gas
extraction and design policies that properly internalize environmental
externalities. In regions where development rights are centrally owned or
distributed, significant environmental savings can potentially be achieved
without the need for additional regulations. In other regions, our findings
can be used to motivate regulations that do better than traditional
command-and-control approaches. As such, we see large potential to
develop shale gas more conscientiously in the coming decades.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Reconfiguring Impact
Impact Scores output by Bungee are not comparable across sites.
However, we need something comparable/tradable to be able to allocate
impacts across sites. To accomplish this, we do the following:
1. Calculate individual impact metrics
( ) where
is the metric
name, is the index of the site, and is the layout.
2. Likewise, calculate the baselines at each site. In our study, the
baseline for all metrics is 0.
3. Find the maximum unit impact for each metric across layouts:
(
)
( )
(
).
4. Scale each metric for each layout using [3]:
( )

( )

|
(

|
)

5. Finally, we calculate the new Impact Score for each layout as
( )

∑

(

( )

)

where
is the relative priority of the metric. This gives us a way
to trade impacts across sites since the scaling values across sites
are the same.
This transformation keeps the general shape of tradeoff curves across
sites, but fails in one important respect. Many tradeoff curves (28 of 84
sites representing 270 of 607 layouts) no longer satisfy the Paretoimprovement shape needed for our analysis (see Fig. S 4.1). The reason
these curves are no long monotonically increasing is because the scaling
values for each impact metric have changed relative to other impact
metrics in the site. As such, the relative contribution of each metric to
the Impact Score changes which causes some layouts to fall away from
the newly defined Pareto frontier. To get around this, we simply omit
from our analysis those sites whose tradeoff curves violate the Paretoimprovement conditions. We were left with the 56 sites (Fig. S 4.2) with
black tradeoff curves in Fig. S 4.1.
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4.6.2 Present Value of Gas Production,
We calculate the profit of gas production in a site using the present
value. We base our estimates on the flow rate of gas from wells in the
counties from our sites in our previous study as well as recent national
well-head gas prices.

a

b

Fig. S 4.1. (a) results from our previous study, where Impact Scores are calculated
using site-specific normalization constants for each impact metric and tradeoff
curves are monotonically increasing. (b) results of re-scaling impact metrics to
calculate tradable impacts, the result of which is that many tradeoff curves (green,
n=28 of 84) are no longer monotonically increasing, which violates the conditions
necessary for optimal allocation of impacts.

The present value

in a site depends on several things:

1.

, the initial rate of flow of gas from when production begins
(Mcf/day)
2. , the change in the flow rate from a well per unit time (Mcf/day2)
3. , the monetary discount rate
4.
, the number of wells in the site
The flow of gas from a well at a particular time
linearly declining curve
( )

is approximated by the
(4)
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with units of <amount of gas> per <unit of time>. Note that several other
more complex and accurate estimates of gas flow exist that account for
linear decrease in flow in the early portions of the well’s life followed by
declining marginal returns later (Al Ahmadi, Almarzooq & Wattenbarger
2010; Miller, Jenkins & Rai 2010). We chose this one because the
present-value of gas is relatively easy to calculate with it and it provides
estimates of the total amount of gas in a well that agree with other
findings (Aucott & Melillo 2013). Further, many wells exhibit linear
decreases in flow during the first decade of production (Al Ahmadi,
Almarzooq & Wattenbarger 2010; Miller, Jenkins & Rai 2010). The
simplest alternative is the exponential decay curve, but using this gave
estimates of the total amount of gas in a well three orders of magnitude
above (Aucott & Melillo 2013).
( ), where
The value of gas at a particular time is just
is
the price of gas. The present value of gas from all wells in a site
(assuming all wells begin production at the same time) is given by
∫ (

)

(

)

The integral goes to
since this is the point at which ( )
the estimate of gas flow breaks down.
(

)

[ (

)

(

)

]

, where

(5)

We estimated these values from existing production data in
Pennsylvania and our sites from our previous study. We estimate
and
by fitting Eq. ( 4 ) to 827 production time-series across 5 counties in
Pennsylvania (taken from
https://www.paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/P
roduction/ProductionByCounty.aspx). For each well, we estimated
and
. If
or there were less than 5 data points, we discarded the
estimate, which reduced our count from 1,801 to 827 wells. We then
took the average values across the wells. We found an average ̅̅̅
(
) and ̅
(
). For the price of
gas we used 4.5465 USD per 1000 ft3 - the average wellhead price
reported between 2008 and 2012 (most recent year) from the EIA, which
is the period over which development we study took place
(http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_nus_m.htm). These data
from the EIA are at the national level but do not include Pennsylvania.
We used a discount rate of
.
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Fig. S 4.2. Development sites with grouped well permits (gray) and the Marcellus
shale play (beige). Sites were derived by overlaying production units on existing well
permits and taking contiguous land parcels under those production units by a single
operator. Of the 84 candidate sites (green polygons), 56 (black outlines) were
analyzed after transformation of Impact Scores.
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In our previous study we assumed every pad would have six wells,
but they varied by the number of pads. In Fig. S 4.3 we show the
distribution for the present-value of gas across sites. We calculated a
total volume of gas for each well at 1.4 Bcf, which is on the lower end of
the best estimates from (Aucott & Melillo 2013).

Fig. S 4.3. Distribution of gas values across our 56 study sites.
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Conclusion
As the world changes, it is critical for conservation planning as a practice
and science to change in accordance. In my dissertation I created
methods and performed analyses to advance the science and practice of
applied conservation planning. In Chapter 1 I assessed how new records
of species observations change spatial priorities in Tennessee and found
that when planning for complementary richness new observations will
continue to affect priorities in the coming years. In Chapter 2 I evaluated
the relative performance of simple planning guidelines to reduce
environmental impacts of surface infrastructure (“impacts”) for shale gas
and how such planning produces tradeoffs between impacts. I found that
while not pervasive, there are tradeoffs between impacts and that single
guidelines do not perform best across all impacts. In Chapter 3 I explored
site-level costs of reducing impacts and found heterogeneity across sites
in both the ability to reduce impacts and the relative costs of doing so. In
Chapter 4 I analyzed the cost effectiveness of different regulations for
reducing impacts across multiple sites and found large potential savings
by using a market-based, cap and trade approach as opposed to a
traditional uniform, inflexible approach.
My dissertation has many implications for conservation science
and practice. For instance, the results of Chapter 1 suggest that
biodiversity sampling is most important in the early stages of
conservation effort, but even at later points continued data collection is
useful for determining spatial priorities. The results of Chapter 2 justify
the use simple planning guidelines in sites where major impacts and
conservation priorities are few and obvious, but that tools that explicitly
reduce multiple potential impacts are called for in many places. From
Chapter 3 I can advocate that while many sites will be able to avoid
impacts inexpensively when taking an aggregate approach, a uniform
policy that requires developers to act at a median standard will push
many sites out of production, perhaps unnecessarily. Finally, the
findings of Chapter 4 endorse market-based tools for reducing impacts
from shale gas surface infrastructure, especially when regulators make
an intermediate commitment to reducing impacts.
Several important qualities of my dissertation are apparent when
looking across multiple chapters. First, I find that the granularity of
biodiversity data used to define benefits for spatial planning is influential
for planning outcomes (Sutton & Armsworth 2014). Species are not
distributed randomly on the landscape at large or small scales (Gaston
2000). Combined with the types of data – usually opportunistic,
presence-only, element occurrence points of rare species of interest – and
the result is very grainy biodiversity data. In Chapters 1 and 3 I find that
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grainy biodiversity data play a key role in my results. In Chapter 1,
biodiversity data are concentrated in relatively few sites across
Tennessee. This is partially due to the natural distribution of biodiversity
as well as sampling bias inherent in an opportunistically collected
dataset. The complementary richness of sets of sites for priority action
responded to the granularity of the biodiversity data, and this led to
qualitatively different outcomes than an approach that focused on sitespecific species richness. In Chapter 3, large differences in the numbers
of observed species between spatially adjacent habitat types produced a
very grainy planning surface for the rare spp. impact metric. As a result,
in some cases the impacts of expected infrastructure could be greatly
reduced by relatively small changes to infrastructure placement. Further,
rare spp. contributed significantly more to reductions in the Impact Score
than the other four metrics included in that chapter.
A second important quality of my dissertation is that it crosses
multiple scales in space and time. The scale of decision making is
essential to consider when designing applied conservation planning
research (Spies & Johnson 2003). In Chapters 2 and 3, I focus on sitelevel planning that takes place over a few months. At this scale,
developers and conservation groups are making decisions with
observable effects on individual organisms and populations that extend
throughout the site and to adjacent areas. This is the scale at which
development decisions most directly impact conservation priorities. In
Chapters 1 and 4 I look at a scale of planning across many sites and
longer times. At these larger scales, decisions are being made by
individuals higher in organizations and in organizations that operate at
larger scales. The information from decisions at smaller scales may play
an important role in these larger scale decisions (Spies & Johnson 2003).
Third, my dissertation chapters are all motivated by a need to do
science that is immediately useful for practice. For instance, In Chapter
1 I make recommendations for the immediate use of my results for large
scale planning in Tennessee. I also outline strategies for long-term
planning in other places, especially where conservation actions are just
beginning. In Chapter 2 I evaluate simple practices for planning surface
infrastructure to see in what situations simplified planning is sufficient
for avoiding multiple impacts. This kind of “rule of thumb” research is
often a goal of conservation groups working to create best management
practices or other strategies that can be applied without huge data or
analysis resources (pers. obs.). I go a step further in the later chapters by
creating Bungee, a decision-support tool for planning surface
infrastructure to avoid aggregate environmental impacts. Bungee is made
most directly for use by the gas industry, but also has defined uses for
conservation stakeholders and regulators (see Chapter 3 Discussion). At
the time of writing, EnSitu – the ArcMap Python toolbox that uses
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Bungee as the analysis engine – was either being used or was intended to
be used by 27 groups spanning the conservation, government, industry,
and research sectors. EnSitu is a streamlined front-end for Bungee. It
combines the individual submodules of Bungee into a simpler two-step
process in ArcMap. Bungee has its own visual interface, but running it
entails more work while offering greater flexibility within ArcMap.
Because of its streamlined structure, EnSitu is the product presented to
primary users.
One challenge I faced in my dissertation was to balance the needs
of science with the needs and limitations of conservation practice. In all
my chapters I use almost exclusively publicly available datasets, datasets
which are used in practice. These datasets are free and usually large, but
are not always of a quality or information content that ideally suits the
scientific questions being asked. However, in advancing science that
advances practice, it is important to reflect the decision processes and
inputs used by decision makers. Another notable place where my science
met conservation practice is in the design of Bungee. The planning
problem addressed by Bungee is one that, in order to solve globally for
realistic scenarios, would take massive computational resources and/or
a very long time. However, in designing Bungee as a tool for use outside
of academia, we constrained ourselves to solutions that could be derived
on the order of hours on a desktop personal computer. As a result,
Bungee is actually useful for surface infrastructure planning, though at a
cost of confidence in the overall (i.e. global) optimality of results.
There is no shortage of free spatial conservation planning tools,
and as a result much of conservation is (sometimes inappropriately)
performed with existing tools (pers. obs.). In my dissertation and with
Bungee I took a different approach. I chose to design a tool for a specific
conservation planning problem, namely the planning of shale gas surface
infrastructure to avoid multiple environmental impacts. This decision
created some distinct advantages, the largest of which is that I was able
to tailor my solution to that problem rather than sacrifice on the
relevance of the solution. As a result, my scientific findings address the
problem more accurately and represent the actual decision process more
directly. In addition, end users of Bungee benefit because they can work
in an environment more similar to their experiences, which increases
buy-in and encourages appropriate use of the software. At the same time,
tailoring of software presents challenges relative to using existing tools,
since programming, datasets, test scenarios, case studies, and
documentation must all be created from scratch. The time and effort to
tailor solutions to problems is worthwhile if it leads to those solutions
being used in practice.
Bungee is not another Marxan (http://www.uq.edu.au/marxan/)
or Zonation (http://cbig.it.helsinki.fi/software/zonation), two of the most
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widely used conservation planning programs, because it takes a
fundamentally different approach to conservation. First, the perspective
is an intentional balance between conservation and development. On the
surface, Bungee is a decision support tool for placing shale gas surface
infrastructure. Using EnSitu (the visual interface) can be as simple as
inputting two development-related shapefiles and clicking ‘Go’. However,
the primary driver of infrastructure placement is a suite of conservationbased, ecologically relevant environmental impact metrics. It is because
of this balance that I normally think of Bungee’s planning task as
‘conservation-oriented development’. Second, Bungee plans multiple
explicitly interacting geometries. It is not uncommon for spatially nonadditive – think complementary richness – objectives to be part of
conservation planning tools (Sarkar et al. 2006). But how Bungee differs
is by planning well pad (points/polygons), road (lines), and pipeline
(lines) features together in a way that goes beyond picking pixels to
instead pick spatial configurations that would not be derived by thinking
of the geometries independently. Third, Bungee represents a move from
‘where to protect’ to ‘where to condemn’. This is not the first time such
an approach has been taken (Moilanen 2012), but it is a recognition and
acceptance that threats to conservation priorities are increasingly best
handled by moderating those threats rather than attempting to prevent
them.
Bungee is not limited to planning in the Marcellus shale play or to
shale gas, but neither are its applications limitless. Within the shale gas
context, Bungee will be most useful in its current form in areas where 1)
the shale is moderately uniform thickness, 2) multiple well pads with
flexible locations are planned simultaneously, and 3) impacts are
spatially variable over small (tens of meters) scale. The Marcellus play in
Appalachia is by design the most natural place for using Bungee, but
groups in other parts of the U.S. and distant countries see low-effort
extensions of the tool. Bungee could also be used for planning outside
shale gas. In Chapter 3 I draw an analogy to rural home development,
which is a comfortable context in which Bungee could be applied.
Bungee could also be used to plan wind or solar installations. All of these
applications can be achieved with little or no modification to the
software, provided the main planning and impacting features are roads,
transmission lines, and point/polygon features. Bungee is limited,
however, in the scale of analysis. At the moment, the tool plans at 30-m
pixel resolution. At resolutions coarser than ~60 m or finer than ~10 m,
some of the built in assumptions of the software will be violated. This
precludes two natural uses of the tool, which are to do fine scale final
planning of infrastructure and separately to simultaneously plan
infrastructure over whole regions.
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One future research direction is to apply my fairly general methods
to similar analyses at multiple scales across the globe. Since all of my
chapters aim at providing recommendations for conservation practice
now, performing such analyses in new places would benefit practitioners
in those regions immediately. The challenges of applying my methods
elsewhere are largely data challenges. In some of the places where my
methods would be most useful, data are sparse and/or poorly
maintained, and the only remedy is to collect data and perform
intermediate analyses. In particular, using Bungee in new regions would
also require an evaluation of conservation priorities, formulation of
metrics of impact, and confirmation of model assumptions, none of
which are trivial tasks.
Other possible research extensions include longer-term and
ongoing research, especially with regards to shale gas development,
which would increase the certainty of my results. Especially useful would
be to see how implementing some of my recommendations affect the
outcomes of future conservation-relevant activities. For instance, a
comparison of development using 1) standard practices versus 2) Bungee
versus 3) rules of thumb could strengthen the case for informed spatial
planning I undertook. In addition, examining long time series of the
effects of additional data on spatial priorities would inform the generality
of my Chapter 1 results. Testing my assumptions about market
dynamics and developer behavior in Chapter 4 in the lab using human
subjects would inform the cost effectiveness of cap and trade for shale
gas (Cason & Gangadharan 2003).
One question my dissertation raises is what should be the balance of
regulated versus voluntary reduction of environmental impacts from
shale gas development. On one hand, the primary goal of creating
Bungee is to provide a tool for the gas industry to incorporate
environmental priorities in their planning at low or no cost and minimal
effort to them. Currently there are few strong incentives for the industry
to go above and beyond regulation using Bungee. Namely, the main
incentives I have identified are 1) to promote an environmentally friendly
image, 2) to adhere to a personal or mission-based conservation ethic,
and 3) to reveal the financial bottom-line (pers. obs.). Those incentives
are probably overwhelmed by more certain financial incentives. However,
pressure from society to be green may change that. On the other hand,
new regulations can create incentives, e.g. by creating a market for
impacts. However, there are many issues with creating new regulations.
New regulations require administration, research, and infrastructure, all
of which can be costly (Stavins 1995; Falconer, Dupraz & Whitby 2001;
Joshi, Krishnan & Lave 2001). Poorly designed regulations can create
moral hazards in which developers are incentivized to harm the
environment more (Ozanne, Hogan & Colman 2001). Lastly, new
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regulations that internalize environmental externalities will be politically
controversial and thus harder to institute. Though my dissertation does
not inform the feasibility of reducing impacts voluntarily versus through
regulation, it does provide information and tools for both resolutions.
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